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SEXUAL ETHICS AND POSTMODERNISM IN
GAY RIGHTS PHILOSOPHY
CARLOS A. BALL
In this Article, Professor Ball uses the writings of Michel Foucault
on ethics as a care of the self to explore the meaning of a
contemporary gay and lesbian sexual ethic. Professor Ball argues
that the legal, medical, and moral decodification of same-gender
sexuality that has taken place in the United States in the last forty
years has led to the emergence of a gay and lesbian sexual ethic
defined by values such as openness, mutuality, and pleasure.
Professor Ball analogizes the emergence of this sexual ethic to the
ethics as practices of freedom in ancient Greece and Rome as
identified by Foucault. A gay and lesbian sexual ethic, Professor
Ball argues, offers a powerful alternative to the traditional
Christian sexual ethic that makes moral judgments based, in part,
on the nature of particular sexual acts. Professor Ball also
explores the role that the capacity for autonomy plays in the
development of a gay and lesbian sexual ethic as he seeks to find a
middle ground between postmodernist and liberal supporters of
gay rights.
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INTRODUCTION
Opponents of gay rights often dismiss the sexual practices of
lesbians and gay men as being either immoral or morally worthless.'
Many of these critics abide by a conception of sexual morality and
ethics that limits the range of acceptable sexual conduct to that
engaged in by individuals of different genders, preferably within the
institution of marriage2 From this perspective, although society may
1. See, e.g., John M. Finnis, Law, Morality, and "Sexual Orientation," 69 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 1049, 1063-76 (1994); Robert P. George & Gerard V. Bradley, Marriage
and the Liberal Imagination, 84 GEO. L.J. 301,313-18 (1995); see also Norman Podhoretz,
How the Gay Rights Movement Won, COMMENT., Nov. 1, 1996, at 32, 41 (arguing that
"promiscuity is an intrinsic and all but inescapable component of male homosexuality");
Symposium, Sex and God in American Politics: What Conservatives Really Think, POL'Y
REV., Summer 1984, at 12,24 ("[Homosexuality] is like prostitution. Nobody can stop you
if you want to be a prostitute or to patronize a prostitute, but you are not going to force us
to say that it is morally acceptable.") (quoting conservative activist Phillis Schlafly).
In his recent study of the attitudes of middle-class Americans, the sociologist Alan
Wolfe found that many of those he surveyed "had no trouble finding these words, all of
which cropped up in [his] interviews when the subject of homosexuality was raised:
'abnormal,' 'immoral,' 'sinful,' 'unacceptable,' 'sick,' 'unhealthy,' 'untrustworthy,'
'mentally ill,' 'wrong,' 'perverted,' and 'mentally deficient.'" Alan Wolfe, The
Homosexual Exception, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1998, § 6 (Magazine), at 46. For a further
discussion of Wolfe's findings, see ALAN WOLFE, ONE NATION, AFTER ALL 72-81
(1998).
2. See George & Bradley, supra note 1, at 302 (arguing that "'reproductive-type
acts' of spouses.., have.., special value and moral significance"); see also John Finnis,
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have prudential reasons for not criminalizing same-gender sexual
acts, it should never view such sex as moral. In fact, opponents of
state recognition of same-sex marriage often base their opposition on
the perceived immorality of same-gender sexual conduct, which they
argue constitutes a threat to the values system inherent in the
traditional view of marriage.
3
Conservatives, then, have largely monopolized the discussion of
sexual morality and ethics in the context of gay rights. In the last few
decades, however, lesbians and gay men have constructed a distinct
sexual ethic with its own processes and values. These processes and
values challenge the conventional notion held by opponents of gay
rights that sexual morality and ethics are only on one (their) side of
the gay rights controversies that are part of our nation's moral,
political, and legal debates.
This Article explores the meaning, implications, and
philosophical underpinnings of a gay and lesbian sexual ethic. I
contend that the legal, medical, and moral decodification of
homosexuality that has taken place in the United States over the last
forty years has allowed for the emergence of a gay and lesbian sexual
ethic. Legal, medical, and moral codes that address issues of sexuality
inevitably link sexual (im)morality to particular sexual acts. A gay
and lesbian sexual ethic, on the other hand, does not rely on a
codified regime of sexual acts; instead, such an ethic is based on a
process of self-definition and self-transformation as lesbians and gay
men reflect and elaborate on the ethical meaning of their otherwise
socially-marginalized sexual practices. This process of self-definition
and self-transformation has led to the emergence of a gay and lesbian
sexual ethic with a normative content based on the values of
openness, mutuality, and pleasure in sexual relations.'
The Good of Marriage and the Morality of Sexual Relations: Some Philosophical and
Historical Observations, 42 AM. J. JURIS. 97, 97-98 (1997) (noting that "sex acts are
immoral when they are 'against the good of marriage' "); Patrick Lee & Robert P. George,
What Sex Can Be: Self-Alienation, Illusion, or One-Flesh Union, 42 AM. J. JURIS. 135, 135
(1997) (arguing "that sexual acts are morally right only within marriage").
3. See, e.g., Betsy Hart, Editorial, An Attack on Marriage, CHI. SUN TIMES, Dec. 27,
1999, at 35; Robert H. Knight, Editorial, Say No to "Counterfeit Marriage," USA TODAY,
Mar. 15, 2000, at 30A; Mark Paschall, Editorial, Anything Other than One Man Marrying
One Woman is Wrong, DENVER POST, Apr. 9,2000, at 10G. Congressman Henry Hyde,
while arguing in favor of the Domestic Marriage Act of 1996, stated that whether society
should recognize same-sex marriage "is a moral issue" and that "[p]eople don't think that
traditional marriage ought to be demeaned or trivialized by same-sex unions." SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE: PRO AND CON-A READER 225 (Andrew Sullivan ed., 1997).
4. See infra Part II.C, notes 249-322 and accompanying text.
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The most convincing foundation for a gay and lesbian sexual
ethic can be found in the writings and interviews5 of Michel Foucault,
in particular Volume II (The Use of Pleasure)6 and Volume Ill (The
Care of the Self) 7 of his History of Sexuality. Academics in general
and legal scholars in particular -have for the most part ignored these
two volumes.' In fact, although no philosopher has had a greater
impact on gay and lesbian studies than Foucault, that influence
emanates largely from The History of Sexuality, Volume I, 9 while
those interested in gay issues have largely ignored the other two
volumes.
As I explain in Part I, Foucault in The History of Sexuality,
Volume I, argues that modem societies beginning in the eighteenth
century defined sexuality through the operation of systems of
discourse, power, and knowledge. Societal forces and dynamics
created sexual subjects-including, but not limited to, homosexuals-
by assigning sexual identities to them based on their sexual conduct
and desires. In The Use of Pleasure and The Care of the Self,
however, Foucault largely ignores modem societies and instead
5. Foucault gave many interviews throughout his professional life. Several of the
interviews that he gave towards the end of his life elaborated on his conception of ethics.
Most of those are included in MICHEL FOUCAULT, ETHICS: SUBJECTIVITY AND TRUTH
(Paul Rabinow ed., 1997) [hereinafter ETHICS: SUBJECTIVITY AND TRUTH]. The most
important of these interviews are MICHEL FOUCAULT, On the Genealogy of Ethics: An
Overview of Work in Progress, in ETHICS: SUBJECTIVITY AND TRUTH, supra, at 253-80
[hereinafter FOUCAULT, On the Genealogy of Ethics], and The Ethics of the Concern for
Self as a Practice of Freedom, in ETHICS: SUBJECTIVITY AND TRUTH, supra, at 281-302
[hereinafter FOUCAULT, The Ethics of the Concern for Self].
6. 2 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: THE USE OF PLEASURE
(Robert Hurley trans., 1985) [hereinafter FOUCAULT, THE USE OF PLEASURE].
7. 3 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: THE CARE OF THE SELF
(Robert Hurley trans., 1986) [hereinafter FOUCAULT, THE CARE OF THE SELF].
8. See David H.J. Larmour et al., Introduction: Situating The History of Sexuality, in
RETHINKING SEXUALITY: FOUCAULT AND CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY 3, 34 (David H.J.
Larmour et al. eds., 1997) (noting that "the last two volumes [of The History of Sexuality]
have been relatively neglected and their provocative and stimulating theorization of
sexuality, both ancient and modern, has remained unexplored and insufficiently
analyzed").
I have been able to find only one extended discussion of The Use of Pleasure in a
law review article, see Nicholas Wolfson, Eroticism, Obscenity, Pornography and Free
Speech, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 1037, 1047-51 (1994), and no substantive discussion of The
Care of the Self. As Hugh Baxter notes, "[m]ost of Foucault's appearances in legal
scholarship are in footnotes, where he stays just long enough to create the impression that
the author is familiar with European theory, then disappears without doing any work."
Hugh Baxter, Bringing Foucault into Law and Law into Foucault, 48 STAN. L. REV. 449,
473 (1996) (book review) (footnote omitted).
9. 1 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION
(Robert Hurley trans., 1978).
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explores in great detail sexual ethics in ancient Greek and Roman
cultures. As I explain in Part I, there are two main differences
between ancient cultures and the modern cultures that Foucault
describes in The History of Sexuality, Volume I. The first difference
is the relative unimportance in antiquity of legal, religious, and moral
codes in the formation and elaboration of sexual ethics. 10 The second
difference, which is related to the first, is that in antiquity there was a
greater appreciation for the need to allow the individual to reflect and
work through what society considered to be the difficult issues of
sexual ethics." This did not mean that the individual was free to
determine his sexual ethics independently of societal norms.12
Instead, the individual was constrained by his culture's distinct
problematization of sexuality. 3 But within the confines of that
problematization, sexual ethics in ancient Greece and Rome
encouraged the individual to reflect upon the meaning and use of
sexual pleasure in order to transform himself. 4 This perspective on
the role of the individual in the elaboration of sexual norms differs
from the one we see in History of Sexuality, Volume I where the
sexual subject is little more than a byproduct of power relations and
systems of knowledge, with little room for agency or autonomy.
In Part II, I explore the role that the legal codification of sexual
norms in the United States has played in the creation of a sexual
identity category known as "the homosexual." Foucault, for reasons
that will be explained, pays insufficient attention to the role of the law
in the simultaneous formation and marginalization of a homosexual
identity. 5 The law in the United States beginning in the late
nineteenth century played an important role in the creation of a
homosexual identity, a role that tracked the discourses of science and
medicine that so interested Foucault in The History of Sexuality,
Volume 1.16
10. See infra notes 92-96 and accompanying text; infra, Part I.C, notes 104-44 and
accompanying text.
11. See infra Part I.C, notes 104-44 and accompanying text.
12. I say "his" because sexual ethics in classical antiquity were largely viewed from the
perspective of men. See infra note 104.
13. "'Ethical problematizations' pertain to the question of which part of someone, of
his or her life and actuality, requires ethical care." Marli Huijer, The Aesthetics of
Existence in the Work of Michel Foucault, PHILOSOPHY & SOCIAL CRITICISM, Mar. 1999,
at 61, 70.
14. See infra Part I.C, notes 104-44 and accompanying text.
15. See infra Part II.A.1, notes 150-57 and accompanying text.
16. See infra Part II.A.2, notes 158-219 and accompanying text.
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But our story is not only one of codification. It is also one of
legal, medical, and moral decodification. This latter process has
contributed to the emergence of a contemporary gay and lesbian
sexual ethic, in the same way that the absence of universal codes of
conduct that sought to distinguish between acceptable and
unacceptable sexual acts in ancient Greece and Rome gave
individuals the freedom they needed to create what Foucault
categorizes as the personal crafting of a sexual ethic through an
"aesthetics of existence."1 7  I argue in Part II that the partial
decodification of homosexuality in the United States has permitted
the emergence of a gay and lesbian sexual ethic characterized by the
values of openness, mutuality, and pleasure.18 Unlike the conception
of sexual morality held by the Christian tradition, and its secular
variation found in new natural law philosophy,19 a gay and lesbian
sexual ethic is not based on a codified regime of conduct that
distinguishes morality from immorality on the basis, in part, of the
nature of particular sexual acts.
Many academics have relied on The History of Sexuality, Volume
I, to argue in favor of an antiessentialist conception of human
sexuality.2 This conception holds that sexual orientation-along with
accompanying categories such as "the homosexual" and "the
heterosexual"-is a social construction that has no correspondence to
nature or truth. Postmodernist queer theory2' combines this
17. I discuss what Foucault means by an "aesthetics of existence" in infra notes 87-91
and accompanying text.
18. See infra Part II.C.2, notes 259-310 and accompanying text.
19. See infra Part II.B, notes 220-48 and accompanying text.
20. See, e.g., JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE
SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY 91-96 (1990); DAVID M. HALPERIN, SAINT FOUCAULT:
TOWARDS A GAY HAGIOGRAPHY 38-48 (1995); LADELLE MCWHORTER, BODIES AND
PLEASURES: FOUCAULT AND THE POLITICS OF SEXUAL NORMALIZATION 9-33 (1999);
MOMIN RAHMAN, SEXUALITY AND DEMOCRACY: IDENTITIES AND STRATEGIES IN
LESBIAN AND GAY POLITICS 17-47 (2000); JEFFREY WEEKS, AGAINST NATURE:
ESSAYS ON HISTORY, SEXUALITY AND IDENTITY 33-37 (1991).
21. While queer theory, as a field of academic inquiry, is not subject to easy
definitions, its origins can be traced to the dissatisfaction by many gay and lesbian
academics with the identity politics of the gay rights movement. See ANNAMARIE
JAGOSE, QUEER THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 58-71 (1996). The problem, according to
queer theorists, is that "[a] theoretical and political project which aims exclusively to
normalize homosexuals and to legitimate homosexuality as a social minority does not
challenge a social regime which perpetuates the production of subjects and social worlds
organized and regulated by the heterosexual/homosexual binary." Steven Seidman,
Deconstructing Queer Theory or the Under-Theoretization of the Social and the Ethical, in
SOCIAL POSTMODERNISM: BEYOND IDENTITY POLITICS 116, 126 (Linda Nicholson &
Steven Seidman eds., 1995). Queer theorists, then, urge a shift away from identity-based
politics to a focus on issues of discourse, knowledge, and power. As such, queer theory
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antiessentialist conception of sexuality with an antifoundationalist
moral and political philosophy that rejects universal norms and values
that apply across time and cultures and that provide some measure of
objectivity in making moral and political judgments.22 In Part III, I
question whether an antifoundationalist conception of political
morality must necessarily follow from an antiessentialist
understanding of sexual orientation. I will argue that the universalist
idea that we all share a capacity for autonomy is not inconsistent with
the view that sexual orientation categories and the meaning of sexual
acts are socially constructed. Even if our identities (sexual and
otherwise) are nothing more than the effects of social discourses and
power relations, we still retain, to some degree, a capacity to exercise
our autonomy. The need to respect and promote the capacity for
autonomy that all human beings share is a universal concern that can
contribute to the development of an alternative sexual ethic for
marginalized sexual minorities, even if the sexual identities of those
minorities form themselves entirely through a process of social
construction.
Postmodernists are quick to dismiss the concept of autonomy as
illusory because to them it suggests a subject or a self (which are the
terms they prefer to use rather than "individual") who exists apart
from its social context. As I argue in Part III, we need not view
autonomy in such a way. In fact, some contemporary liberal theorists
argue that a capacity for autonomy is recognizable and
understandable only from within social relationships and public
meanings that play crucial roles in defining the self.24 I therefore
argue that there are more similarities than differences between some
has been heavily influenced by Foucault's writings. As such, Foucault's writings have
heavily influenced queer theory. See JAGOSE, supra, at 81-83.
22. Antifoundationalism and a rejection of metanarratives are the main characteristics
of postmodernist theory. See JEAN-FRANCOIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN
CONDITION: A REPORT ON KNOWLEDGE, at xxiv (Geoff Bennington & Brian Massumi
trans., 1984); see also DOUGLAS E. LITOWrrz, POSTMODERN PHILOSOPHY AND LAW 10
(1997) (noting that postmoderists "deny the existence of a neutral and objective faculty
of reason which can be used to generate first principles of morality and law"); MICHAEL
LuNTLEY, REASON, TRUTH AND SELF: THE POSTMODERN RECONDITIONED 9 (1995)
(noting that "[t]he critical point of postmodernism is an attack on the idea that reason,
truth and self can be understood abstracted from history"); Steven Seidman & David G.
Wagner, Introduction: The Postmodern Challenge, in POSTMODERNISM AND SOCIAL
THEORY 1, 6 (Steven Seidman & David G. Wagner eds., 1992) ("Central to
postmodernism is its critique of the claim that scientific knowledge is universal and can be
justified in a noncontextual way. Postmodernists contend that standards of truth are
context-dependent.").
23. See infra notes 329-34 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 342-54 and accompanying text.
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liberal conceptions of autonomy and the postmodernist conception of
agency.
As I do in the earlier parts of the Article, I in Part III rely heavily
on Foucault's conception of ethics as presented in his writings and
interviews from the later period of his life. In my estimation,
Foucault's later work can lead to greater understanding between
postmodernists and liberals. Instead of dismissing postmodernism as
relativistic about human values and pessimistic about the possibility
of freedom s or alternatively, viewing liberal values as sources of
oppression and domination, 6 the later Foucault can help us focus on
common ground. On the one hand, I want to reach out to
postmodernists by relying on the work of one of their philosophical
heroes (or saints)27 to explain how the conception of agency held by
many of them is not terribly different from some liberal conceptions
of autonomy. On the other hand, by emphasizing that Foucault, at
least in his later years, believed that we can contribute to our own
conditions of freedom and that we are, as a result, not always the
helpless pawns of power relations beyond our control, I hope to
convince liberals that there is real value in Foucault's writings.
I. FOUCAULT AND SEXUAL ETHIcs
While academic commentators interested in issues of sexual
orientation have paid enormous attention to The History of Sexuality,
25. This accusation has been a standard one leveled at Foucault by some of his critics.
See, e.g., Charles Taylor, Foucault on Freedom and Truth, in FOUCAULT: A CRITICAL
READER 69, 69 (David Couzens Hoy ed., 1986) [hereinafter FOUCAULT: A CRITICAL
READER]; Michael Walzer, The Politics of Michel Foucault, in FOUCAULT: A CRITICAL
READER, supra, at 51-52; see also Nancy Fraser, Foucault on Modern Power: Empirical
Insights and Normative Confusions, 1 PRAXIS INT'L 272, 281-86 (1981) (arguing that
Foucault posits a conception of power that refuses to take normative positions). It is
interesting that in North America, it is communitarian philosophers such as Taylor and
Walzer who have criticized Foucault for his supposed rejection of notions such as freedom
and truth. American liberal philosophers, such as John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin, have
not even attempted to engage Foucault.
26. See, e.g., HONI FERN HABER, BEYOND POSTMODERN POLITICS: LYOTARD,
RORTY, FOUCAULT 1 (1994) (arguing that the liberal values of objectivity and rationality
are often "used to justify the dominance of white, patriarchal, classist, and racist
regimes"); HALPERIN, supra note 20, at 123 (noting that "lesbians and gay men.., far
from having been beneficiaries of liberal, humanist notions of freedom, truth, and
rationality, have tended rather to be the targets of a new kind of terror carried out in the]
name" of those ideals); Allan C. Hutchinson, The Three "Rs". Reading/Rorty/Radically,
103 HARv. L. REv. 555, 564 (1989) (book review) (arguing that "liberal
institutions.., have helped to create [a cumulative state of affairs]" characterized by
"patriarchy, racism, economic inequality, and the continual threat of nuclear holocaust
and environmental destruction").
27. See HALPERIN, supra note 20.
[Vol. 80
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Volume I, I they have paid much less attention to Foucault's writings
on sex and sexuality that followed the publication of that book. In
Part I.A, I summarize Volume I and explain its implications for an
antiessentialist understanding of sexual orientation. In Part I.B, I
describe Foucault's post-Volume I shift on issues of sexuality from a
focus on pervasive and hegemonic power relations and systems of
knowledge to a focus on the ability of the subject to transform itself
through practices of freedom. For Foucault, practices of freedom are
the constitutive elements of an ethical life. In Part I.C, I explore what
Foucault takes to be the practices of freedom that constituted sexual
ethics in ancient Greece and Rome.
A. The History of Sexuality, Volume I
In The History of Sexuality, Volume I, Foucault explains how the
discourse on sexuality in Western countries went through a
transformation in the seventeenth century. At the beginning of that
century, "sexual practices had little need of secrecy."2 9  People
discussed sexual matters openly and "[c]odes regulating the coarse,
the obscene, and the indecent were quite lax. ' 30 By the end of the
century, however, what we can characterize as the modern era of
sexuality began. Two principal phenomena defined this era. First,
areas of enforced silence were established where matters of sexuality
were not to be discussed; these areas included the relationship
"between parents and children, for instance, or teachers and pupils,
or masters and domestic servants.' At the same time, a second
phenomenon took place, namely, an explosion of discourses
concerning sex. Through discourses of science, medicine, and
psychiatry, so-called experts began to study and analyze sex at a great
level of detail. Different disciplines sought to schematize human
sexuality through an endless discussion and cataloging of sexual
desires, tendencies, and acts. That schematization centered around
four different axes: (1) the hysterization of women's bodies; (2) the
pedagogization of children's sex; (3) the socialization of procreative
behavior; and (4) the psychiatrization of pleasure that was deemed to
be perverse.3" As Foucault notes, "[u]nder the authority of a
28. See BUTLER, supra note 20, at 91-96; HALPERIN, supra note 20, at 38-48;
MCWHORTER, supra note 20, at 9-33; RAHMAN, supra note 20, at 17-47; WEEKS, supra
note 20, at 33-37.
29. FOUCAULT, supra note 9, at 3.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 18.
32. See id. at 104-05.
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language that had been carefully expurgated so that it was no longer
directly named, sex was taken charge of, tracked down as it were, by a
discourse that aimed to allow it no obscurity, no respite.
'33
It is possible to view the two phenomena mentioned above,
namely, the establishment of areas of silence and of intense discourse,
as dichotomous and contradictory. In fact, however, the two were
very much interrelated. This relationship is perhaps clearest in
nineteenth century Victorian sexual norms that simultaneously
silenced and incited sexuality. In the Victorian bourgeoisie home,
"silence [was] the rule. The legitimate and procreative couple laid
down the law. The couple imposed itself as model, enforced the
norm, safeguarded the truth, and reserved the right to speak while
retaining the principle of secrecy." 3 At the same time, however, well-
established institutional discourses regarding sexuality represented "a
political, economic, and technical incitement to talk about sex. And
not so much in the form of a general theory of sexuality as in the form
of analysis, stocktaking, classification, and specification, and of
quantitative or causal studies."'35 Studies of populations, of birthrates
and the appropriate age to marry, of fertility and infertility, of
childhood sexuality, of sexual normality and abnormality, of sexual
crimes and other infractions against nature, and of debilitating and
frustrating sexual desires all created a discourse on sexuality that was
extensive and multifaceted 6 "What is peculiar to modern societies,"
Foucault writes, "is not that they consigned sex to a shadow existence,
but that they dedicated themselves to speaking of it ad infinitum,
while exploiting it as the secret."'37
In The History of Sexuality, Volume I, Foucault seeks to show-
as he had done earlier with mental illness,38 medicine,39 and penal
discipline 4 -the hegemony of power.41 His objective is:
33. Id. at 20.
34. Id. at 3.
35. Id. at 23-24.
36. See id. at 23-26.
37. Id. at 35.
38. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION: A HISTORY OF
INSANITY IN THE AGE OF REASON (Richard Howard trans., 1973).
39. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE BIRTH OF THE CLINIC: AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF
MEDICAL PERCEPTION (A. M. Sheridan Smith trans., 1973).
40. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON
(Alan Sheridan trans., 1979). Foucault was interested in "the relations between
experiences (like madness, illness, transgression of laws, sexuality, self-identity),
knowledge (like psychiatry, medicine, criminology, sexology, psychology), and power
(such as the power which is wielded in psychiatric and penal institutions, and in all other
institutions which deal with individual control)." Michel Foucault, Omnes et Singulatum:
[Vol. 80
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to locate the forms of power, the channels it takes, and the
discourses it permeates in order to reach the most tenuous
and individual modes of behavior, the paths that give it
access to the rare or scarcely perceivable forms of desire,
how it penetrates and controls everyday pleasure-all this
entailing effects that may be those of refusal, blockage, and
invalidation, but also incitement and intensification: in
short, the "polymorphous techniques of power."'42
According to Foucault, observation, surveillance, and classification by
scientists and social scientists alike create regimes of discipline from
which emanate diffuse and noncentralized sources of power. Medical
hospitals, mental hospitals, prisons, schools, and other institutions
develop their own disciplinary techniques that are reflected in the
power relations used to train, regulate, and control people.43 The
liberal fixation with the abuse of power by the state and the Marxist
fixation with the abuse of power by the ruling classes are unsatisfying
for Foucault because they largely ignore the dispersed regimes of
power found everywhere in society. "Power is not something that is
acquired, seized, or shared, something that one holds on to or allows
to slip away; power is exercised from innumerable points, in the
interplay of nonegalitarian and mobile relations."'  From this
perspective, individuals are constituted by systems of knowledge
(such as medicine and psychiatry) and power relations; there is
nothing to the individual-including his or her sexuality-that is
Towards a Criticism of "Political Reason," in THE TANNER LECrURES ON HUMAN
VALUES 223,239 (Sterling M. McMurrin ed., 1981).
41. Foucault's earlier works were archeological and genealogical. The former entails
the study of truth as a form of representation and discourse. The latter entails the study of
truth as a form of domination, subjugation, and power. See Arnold I. Davidson,
Archaeology, Genealogy, Ethics, in FOUCAULT: A CRITICAL READER, supra note 25, at
221-27. In his later work, Foucault was interested mostly in ethics, which he conceived to
be "a study of the self's relationship to itself." Id. at 228. I discuss Foucault's conception
of ethics in infra Parts I.B and I.C, notes 63-144 and accompanying text.
42. FOUCAULT, supra note 9, at 11.
43. See generally FOUCAULT, supra note 38 (discussing mental institutions);
FOUCAULT, supra note 39 (discussing medical hospitals); FOUCAULT, supra note 40
(discussing prisons). David Halperin explains Foucault's conception of power as follows:
Power is not a possession of the Monarch or the Father or the State, and people
cannot be divided into those who "have" it and those who don't. Instead, power
is what characterizes the complex relations among the parts of a particular
society-and the interactions among individuals in that society-as relations of
ongoing struggle. Power is thus a dynamic situation, whether personal, social or
institutional: it is not a quantum of force but a strategic, unstable relation.
HALPERIN, supra note 20, at 16-17.
44. FOUCAULT, supra note 9, at 94.
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either natural or true.45 What we consider to be natural or true about
ourselves is nothing more than the effects of societal forces as
reflected in systems of knowledge and power relations.46
As a result, according to Foucault, the promise of liberation from
repression, proposed by psychiatry in general and Freud in particular
offers a dangerous hope. The possibility of overcoming repression
suggests the possibility of liberation, of being outside of relations of
power. But Foucault argues that such a liberation is impossible.47 In
fact, there is in The History of Sexuality, Volume I, little sense that
the subject is its own agent; there is very little hope that the self can
be anything but one that is defined and constrained by the discourses
that are themselves effects of power relations. Neither truth in a
universal sense nor individual agency provides any solace or hope for
liberation from power relations.
Foucault's view of power, as well as his rejection of philosophical
metaprinciples of truth and justice in The History of Sexuality,
Volume I (as well as in his earlier work), places him firmly in the
postmodernist camp and subjects him to criticism by those who find
45. As Foucault notes:
Sexuality must not be thought of as a kind of natural given which power tries to
hold in check, or as an obscure domain which knowledge tries gradually to
uncover. It is the name that can be given to a historical construct: not a furtive
reality that is difficult to grasp, but a great surface network in which the
stimulation of bodies, the intensification of pleasures, the incitement to
discourse, the formation of special knowledges, the strengthening of controls and
resistances, are linked to one another, in accordance with a few major strategies
of knowledge and power.
FOUCAULT, supra note 9, at 105-06; see also HALPERIN, supra note 20, at 40 ("In The
History of Sexuality, Volume I, Foucault ... treats sexuality not as a thing, a natural
reality, but as the necessary instrument and determinate effect of an entire series of
discursive and political strategies.").
46. Foucault in Discipline and Punish provides the following explanation of the
connection between knowledge and power:
We should admit.., that power produces knowledge (and not simply by
encouraging it because it serves power or applying it because it is useful); that
power and knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation
without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge
that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations ....
[T]he subject who knows, the objects to be known and the modalities of
knowledge must be regarded as so many effects of these fundamental
implications of power/knowledge and their historical transformations.
FOUCAULT, supra note 40, at 27-28.
47. See FOUCAULT, supra note 9, at 5-10.
48. "Foucault induces skepticism about post-Kantian dogmas of universalist history,
anthropological foundation, and master schemes.... In the place of universalist narrative,
he looks for the plurality and singularity of our origins; in the place of unified science or
rationality, he looks for many changing practices of knowledge." JOHN RAJCHMAN,
MICHEL FOUCAULT: THE FREEDOM OF PHILOSOPHY 3 (1985); see also MADAN SARUP,
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his vision overly pessimistic and relativistic.4 9 While Foucault remains
a controversial figure among non-postmodernist philosophers, queer
theorists openly embrace his conception of sexuality as presented in
Volume I. °  It is no coincidence, they argue, that the term
"homosexual" first appeared at the end of the nineteenth century,
when the modernist discourses of sexuality were at their apogee.51 In
an effort to categorize, analyze, and schematize human sexuality,
political, religious, scientific, and medical systems of power and
knowledge imposed an identity (and a discourse) on those individuals
who engaged in same-gender sexual conduct. What before had been
viewed simply as sexual acts (such as sodomy) now became the basis
for a socially constructed identity. As Foucault quips, "[t]he sodomite
had been a temporary aberration; the homosexual was now a
species. '
Queer theorists argue that because sexual identities such as the
"homosexual" arise from particular societal contexts and discourses,
sexual orientation cannot be an essential or constitutive part of
human beings that is in any way natural or universal 3 Society both
creates the category of "the homosexual" and then seeks to
marginalize it by contrasting its supposed perversity to the normality
of the other socially constructed category, namely, "the
IDENTITY, CULTURE AND THE POSTMODERN WORLD 69 (1996) (noting that Foucault
"objects to historicism and western humanism to the extent that they assume a continuous
development, progress and global totalisation").
49. See Taylor, supra note 25, at 69; Walzer, supra note 25, at 51.
50. "While relatively mainstream philosophers, historians, and political theorists
insisted that Foucault's work could never form the basis for or even aid any successful
political movement, queer readers were making Foucault a part of their intellectual lives."
MCWHORTER, supra note 20, at xv.
51. See DAVID M. HALPERIN, ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF HOMOSEXUALITY 15
(1990); JONATHAN NED KATZ, GAY/LESBIAN ALMANAC: A NEW DOCUMENTARY 147-
50 (1983).
52. FOUCAULT, supra note 9, at 43. Foucault argued that while under "ancient civil
or canonical codes, sodomy was a category of forbidden acts ... [in t]he nineteenth-
century [the] homosexual became a personage, a past, a case history, and a childhood, in
addition to being a type of life, a life form, and a morphology .... Nothing that went into
his total composition was unaffected by his sexuality." Id.
53. David Halperin summarizes the constructionist position as follows:
Sexuality... is not, as it often pretends to be, a universal feature of human life
in every society .... [S]exuality does not refer to some positive physical
property-such as the property of being anatomically sexed-that exists
independently of culture; it does not rightly denote some common aspect or
attribute of bodies. Unlike sex, which is a natural fact, sexuality is a cultural
production: it represents the appropriation of the human body and of its
erogenous zones by an ideological discourse.
HALPERIN, supra note 51, at 25 (citations omitted).
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heterosexual."'54 Queer theorists, therefore, follow Foucault in
contending that there is no objective essence and no universal truth to
human sexuality. The perceived abnormality of homosexuality is the
result of contemporary power struggles for domination of the
discourse on sexuality. The focus, queer theorists argue, needs to be
on recasting the discourse with the understanding that stepping
outside of the power relations that determine the nature of the
discourse is impossible.'
Some scholars take issue with the antiessentialism of
postmodernist queer theory. 6 These thinkers believe "that there are
objective, intrinsic, culture-independent facts about what a person's
sexual orientation is."' 57  For these writers, there have always been
homosexuals, even if different societies have perceived them in
different ways at different times.58  Studies suggesting the possibility
of a biological or physiological basis for sexual orientation have
added some support to the essentialist position,5 9 though the meaning
of those studies remains highly controversial.60
54. See HALPERIN, supra note 20, at 44-48; MCWHORTER, supra note 20, at 32-33.
The relationship between homosexuality and heterosexuality is a dynamic one that goes
beyond the simple binarism of one dominating and marginalizing the other. Instead, each
category is defined by the other in an ongoing and fluid process. See EVE KOSOFSKY
SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET 9-10 (1990); see also JONATHAN
DOLLIMORE, SEXUAL DISSIDENCE: AUGUSTINE TO WILDE, FREUD TO FOUCAULT 28
(1991) (noting that "the negation of homosexuality has been in direct proportion to its
symbolic centrality; its cultural marginality in direct proportion to its cultural
significance").
55. See, e.g., MCWHORTER, supra note 20, at 97-98; David M. Halperin, Historicizing
the Subject of Desire: Sexual Preferences and Erotic Identities in the Pseudo-Lucianic
Erotes, in FOUCAULT AND THE WRITING OF HISTORY 19, 21-23 (Jan Goldstein ed.,
1994).
56. See, e.g., RICHARD D. MOHR, GAY IDEAS: OUTING AND OTHER
CONTROVERSIES 221-42 (1992); John Boswell, Categories, Experience and Sexuality, in
FORMS OF DESIRE: SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONIST
CONTROVERSY 133-73 (Edward Stein ed., 1990) [hereinafter FORMS OF DESIRE].
57. Edward Stein, Introduction, in FORMS OF DESIRE, supra note 56, at 5.
58. See Boswell, supra note 56, at 158-67.
59. See, e.g., J. Michael Bailey & Richard C. Pillard, A Genetic Study of Male Sexual
Orientation, 48 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1089, 1090-95 (1991); Dean H. Hamer et
al., A Linkage Between DNA Markers on the X Chromosome and Male Sexual Orientation,
261 SCI. 321, 321-26 (1993); Simon LeVay, A Difference in the Hypothalamic Structure
Between Heterosexual and Homosexual Men, 253 Sci. 1034, 1034-36 (1991).
60. Many scholars question the validity and significance of the studies. See, e.g.,
MCWHORTER, supra note 20, at 13-34; EDWARD STEIN, THE MISMEASURE OF DESIRE:
THE SCIENCE, THEORY, AND ETHICS OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION 190-228 (1999); Janet E.
Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the Argument from
Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REV. 503,529-46 (1994).
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I do not here take a position on the constructionism versus
essentialism debate on matters of sexual orientation. That debate has
received sufficient attention elsewhere.61 I assume for purposes of
this Article that queer theorists are correct that sexual orientation
categories are socially constructed and that there is nothing of essence
or universal about them.62 I make this assumption because I do not
think it undermines my broader point, namely, that even if discourses
and power relations define a subject's sexuality, it is still possible to
promote a sexual ethic that leaves a significant role for him or her as
an autonomous agent who can engage in self-defining and self-
transformative practices. In order to begin supporting this view, I
turn now to Foucault's later writings and interviews on sexual ethics.
B. Foucault's Shift
After Foucault published The History of Sexuality, Volume I, it
took him an additional eight years to publish Volume II (The Use of
Pleasure)63 and Volume II (The Care of the Self). 61 During those
intervening years, Foucault redirected his philosophical interests. He
spoke about the change shortly before his death in a 1984 interview
titled "The Ethics of the Concern for Self as a Practice of Freedom."
65
Foucault's inquiries shifted away from a study of the hegemony and
coercive practices of disciplines and professions and towards an
interest in asceticism, "not in the sense of a morality of renunciation
but as an exercise of the self on the self by which one attempts to
develop and transform oneself, and to attain... a certain mode of
61. For extensive discussions of this issue from many different perspectives, see the
essays collected in FORMS OF DESIRE, supra note 56; DENNIS ALTMAN ET AL.,
HOMOSEXUALITY, WHICH HOMOSEXUALITY?: INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
GAY AND LESBIAN STUDIES (Anja van Kooten & Theo van der Meer eds., 1989). The
essentialist/constructionist debate in the context of sexual orientation has also received
considerable attention in the law reviews. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Social
Constructionist Critique of Posner's Sex and Reason: Steps Toward a Gaylegal Agenda,
102 YALE L.i. 333, 365-75 (1992); Halley, supra note 60, at 546-66; Janet E. Halley, The
Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protection for Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Identity,
36 UCLA L. REV. 915, 932-46 (1989); Daniel R. Ortiz, Creating Controversy:
Essentialism, Constructivism and the Politics of Gay Identity, 79 VA. L. REV. 1833, 1843-50
(1993).
62. Scholars such as Halperin take this position, arguing that "sexuality is not lodged
in our bodies, in our hormones, or in our genitals, but resides in our discursive and
institutional practices as well as in the experiences which they construct." Halperin, supra
note 55, at 33. Halperin adds, rather bluntly, that "there is no orgasm... without
ideology." Id. at 34.
63. See FOUCAULT, supra note 6.
64. See FOUCAULT, supra note 7.
65. See FOUCAULT, The Ethics of the Concern for Self, supra note 5.
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being. '6 6  Individuals in ancient Greek and Roman civilizations
practiced this care of the self to a much greater extent than those in
the modern era;67 for this reason, Foucault turned his attention to
antiquity, writing Volumes II and III of The History of Sexuality
about an era that came centuries before the one he discussed in
Volume I.
In the interview, Foucault makes clear that power is omnipresent
(a point he had made many times before), but such omnipresence is
not inconsistent with freedom (a point he did not emphasize
previously). For Foucault, power exists in all human relationships,
including those not directly connected to political or social
institutions.' Power relations exist whenever "one person tries to
control the conduct of the other,"6 9 which encompasses just about any
form of human interaction, including "amorous, institutional, [and]
economic relationships. '7  But we should not despair about the
omnipresence of power relations because those relations are "mobile,
reversible, and unstable."' 71 Power relations have these characteristics
precisely because the individuals who are their subjects retain some
freedom.72 Foucault explains this as follows:
[I]n power relations there is necessarily the possibility of
resistance because if there were no possibility of resistance
(of violent resistance, flight, deception, strategies capable of
reversing the situation), there would be no power relations
at all. This being the general form, I refuse to reply to the
question I am sometimes asked: "But if power is
66. Id. at 282.
67. Foucault notes that when discussing issues of morality and ethics, we are much
more comfortable today with the concept of "knowing oneself" than we are with "caring
for oneself." But the latter "was, for the Greeks, one of the main principles of cities, one
of the main rules for social and personal conduct and for the art of life." MICHEL
FOUCAULT, Technologies of the Self, in ETHICS: SUBJECTIVITY & TRUTH, supra note 5,
at 223, 226 [hereinafter FOUCAULT, Technologies of the Self]. In contrast,, today "[w]e
find it difficult to base rigorous morality and austere principles on the precept that we
should give more care to ourselves than to anything else in the world." Id. at 228. For the
Greeks, as for the later Foucault, however, "th[e] critical function of philosophy derives
from the Socratic injunction 'Take care of yourself,' in other words, '[m]ake freedom your
foundation, through the mastery of yourself.'" FOUCAULT, The Ethics of the Concern for
Self, supra note 5, at 301.
68. "[W]hen one speaks of power, people immediately think of a political structure, a
government, a dominant social class, the master and the slave, and so on. I am not
thinking of this at all when I speak of relations of power." FOUCAULT, The Ethics of the
Concern for Self, supra note 5, at 291.
69. Id. at 292.
70. Id. at 291.
71. Id. at 292.
72. See id. at 291-92.
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everywhere, there is no freedom." I answer that if there are
relations of power in every social field, this is because there
is freedom everywhere.73
Domination-as opposed to power relations-exists when there
is no possibility of resistance, that is, when resistance proves to be
"only stratagems that never succeedf] in reversing the situation." 74
The main difference between power and domination is that the
former allows for freedom while the latter does not.75 Domination
exists when the relations of power are "perpetually asymmetrical and
allow an extremely limited margin of freedom. '7 6  As an example,
Foucault points to the domination of women by men "in the
conventional marital structure of the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries."'  Foucault, however, emphasizes that "[t]he idea that
power is a system of domination that controls everything and leaves
no room for freedom cannot be attributed to me."78
While Foucault in The History of Sexuality, Volume I, had noted
that resistance is a constitutive element of power,7 9 he was by 1984
much more explicit in his acknowledgment that the possibility of
resistance means the possibility of freedom. This new focus on the
possibility and practices of freedom calls for a different (or perhaps
more complete) view of the self. The self in Foucault's prior
73. Id. at 292.
74. Id.
75. As Foucault notes:
Power is exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are free. By
this we mean individual or collective subjects who are faced with a field of
possibilities in which several ways of behaving, several reactions and diverse
comportments may be realized. Where the determining factors saturate the
whole there is no relationship of power; slavery is not a power relationship when
man is in chains.
Michel Foucault, Afterword: The Subject and the Power, in HUBERT L. DREYFUs & PAUL
RABINOW, BEYOND STRUCrURALISM AND HERMENEUTICS 208,221 (2d ed. 1983).
76. FOUCAULT, The Ethics of the Concern for Self, supra note 5, at 292.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 293; see Huijer, supra note 13, at 66 (noting that for Foucault "[f]reedom in
the form of resistance is a condition for exerting powers").
Taylor and Walzer, among others, have charged that Foucault rejected the
possibility of freedom. See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 25, at 69; Walzer, supra note 25, at 51.
For defenses of Foucault on the charge, see, for example, Andrew W. Lamb, Freedom, the
Self, and Ethical Practice According to Michel Foucault, 35 INT'L PHIL. Q. 449, 462-63
(1995) (explaining that, according to Foucault, although power is present in every
relationship, it contributes to freedom by allowing for the possibility of overcoming limits);
Barry Smart, On the Subjects of Sexuality, Ethics, and Politics in the Work of Foucault,
BOUNDARY 2, at 201, 215-18 (1991) (noting weaknesses in the arguments of Foucault's
critics). I return to this issue in Part III.A, infra notes 326-87 and accompanying text.
79. See FOUCAULT, supra note 9, at 95-96.
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writings-including in The History of Sexuality, Volume I-was
passive, as he emphasized how power relations and systems of
knowledge constitute it."0 While Foucault had recognized the
possibility of resistance, he was in his earlier work not particularly
explicit (or optimistic) about the nature of such resistance. The later
Foucault, however, became explicitly interested in the concept of
freedom and in how "the subject constitutes itself in an active fashion
through practices of the self."81  Foucault's later work focuses on
ethics, which he defines as "the kind of relationship you ought to have
with yourself ... and which determines how the individual is
supposed to constitute himself as a moral subject of his own
actions."'  What does remain constant in Foucault's writings is the
view that the practices of freedom do not arise from within the self.
Instead, the practices "are models that [the self] finds in his culture
and are proposed, suggested, imposed upon him by his culture, his
society, and his social group.
8 3
Foucault, in another interview, argues that "human beings
understand themselves" through "truth games" or "technologies," of
which there are four major types:
(1) technologies of production, which permit us to produce,
transform, or manipulate things; (2) technologies of sign
systems, which permit us to use signs, meanings, symbols, or
signification; (3) technologies of power, which determine the
conduct of individuals and submit them to certain ends or
domination, an objectivizing of the subject; (4) technologies
of the self, which permit individuals to effect by their own
means, or with the help of others, a certain number of
operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct,
80. See FOUCAULT, The Ethics of the Concern for Self, supra note 5, at 290-91.
81. Id. at 291 (emphasis added). "Whereas in his earlier work the subject is examined
indirectly through the analysis of various constitutive practices, e.g., penal, medical, etc.,
later works highlight the constitution of the subject in its active dimension, i.e., in the ways
it chooses certain practices in order to become a moral subject." Derek D. Nikolinakos,
Foucault's Ethical Quandary, 83 TELOs 123,134 (1990).
82. FOUCAULT, On the Genealogy of Ethics, supra note 5, at 263.
83. FOUCAULT, The Ethics of the Concern for Self, supra note 5, at 291. Foucault in
another interview explained it this way: "I believe ... that the subject is constituted
through practices of subjection, or, in a more autonomous way, through practices of
liberation, of liberty, as in Antiquity, on the basis, of course, of a number of rules, styles,
inventions to be found in the cultural environment." MICHEL FOUCAULT, An Aesthetics
of Existence, in MICHEL FOUCAULT: POLITICs, PHILOSOPHY, CULTURE 47, 50-51
(Lawrence D. Kritzman ed., 1988) [hereinafter FOUCAULT, An Aesthetics of Existence].
Part Ill.A, infra notes 326-87 and accompanying text, discusses how it is possible
to read Foucault as believing in a capacity for autonomy, even if the ways in which that
capacity is exercised and expressed are determined by social practices and power relations.
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and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to
attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom,
perfection or immortality. 4
Whereas the earlier Foucault wrote primarily about the third
technology, the later Foucault wrote almost exclusively about the
fourth. All four technologies go to the definition of the self, but the
first three are entirely external to it. The fourth set of technologies
differs; it understands the self as playing an active role in its own
constitution and transformation.
By focusing on the technologies of the self, Foucault explores the
relationship between freedom and ethics and how an individual can
lead a life that is both free and ethical if he or she engages in a
process of reflection with the ultimate goal of self-transformation. As
he puts it, "[f]reedom is the ontological condition of ethics. But ethics
is the considered form that freedom takes when it is informed by
reflection."85  Foucault here can be understood as making "two
important claims: first, ethics is what gives a coherent form to the
exercise of freedom, and second, coerced practice can never be
strictly speaking, ethical practice (which, importantly enough,
Foucault refers to as the practice of freedom)."86 It was the practices
of freedom that intrigued Foucault during the last years of his life, in
particular those engaged in by individuals in ancient Greece and
Rome who sought to care for themselves through an aesthetics of
existence.
An aesthetics of existence is made of "those intentional and
voluntary actions by which men not only set themselves rules of
conduct, but also seek to transform themselves, to change themselves
in their singular being, and to make their life into an oeuvre, that
carries certain aesthetic values and meets certain stylistic criteria.
' 's
While today we tend to equate art with objects, the concept of art or
aesthetics for the Greeks was much broader than that, and included
living one's life as a work of art. s As David Halperin puts it, "What
84. FOUCAULT, Technologies of the Self, supra note 67, at 225.
85. FOUCAULT, The Ethics of the Concern for Self, supra note 5, at 284.
86. Lamb, supra note 78, at 456.
87. FOUCAULT, supra note 6, at 10-11.
88. FOUCAULT, On the Genealogy of Ethics, supra note 5, at 261:
What strikes me is the fact that, in our society, art has become something that is
related only to objects and not to individuals or to life. That art is something
which is specialized or is done by experts who are artists. But couldn't
everyone's life become a work of art? Why should the lamp or the house be an
art object but not our life?
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Foucault understood by an 'art of existence'... was an ethical
practice that consisted in freely imposing on the form of one's life a
distinctive shape and individual style, and thereby transforming
oneself in accordance with one's conception of beauty or value. 'S9
Foucault views an aesthetics of existence as a process of self-
transformation whereby the subject seeks (some) freedom from its
socially constructed self. Thus, in matters of sexuality, we "practice
freedom.., by liberating our desire [so] that we will learn to conduct
ourselves ethically in pleasure relationships with others." 90  This
conception of ethical practices is consistent with Foucault's more
general view of philosophy, which he sees as the attempt "to learn to
what extent the effort to think one's own history can free thought
from what [one] silently thinks, and so enable [one] to think
differently." 91
Sexual ethics in ancient Greece and Rome were problematized in
such a way that the focus was on the practices of the self and not on
codes of conduct (whether legal, scientific, or religious). In fact, the
problematization of sex in antiquity raised issues of ethics and not of
morality. Morality for Foucault "means a set of values and rules of
action that are recommended to individuals through the intermediary
of various prescriptive agencies such as the family (in one of its roles),
educational institutions, churches, and so forth." v While the sources
of moral values can be quite varied, those values are usually
represented in codes of conduct. When we speak of morality,
according to Foucault, we compare "the real behavior of individuals
in relation to the rules and values that are recommended to them" by
the codes of conduct.93 But when we speak of ethics, we speak of "the
manner in which one ought to 'conduct oneself-that is, the manner
in which one ought to form oneself as an ethical subject acting in
reference to the prescriptive elements that make up the [moral]
code[s]. '94
Id; see also id. at 262 ("From the idea that the self is not given to us, I think that there is
only one practical consequence: we have to create ourselves as a work of art.").
89. HALPERIN, supra note 20, at 69-70.
90. FOUCAULT, The Ethics of the Concern for Self, supra note 5, at 284.
91. FOUCAULT, supra note 6, at 9; see also MICHEL FOUCAULT, Truth, Power, Self, in
TECHNOLOGIES OF THE SELF 9 (Luther H. Martin et al. eds., 1995) ("The main interest in
life and work is to become someone else that you were not in the beginning.").
92. FOUCAULT, supra note 6, at 25.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 26. Foucault distinguishes between a history of moral codes, namely, a
history of "the different systems of rules and values that are operative in a given society or
group, the agencies or mechanisms of constraint that enforce them, the forms they take in
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Morality, then, is a codification of normative principles
understood as universal rules of general applicability that are "meant
to embrace every area of behavior. 9 5 Ethical precepts, on the other
hand, are not universal rules of behavior; instead, they are
determined by "what is required of the individual in the relationship
he has with himself, in his different actions, thoughts, and feelings as
he endeavors to form himself as an ethical subject." 96  Different
periods in the history of sexuality have seen the presence of both
morality and ethics, though there have been marked differences in
the emphasis of one over the other. To be schematic about it, we can
divide the history of sexuality in the West into four parts.
Chronologically we begin with Greek and Roman antiquity, where
the problematization of sexuality was based on the practices of the
self (ethics) rather than on a codification of rules of universal
applicability (morality). Thus, Foucault argues that in antiquity there
were few references to codes that sought to prescribe morally
permissible-and proscribe morally impermissible-sexual conduct.
Instead, the focus was on the practices of freedom through which the
self defined itself as an ethical (and thus a free) subject. I explain all
of this in more detail in Part I.C below.
The second period was the Christian period when the emphasis
in matters of sexuality shifted from ethics and the practices of the self
to "a very strong 'juridification'-more precisely, a very strong
'codification'-of the moral experience." 9  In the transition "[f]rom
Antiquity to Christianity, we pass from a morality that was essentially
their multifariousness, their divergences and their contradictions," and a history of ethics.
Id. at 29. The latter is:
[A] history of the way in which individuals are urged to constitute themselves as
subjects of moral conduct [and is] concerned with the models proposed for
setting up and developing relationships with the self, for self-reflection, self-
knowledge, self-examination, for the decipherment of the self by oneself, for the
transformations that one seeks to accomplish with oneself as object.
Id. Mark Bevir summarizes the distinction that Foucault makes between morality and
ethics as follows:
Morality refers to sets of rules that specify what individuals should or should not
do. Ethics, in contrast, refers to the ways in which individuals conduct
themselves in relation to such sets of rules. Whereas a morality seeks to impose
certain requirements and restrictions on the individual, an ethic constitutes a
practice through which an individual can negotiate his relationship to such
requirements and restrictions.
Mark Bevir, Foucault and Critique: Deploying Agency Against Autonomy, 27 POL.
THEORY 65,75 (1999).
95. FOUCAULT, supra note 6, at 29.
96. Id. at 30.
97. Id.
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the search for personal ethics to a morality as obedience to a system
of rules."9  Those rules, as they relate to sexuality, were best
exemplified by the penitentials of early Christianity, which were
codes of conduct-used by priests during confessions-that set forth
in great detail the sexual sins (as defined by the Church) and their
corresponding penances.99
Although Foucault does not elaborate on Christian sexual
morality in great detail,1° his work is sprinkled with references to the
differences in the problematization of sexuality between antiquity and
Christianity. In addition to the already mentioned codification,
Christian sexual morality called not for the self-transformation of the
ethical subject but instead for the self-renunciation of impure
desires.101 Christian sexual morality was dominated by the idea of
98. FOUCAULT, An Aesthetics of Existence, supra note 83, at 49.
99. The penitentials "came to embody a virtually all inclusive register of proscribed
sexual acts." PIERRE J. PAYER, SEX AND THE PENITENTIALS: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A
SEXUAL CODE 550-1150, at 5 (1984). "For five hundred years [from the sixth century
through the twelfth] the penitential literature [was] the principal agent in the formation
and transmission of a code of sexual morality." Id. The penitentials were quite explicit in
their codification. In terms of homosexual acts, sodomy was the most serious sin and
received the longest period of penance, but other acts such as fellatio and mutual
masturbation between men, and fornication between women, were also proscribed. See id.
at 40-44.
100. When Foucault died, he was working on a fourth volume of the History of
Sexuality, which was to cover the Christian period that followed antiquity and preceded
modernity. The manuscript of the fourth volume remains unpublished. See Davidson,
supra note 41, at 27.
101. In the Christian sense of moral conduct,
the ethical subject was to be characterized not so much by the perfect rule of
the self by the self in the exercise of a virile type of activity, as by self-
renunciation and a purity whose model was to be sought in virginity. This
being the case, one can understand the significance that was attached, in
Christian morality, to two opposite yet complementary practices: a
codification of sexual acts that would become more and more specific, and the
development of a hermeneutics of desire together with procedures of self-
decipherment.
FOUCAULT, supra note 6, at 92.
As Smart explains it,
With the advent of Christianity, the ethical constitution of the subject changes as
follows. The ethical substance is not the aphrodisia but the "flesh,"
concupiscence, a form of desire; the mode of subjection is no longer the
cultivation of (aesthetic) styles of existence or conduct embodying morally
valorized uses of pleasure but rather divine law; ... the telos of moral action is no
longer moderation but purity and immortality.
Smart, supra note 78, at 211; see also Peter Brown, Bodies and Minds: Sexuality and
Renunciation in Early Christianity, in BEFORE SEXUALITY: THE CONSTRUCrION OF
EROTIC EXPERIENCE IN THE ANCIENT GREEK WORLD 479, 489-90 (David M. Halperin
et al. eds., 1990).
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lustful desires and the need to atone for those desires, mainly through
confession. 102
The modem period, described by Foucault in the History of
Sexuality, Volume I, emphasized the codification of sexual rules-
much like the Christian era that preceded it. Religious codes,
however, became less hegemonic (though they retained considerable
influence) and scientific, medical, and psychiatric codes became more
important. 3  Modem discourses on sexuality focused on the
debilitating effects (physical, psychological, and moral) of sexual
desire. There was continuity from the earlier Christian period in the
sense that the focus remained on the need to control improper desires
and to avoid sexual acts that were considered immoral or abnormal.
This focus differed from the one in antiquity, which emphasized
learning how to use sexual pleasures in order to transform oneself.
Although Foucault was never explicit on this issue, I think it is
possible to speak of our contemporary era as a fourth period in the
history of sexuality in the West. There is continuity between the
modem period and the contemporary period (as there was between
the Christian period and the modem era) given that legal, medical,
and moral codes retain some importance in determining the
discourses of sexuality. But the contemporary era is characterized by
a partial decodification that has allowed a return of sorts to a focus on
[In the early] Christian world, forms of ascetic radicalism that had once hinted at
the possibility of transcendence of sexual desire, even of sexual differences, were
condemned by bishops and by Imperial laws.... By the end of the fourth
century, [the idea of] sexuality as a symbol of reversibility... had lost much of its
momentum.
Id.
102. In early Christianity, the evil and dark side of the human condition was associated
with sexual desires. "What is distinctive is the speed and tenacity with which that dark
spot came to be identified, in Christian circles, with specifically sexual desires, with
unavowed sexual strategems, and... with the lingering power of sexual fantasy." Brown,
supra note 101, at 481.
Before the sixth century, the only way to be forgiven for one's sins (sexual or
otherwise) was to engage in a complicated ritual of public penance, an opportunity that
was available only once during one's lifetime. See PAYER, supra note 99, at 7. Beginning
in the sixth century, a system of private penance or confession developed and it was then
that the penitentials-with their codification of proscribed sexual acts-began to be used
by priests as codes of sexual morality. See id. at 6-7. Foucault associates the
"development of confessional techniques" with the Lateran Council of 1215. FOUCAULT,
supra note 9, at 58. That Council for the first time required annual confessions from all
Christians. See id. at 60. Payer argues, however, that "[p]enance was codified and
confessional techniques developed well before 1215," namely, with the penitentials of the
sixth century. Pierre J. Payer, Foucault on Penance and the Shaping of Sexuality, 14 STUD.
RELIGION 313,315-16 (1985).
103. See supra Part I.A, notes 29-62 and accompanying text.
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the practices of the self, albeit to very different practices from the
ones found in Greek and Roman antiquity. I will in Part II discuss
the contemporary process of decodification of sexual morality and its
implications for the emergence of a gay and lesbian sexual ethic.
Before I do so, however, it is necessary to have a better idea of how
Foucault interprets the practices of the self that were common in
antiquity in order to fully understand what I mean above by "a return
of sorts to a focus on the practices of the self."
C. Sexual Ethics in Classical Antiquity
In classical antiquity, according to Foucault, sexuality for
privileged individuals, that is, for free male citizens, 1°4 was
problematized around the subject's ethical work on itself.105 This self-
formative process is one through "which the individual delimits that
part of himself that will form the object of his moral practice, defines
his position relative to the precept he will follow, and decides on a
certain mode of being that will serve as his moral goal.10 6 I explore
below how Foucault conceives of this self-formative process. I pay
particular attention to it in the context of the problematization in
antiquity of male homosexual conduct. The point of doing so is not to
argue that there should be a return to the way in which ancient
societies dealt with homosexual conduct. Instead, the point is to see
the similarities between antiquity and the contemporary period in
their emphases on the ethical practices of the self and their
deemphases on codes of conduct that seek to construct a sexual
morality based on universal distinctions between acceptable and
unacceptable sexual acts.
104. See FOUCAULT, supra note 6, at 22 (noting that sexual ethics in Greece were
"ethics for men: an ethics thought, written, and taught by men and addressed to men-to
free men [as opposed to slaves], obviously"); see also HALPERIN, supra note 51, at 31
("The extraordinary polarization of sexual roles in classical Athens merely reflects the
marked division in the Athenian polity between the socially superordinate group,
composed of [male) citizens, and various subordinate groups (all lacking full civil rights,
though not equally subordinate), composed respectively of women, foreigners, slaves, and
children."). Foucault, however, has been criticized for "present[ing] us with a vision of
ancient sexual systems that is even more male-centered than what his sources present."
Amy Richlin, Foucault's History of Sexuality: A Useful Theory for Women?, in
RETHINKING SEXUALITY: FOUCAULT AND CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY, supra note 8, at 138,
148; see also Kate Soper, Productive Contradictions, in UP AGAINST FOUCAULT:
EXPLORATIONS OF SOME TENSIONS BETWEEN FOUCAULT AND FEMINISM 29, 41
(Caroline Ramazanoglu ed., 1993) (criticizing Foucault for not addressing the "feelings of
women" and "the role of [male-female] interpersonal relations" in bringing changes to the
"masculine ethics" of ancient Greece).
105. See FOUCAULT, supra note 6, at 27-28.
106. Id. at 28.
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In The Use of Pleasure,1 7 Foucault identifies "four great axes of
experience" that for the Greeks represented the most important areas
where there was a need to establish an ethical relationship with the
self. The axes were "the relation to one's body, the relation to one's
wife, the relation to boys, and the relation to truth." ' 8  In these
different contexts, Foucault discusses at some length the "notion of
aphrodesia, through which one can grasp what was recognized as the
'ethical substance' in sexual behavior."'0 9 "The aphrodesia are the
acts, gestures, and contacts that produce a certain form of
pleasure." 0 For the Greeks, as I explain below, the "ethical
substance" of that pleasure was not linked to particular sexual acts or
to the objects of sexual desire (male or female); what mattered
instead were two criteria: (1) moderation and (2) an active and
reflective approach to sex.
The Greeks associated excess in matters of sexuality with a
failure to care for the self. They viewed sex as just another form of
appetite that needed to be controlled."' They also thought that being
a master of oneself and living one's life as a work of art required
moderation and restraint. The purpose of sexual ethics was not, as it
would become in Christianity, to resist desire. The Greeks were not
subjects of sexual desire (i.e., their sexuality was not defined or
constrained by the need to understand or control sexual desire).
Instead, the key to their sexual ethic was to use sex in certain
acceptable ways.
The discouragement of particular sexual practices in ancient
Greece was not justified in terms of their abnormal nature or the
improper desires that led individuals to want to engage in them;
rather, the sexual practices that were condemned were those that
resulted from immoderation and a lack of self-restraint."2  The
importance of moderation as a norm of sexual ethics, in fact, runs
throughout The Use of Pleasure." What constituted means of self-
107. See id.
108. Id. at 32.
109. Id. at 37.
110. Id. at4O.
111. Foucault in The Use of Pleasure discusses at length how Greeks treated other
forms of pleasurable appetites such as food, drink, and sleep. See id. 97-139. David
Halperin notes that "Foucault's first major conceptual breakthrough" in The Use of
Pleasure was "his ability to specify so clearly the ground of the Greeks' consistent
assimilation of sexual desires to the other appetites.., as qualitatively interchangeable
'necessities,' or compulsions, of human nature." HALPERIN, supra note 51, at 68.
112. See FOUCAULT, supra note 6, at 44-45.
113. There are nineteen entries under "moderation" in the index to The Use of
Pleasure. See id. at 287-88.
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restraint for the Greeks were not codes of conduct, but were instead
voluntary and self-imposed limitations on the uses of sexual
pleasure.1 Sexual ethics were not, as they would become under
Christianity, about rules of conduct based on the distinction between
natural (or good) and unnatural (or bad) sexual acts; instead, it was
about "prudence, reflection, and calculation in the way one
distributed and controlled [one's sexual] acts.11 5 The crucial point to
understand is that individuals were not expected to comply with
norms of sexual moderation and austerity as universal prescriptions
and proscriptions; rather, the norms were understood as "principle[s]
of stylization of conduct for those who wished to give their existence
the most graceful and accomplished form possible."" 6 Whether an
individual led an ethical sexual life, then, was not determined by his
faithfulness towards a code of conduct but by the way in which he
fashioned and used his sexuality to exercise control over his sexual
appetites while leading a graceful and stylized existence.
The absence of codes of conduct that distinguished between
acceptable and unacceptable sexual acts explains why same-gender
sexual intimacy was not problematized in antiquity at the level of
gender. In other words, nothing about the gender of two males who
were sexually intimate with each other made that intimacy ethically
114. "[M]oderation [did] not take the form of an obedience to a system of laws or
codification of behaviors; nor could it serve as a principle for nullifying pleasures; it was
[instead] an art, a practice of pleasures that was capable of self-limitation through the use
of those pleasures." Id. at 57 (emphasis added); see also Smart, supra note 78, at 206
(noting that "in classical antiquity the demands of austerity were dispersed rather than
unified within a coherent, authoritarian moral system-they proposed rather than
imposed moderation, self-control or mastery").
Halperin notes that Foucault's study of ancient Greece leads him to the following
"startling and acute conclusion":
The general requirements of Greek morality radically underdetermine the
definition of proper conduct for an individual in any particular situation; they
leave room for a self-imposed (though no doubt communally enforced) ethic of
sexual restraint within the larger field of a Greek male's moral freedom. Greek
morality, in other words, doesn't concern itself so much with the forbidden as
with the voluntary (in principle, at least): morality is therefore not a matter of
obedience to specific prescriptions but a regulated usage... of morally
unrestricted pleasures.
HALPERIN, supra note 51, at 68.
115. FOUCAULT, supra note 6, at 54. For the Greeks, the focus was "the relation one
has to one's self.., rather than on... a prescriptive model based on the binary opposition
of good and evil, healthy and pathological, normal and abnormal." C. Colwell, The
Retreat of the Subject in The Late Foucault, 38 PHIL. TODAY 56, 65 (1994).
116. FOUCAULT, supra note 6, at 250-51. "Sexual morality [for the Greeks] is thus
subsumed by the more general practice of self-regulation with regard to enjoyment that
constituted for free upperclass Greek males an art of living, a technique for maintaining
personal equilibrium, 'an aesthetics of being.'" HALPERIN, supra note 51, at 69.
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or morally suspect." 7 It would be too easy, however, to conclude that
ancient Greek culture was simply tolerant of homosexual conduct.1I
The Greeks did problematize homosexual acts; they just did it
differently than contemporary Western societies do.
In ancient Greece there was little interest in sexual relations
between men of similar ages or between boys.1 9  The
problematization was instead of relationships between adult men and
boys: "A male relationship gave rise to a theoretical and moral
interest [only] when it was based on a rather pronounced difference
on either side of the threshold separating adolescence from
manhood.' 2 ° The older man was expected to play the active role, not
117. As Martha Nussbaum notes, "in [ancient] Greek culture and practices, the gender
of the partner assumes far less importance than it does in our society, and is usually taken
as less salient than many other facts about a sexual act." Martha C. Nussbaum, Platonic
Love and Colorado Law: The Relevance of Ancient Greek Norms to Modern Sexual
Controversies, 80 VA. L. REv. 1515,1544 (1994).
The view that neither Greek law nor customs prohibited or penalized homosexual
conduct (as long as certain norms were followed, see infra notes 120-32 and accompanying
text) is supported by the leading book in the field. See K-J. DOVER, GREEK
HOMOSEXUALITY passim (1978). While some scholars have argued that this is an
incorrect assessment of the historical record, see David Cohen & Richard Saller, Foucault
on Sexuality in Greco-Roman Antiquity, in FOUCAULT AND THE WRITING OF HISTORY,
supra note 55, at 35, 37-39, the Dover/Foucault position on this issue is accepted by most
classicist scholars. See, e.g., HALPERIN, supra note 51, at 4-7.
118. See FOUCAULT, supra note 6, at 191-92.
119. See id. at 193-95. These relationships "were not an object of moral solicitude or of
a great theoretical interest. Without being ignored or nonexistent, they did not belong to
the domain of active and intense problematization." Id. at 195; see also JOHN BOSWELL,
CHRISTIANITY, SOCIAL TOLERANCE AND HOMOSEXUALITY 28 (1980) (noting that while
the relationship between adult males and boys in ancient Greece may have been "an
idealized cultural convention," this does not mean that those kinds of relationships-as
opposed to relationships between male adults-were more prevalent).
The silence regarding sexual relationships between adult men may have been
caused by the implications of the passive role in the sexual act. As discussed below, this
role was associated with immoderation and femininity. See infra notes 126-27 and
accompanying text. "It is doubtless the existence of this difficulty that explains both the
silence in which this relationship between adults was actually enveloped, and the noisy
disqualification of those who broke this silence by declaring their acceptance of, or rather,
their preference for this 'subordinate role.'" See FOUCAULT, supra note 6, at 220.
120. FOUCAULT, supra note 6, at 195. As Martha Nussbaum notes,
To modern ears the word "boy" suggests someone between the ages of say,
four and twelve. But the eromenos [young partner or beloved] of Greek
custom was typically, and ideally, a young man between the time of full
attainment of adult height and the full growth of the beard. If we go by
modern growth patterns, he was perhaps sixteen to nineteen; but more likely,
because the ancient Greek age of puberty seems to have [been] slightly later
than ours, the age of a modem college undergraduate.
Nussbaum, supra note 117, at 1551.
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just sexually,121 but also socially and morallyYm  The older man was
required to provide guidance, education, and support for the younger
man. There needed to be, however, moderation and self-control on
both sides. The older man "was expected to show his ardor, and to
restrain it;"1" the younger man "had to be careful not to yield too
easily; he also had to keep from accepting too many tokens of love,
and from granting his love heedlessly and out of self-interest, without
testing the worth of his partner. ' 124 Through this ethic of moderation,
each partner sought to make himself into "a subject of ethical
behavior.""2 The idea, once again, was to engage in an active form of
reflection with the goal of incorporating prudence and moderation
into one's sex life.
The ancient Greeks disapproved of immoderation and passivity;
the latter entailed allowing sexual acts to take place without engaging
in an active process of reflection, an omission that was associated with
femininity.1 26  To be active vis-a-vis sexual pleasures meant to use
them for the creation of a better self; to be active meant to be strong,
to control, and to moderate one's use of sexual pleasures. The
problematization, then, did not apply when the object of the sexual
pleasure was of the same gender as the subject. It applied, instead,
when there was a lack of attention to the care of the self. 27
121. It was the older man who was expected to penetrate physically the younger man.
See DOVER, supra note 117, at 103; Nussbaum, supra note 117, at 1546-47.
122. See FOUCAULT, supra note 6, at 195.
123. Id. at 196.
124. Id. Foucault adds:
It was not good (especially in the eyes of public opinion) for a boy to behave
"passively," to let himself be manipulated and dominated, to yield without
resistance, to become an obliging partner in the sensual pleasures of the other, to
indulge his whims, and to offer his body to whomever it pleased and however it
pleased them, out of weakness, lust, or self-interest. This was what dishonored
boys who accepted the first comer, who showed off unscrupulously, who passed
from hand to hand, who granted everything to the highest bidder.
Id. at 211.
125. Id. at 203.
126. As the Greeks saw it,
[I]mmoderation derives from a passivity that relates it to femininity. To be
immoderate was to be in a state of nonresistance with regard to the force of
pleasures, and in a position of weakness and submission; it meant being incapable
of that virile stance with respect to oneself that enabled one to be stronger than
oneself. In this sense, the man of pleasures and desires, the man of nonmastery
(akrasia) or self indulgence (akolasia) was a man who could be called feminine,
but more essentially with respect to himself than with respect to others.
Id. at 84-85.
127. As Foucault notes, "[i]n the eyes of the Greeks, what constituted ethical negativity
par excellence was clearly not the loving of both sexes, nor was it the preferring of one's
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Foucault discusses other components of the ethical use of
pleasure by the Greeks (such as "the relation to the body and to
health, [and] the relation to wives and to the institution of
marriage")," but it was through sexual intimacy between men and
boys "that the question of the relations between the use of the
pleasures and access to truth was developed, in the form of an inquiry
into the nature of true love. 12 9 The initial dissymmetry in the power
and age of the partners could, through reflection and self-control,
lead to true reciprocity and the "convergence of love."'3 °  The
reciprocity existed because the older man became as much the object
of attention as the boy; the older man's wisdom and experience
became the boy's object of love. The older man, "through the
complete mastery that he exercises over himself, will turn the game
upside down, reverse the roles, establish the principle of a
renunciation of the aphrodesia, and become, for all young men who
are eager for truth, an object of love.' 3' Thus, Foucault notes that in
the last pages of Plato's Symposium there is a complete role reversal
with the handsome young boys enamored of the old and wise
Socrates and anxious for him to return their attention. 32
According to Foucault, the importance of the care of the self
continued in the Greco-Roman era of the first two centuries A.D. In
the early part of the Roman empire, there was, if anything, a
perceived need for an "intensification of the relation to oneself by
which one constituted oneself as the subject of one's acts."' 33 The
Romans, like the ancient Greeks, paid little attention to universal
sex over the other; it consisted in being passive with regard to the pleasures." Id. at 85-86.
Mark Poster adds:
An elaborate etiquette and numerous discourses were developed by the masters
of this period because they feared that the practice of the love of boys might
inure the boys to patterns of passivity, hence undermining their freedom and the
freedom of the polis. In this way sex became a moral problem in a culture where
desire itself was not a moral issue. The love of boys was the leading
preoccupation in the elaboration of techniques of the self by which the masters
constituted themselves in their freedom.
Mark Poster, Foucault and the Tyranny of Greece, in FOUCAULT: A CRITICAL READER,
supra note 25, at 205, 211.
128. FOUCAULT, supra note 6, at 229.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 239 (emphasis removed); see also Nussbaum, supra note 117, at 1547 (noting
that the relationship between older men and younger men in ancient Greece "involve[d] a
real reciprocity of benefits and mutual affection based on it").
131. FOUCAULT, supra note 6, at 241.
132. See id.
133. FOUCAULT, supra note 7, at 41.
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codes of behavior. They also did not problematize sexual intimacy on
the basis of the gender of the parties.M
There were, however, changes in the forms of problematizations
that distinguished Rome in the first two centuries after the death of
Christ from Greek antiquity and which, to some extent, presage some
of the types of sexual problematizations found in later Christianity
and even in the modern era. The first of these changes was the
greater involvement of medicine in matters of sexuality as sex became
viewed as potentially debilitating and as exposing individuals to
illnesses." A second important change was a reduced interest in the
relationship between male adults and boys and a corresponding
greater problematization of the relationship between husband and
wife." 6 This change of focus did not mean that individuals ceased to
engage in same-gender sexual conduct or even that they were
discouraged from doing so. Instead, there was "a decline in the
interest one took in [such conduct]; a fading of the importance it was
granted in philosophical and moral debate." '137 Foucault identifies
several reasons for this decline, including: greater control by parents
in the elite classes over their children;138 the availability of young
slaves-who did not raise the same concerns about status and
passivity as did the children of the elites-as objects of sexual
pleasures; 39 the greater institutionalization of education, which
134. See id. at 40. See generally CRAIG A. WILLIAMS, ROMAN HOMOSEXUALITY:
IDEOLOGIES OF MASCULINITY IN CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY (1999) (arguing that for
Romans the important distinction in matters of sexuality was not that between
homosexuality and heterosexuality, but was instead between citizen and slave, dominant
and subordinate, and masculine and effeminate).
135. See FOUCAULT, supra note 7, at 112-18, 141-43. Even though medicine was now
more involved in issues of sexuality, the nature of that involvement was different from
what took place much later. In the modem era, the involvement of medicine "was to be
organized as a domain that would have its normal forms and its morbid forms, its specific
pathology, its nosography and etiology-to say nothing of its therapeutics." Id. at 141. In
Greco-Roman culture, medicine viewed sexual acts as problematic because they could
lead to physical illnesses caused by the expenditure of energy. Id. at 142.
136. See id. at 190. In the Greco-Roman era, "[m]arriage, as an individual tie capable
of integrating relations of pleasure and of giving them a positive value.... constitute[d]
the most active focus for defining stylistics of moral life." Id. at 192; see also Poster, supra
note 127, at 215 ("In place of the elaborate sub-culture surrounding the love of boys, the
wife became the centre of the man's sexuality and accordingly the locus in which he
constituted his subjectivity.").
137. FOUCAULT, supra note 7, at 189.
138. See id. at 190.
139. See id.
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reduced the mentoring role of adult males;140 and the greater
"valorization of marriage. '141
The increased focus on marriage meant a privileging of sexual
relations within marriage coupled with a concern for the dangers of
nonmarital sexuality. As the Roman Empire era progressed, there
was an increasing codification of natural law and a greater acceptance
of universal rules of conduct as applied to sexuality. 42 With the move
towards a universalization of rules, there was a corresponding
emphasis on "forms of prohibition" such as the discouragement of
adultery.143 These changes presaged the Christian era, with its
comprehensive religious codification of sexual morality, which in turn
gave way to the modern era with its secular codes of conduct and its
systems of knowledge for the production and schematization of
human sexuality that Foucault captured so eloquently in The History
of Sexuality, Volume I.44
II. CODES OF CONDUCT AND A GAY AND LESBIAN SEXUAL ETHIC
It would be too simplistic to interpret ancient Greek culture as
encouraging freedom and tolerance in matters of sexuality. Foucault
repeatedly counsels against such an idealized interpretation of Greek
sexual norms.145 Those norms were not about freedom and toleration
per se; they were instead about using male homosexual acts (in
particular those between adults and adolescents) as the best way of
constituting oneself through reflection, moderation, and self-
transformation. Foucault also makes it clear that he is not calling for
a return to Greek sexual ethics. Opportunities for the ethical use of
pleasures and a care of the self were available only to men from the
ruling classes. It was not deemed possible (or beneficial) for women,
foreigners, or slaves to engage in the process of caring for the self in
an ethical way. 46 Clearly, the ancient Greek society, with its
140. See id.
141. Id.
142. "In the new situation an effort was made for the first time to develop a universal
ideal of the subject. Nature and reason became standards by which to judge and evaluate
the individual's realization of the culture of self." Poster, supra note 127, at 215-16; see
also Brown, supra note 101, at 484 (noting "the shift to a universal paradigm" of sexuality
beginning in the second century AD).
143. See Poster, supra note 127, at 216.
144. See supra Part I.A, notes 29-62 and accompanying text.
145. See, e.g., FOUcAULT, supra note 6, at 187,192-93, 197.
146. See supra note 104 (discussing male centrality in the sexual ethics of ancient
Greece).
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oppressive class and gender hierarchies, is not one that we should aim
to replicate.147
But jt is possible to emphasize an altogether different point: a
sexual ethic which allows for a meaningful care of the self places little
importance on a code of conduct that makes normative distinctions
based on the nature of different sexual acts. It is not a matter, then,
of emulating the Greeks. It is a matter of recognizing that a sexual
ethic does not have to be grounded in codes of conduct that tell us
which sexual acts (and thus which sexual desires) are "good" and
which are "bad." To the extent that we think that the value, truth,
and meaning of sex is to be found in codes of conduct that seek to
make normative distinctions among sexual acts, there is considerably
less room for the kind of self-defining and self-transformative ethical
practices that existed in ancient Greece and Rome. My thesis in this
part of the Article is that the partial legal, medical, and moral
decodification of homosexuality that has taken place over the last
forty years in the United States has allowed for the emergence of a
gay and lesbian sexual ethic, one that offers a powerful and appealing
alternative to traditional Christian sexual ethics.
In Part II.A infra, I briefly summarize the legal codification of
homosexuality that began in the United States in the late nineteenth
century. This codification paralleled the intensification of medical
and psychiatric discourses of (homo)sexuality identified by Foucault
in The History of Sexuality, Volume I. Part II.A also traces the partial
decodification of homosexuality that has taken place in American law
in the last forty years.
In Part II.B, I discuss the role that moral codes of conduct (as
opposed to legal codes of conduct) currently play in assessments of
the morality of same-gender sexual acts. In the United States today, a
consensus no longer exists that moral codes of sexual conduct that
privilege particular sexual acts and prohibit others can serve as
normative foundations for assessments of the goodness and value (or
lack thereof) of sex and sexuality. This process of moral
147. When asked whether the Greeks offered an attractive alternative to contemporary
sexual mores, Foucault was emphatic in his answer: "The Greek ethics were linked to a
purely virile society with slaves, in which the women were underdogs whose pleasure had
no importance, whose sexual life had only to be oriented toward, determined by, their
status as wives, and so on." FOUCAULT, On the Genealogy of Ethics, supra note 5, at 256-
57. He added that "[t]he Greek ethics of pleasure is linked to a virile society, to
dissymmetry, exclusion of the other, an obsession with penetration .... All of that is quite
disgusting!" Id. at 258. In any event, Foucault pointed out that "you can't find the
solution of a problem in the solution of another problem raised at another moment by
other people." Id. at 256.
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decodification, when coupled with a partial legal decodification of
homosexuality, has allowed for the emergence of a gay and lesbian
sexual ethic. I explore the processes, values, and some of the
implications of that ethic in Part II.C.
A. Legal Codification and Partial Decodification of Same-Gender
Sexual Conduct
The law has historically served as an important source for rules
of conduct that relate not only to coerced sexual acts but also to
consensual ones. Thus sodomy, for example, which is often in
criminal statutes referred to as a crime against nature or as a form of
deviate sexual intercourse, has been subject to criminal penalties in
the United States regardless of whether consent is involved.148 As I
discuss below, Foucault pays insufficient attention to the role of the
law in the formation of sexual identities. The law, at least in the
United States, has assisted in the simultaneous creation and
marginalization of a homosexual identity.
149
1. Foucault and the Law
Foucault has very little interest in or use for the law. He sees the
law as the kind of traditional source of power that has been over-
emphasized by historians and philosophers alike. For Foucault, an
emphasis on the law is misplaced because it offers a view of power
relations that places the sovereign (however defined) at the center of
power.150 According to Foucault, political theory should cease to
"privilege... law and sovereignty," and instead analyze power
through its diffusion.15 ' Foucault does not believe that real power
expresses itself through institutions such as legislatures and courts.
Instead, Foucault sees power as being highly diffuse, spread
throughout society in a myriad of different kinds of disciplines and
systems of knowledge.152 For Foucault, these "mechanisms of
148. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWs. ANN. § 750.158 (West 1991); OKL. STAT. ANN. tit.
21 § 886 (West Supp. 2001); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 21.01,21.06 (Vernon 1994).
149. See infra Part II.A.2, notes 158-219 and accompanying text.
150. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, Two Lectures, in POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED
INTERVIEWS AND OTHER WRITINGS, 1972-1977, at 78, 102-04 (Colin Gordon ed., Colin
Gordon et al. trans., 1980) [hereinafter FOUCAULT, Two Lectures].
151. FOUCAULT, supra note 9, at 90.
152. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text; see also FOUCAULT, Two Lectures,
supra note 150, at 96 (noting that we "should be concerned with power at its extremities,
in its ultimate destinations, with those points where it becomes capillary, that is, in its
more regional and local forms and institutions").
404 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
power... are irreducible to the representation of law." '153 "[T]he
juridical system," Foucault notes, "is utterly incongruous with the
new methods of power whose operation is not ensured by right but by
technique, not by law but by normalization, not by punishment but by
control, methods that are employed on all levels and in forms that go
beyond the state and its apparatus.'
1 54
Some commentators have noted that Foucault underestimates
the role that the law plays in affecting the societal structures and
relations that frame the more diffuse kinds of power relations that he
explores in his writings.Y5 Given that Foucault has little faith in the
ability of the law to affect meaningfully the power relations and
disciplines that are the main foci of his historical and philosophical
analyses, it is perhaps not surprising that he also underestimates the
role that the law plays in the formation of sexual identities and
moralities. There is very little in The History of Sexuality, Volume I,
about legal discourse or rules; instead, as we have seen, Foucault's
focus in that book is on the discourses of medicine, psychiatry, and
population studies. 6 As I argue below, however, the law, at least in
the United States beginning at the end of the nineteenth century,
played an important role-alongside the discourses identified by
153. FOUCAULT, supra note 9, at 89. For Foucault, "[t]he classical juridical focus on
state power tends to obscure the ways in which the individual is dominated by other forces
(e.g., schools, hospitals, the military, [and] psychiatry)." LITOWITZ, supra note 22, at 67.
154. FOUCAULT, supra note 9, at 89; see also FOUCAULT, Two Lectures, supra note
150, at 97 ("One should try to locate power at the extreme points of its exercise, where it is
always less legal in character.").
Hunt and Wickham note that Foucault's rather circumscribed view of the law is
similar to that held by the nineteenth century legal philosopher John Austin who
conceived of the law as only those commands issued by the sovereign and enforced
through sanctions. See ALAN HUNT & GARY WICKHAM, FOUCAULT AND LAV:
TOWARDS A SOCIOLOGY OF LAW AS GOVERNANCE 60 (1994) (citing JOHN AUSTIN, THE
PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (H.L.A. Hart ed., Weidenfeld & Nicolson
1955) (1832)).
155. Hunt and Wickham argue that Foucault "unnecessarily marginalised" the role of
the law and the state "with respect to the coordination and condensation of the forms of
power." HUNT & WICKHAM, supra note 154, at 71. They add "that, contrary to Foucault,
disciplinary power is not opposed to law, but rather.., law has been a primary agent of
the advance of new modalities of power, law constitutes distinctive features of their mode
of operation." Id. at 65. Similarly, Duncan Kennedy has criticized Foucault's conception
of the law because it fails to recognize that power relations "between parties... [are
themselves] conditioned through and through by a preexisting legal context." DUNCAN
KENNEDY, SEXY DRESSING ETC. 120 (1993).
156. See supra Part I.A, notes 29-62 and accompanying text.
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Foucault-in the creation of a homosexual identity and in reifying a
conception of homosexuality as dangerous and depraved. 7
2. Legal Codes and Homosexuality
The story of the codification of consensual same-gender sexuality
in American law began with the application of English sodomy (or
buggery) statutes in the colonies. 58 After independence, all of the
new American states enacted sodomy statutes. 59 Prior to the late
nineteenth century, however, the criminal act of sodomy was not
connected to a particular sexual identity. Society, in other words, did
not assign a distinctive sexual identity to those who engaged in
sodomy. This changed at the end of the nineteenth century as science
and medicine helped to create sexual categories known as inverts,
perverts, transsexuals, and homosexuals. 6' While these identities had
different meanings, they had one common denominator: a seeming
refusal by some individuals to abide by what medical and psychiatric
experts (in reflecting broader cultural norms) considered to be
161 Te gneappropriate gender roles and behaviors. The gender
nonconformists flouted the strict societal norms regarding
appropriate male and female personalities, male and female dress,
and male and female subjects of sexual desire.
Sodomy statutes, as a means of regulating same-gender sexual
conduct, were insufficient in an era when American doctors began to
view the turning to one's own gender for sexual intimacy as "a
dangerous sickness."1 6 They proved inadequate because prior to the
157. I will also argue briefly in Part III.B infra that Foucault's failure to appreciate the
effects of legal discourse and rules on societal power relations led him to underestimate
the possible contribution of the law in helping marginalized groups resist and partially
modify those relations. See infra notes 397-401 and accompanying text.
158. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF
THE CLOSET 157 (1999); JONATHAN KATZ, GAY AMERICAN HISTORY: LESBIANS AND
GAY MEN IN THE U.S.A. 16-23 (1976). The English sodomy statutes applied during the
colonial period can be traced back to the Reformation Parliament of 1533. That body, in
turn, secularized criminal offenses previously regulated by the Catholic Church. See
ESKRIDGE, supra, at 157.
159. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 158, at 157.
160. See id. at 22-24,39.
161. See George Chauncey, Jr., From Sexual Inversion to Homosexuality: Medicine
and the Changing Conceptualization of Female Deviance, 58-59 SALMAGUNDI 114, 146
(1982-83).
162. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 158, at 22 (citation omitted). Jonathan Katz provides a
fascinating cross-section of excerpts from the medical literature on homosexuality from
the end of the nineteenth century to the 1970s. See KATZ, supra note 158, at 129-207.
Katz observes:
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1880s they only prohibited anal sex; they did not prohibit oral sex or
mutual masturbation between men, or sex of any kind between
women. 63 In addition, convicting a defendant of consensual sodomy
proved difficult since the testimony of an adult accomplice was
required."6 Beginning in the 1880s, therefore, state legislatures
enacted a slew of new laws to deal with the problem-identified by
science and medicine-of sexual inversion and gender
noncompliance. 65 The scope of sodomy statutes was expanded to
include oral sex.'66 And just as importantly, new laws were enacted
that criminalized public indecency, 167 sexual solicitation,161 cross-
dressing, 69 seduction of minors,170 and obscenity.171  These laws,
The historical change in the conception of homosexuality from sin to crime to
sickness is intimately associated with the rise to power of a class of petit
bourgeois medical professionals, a group of individual medical entrepreneurs,
whose stock in trade is their alleged "expert" understanding of homosexuality, a
special-interest group whose facade of scientific objectivity covers their own
emotional, economic, and career investments in their status as such authorities.
Id. at 130. The view of homosexuality as a sickness began to retreat only in the 1970s after
the decodification of homosexuality by the psychiatric community. See infra notes 217-19
and accompanying text.
163. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 158, at 24, 158.
164. See id. at 24.
165. See id.
166. See id. at 24-25, 158-59. Justice White got his history wrong, therefore, when he
argued in Bowers v. Hardwick that the conduct for which Mr. Hardwick was arrested (oral
sex) had been criminalized for centuries. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192
(1986). Oral sex was not a crime in either England before 1885, see ESKRIDGE, supra note
158, at 158, or more importantly, in the United States at the time of enactment of the
Fourteenth Amendment, see id.; Anne B. Goldstein, History, Homosexuality, and Political
Values: Searching for the Hidden Determinants of Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE L.J. 1073,
1084-85 (1988).
167. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 158, at 29-31. In 1903, for example, California
criminalized "outraging public decency," which allowed the police "to harass cross-
dressing women, female impersonators, male inverts looking for partners, and male as well
as female prostitutes." Id. at 31 (citing Act of Mar. 19, 1903, 1903 Cal. Stat. 201) (other
citations omitted).
168. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 158, at 29-31. In 1900, for example, the New York
legislature "expand[ed] the definition of illegal 'vagrant' to include '[e]very male person
who lives wholly or in part on the earnings of prostitution, or who in any public place
solicits for immoral purposes.'" Id. at 29 (quoting Act of Apr. 5, 1900, 1900 N.Y. Laws
281 (amended by Act of June 6, 1910, 1910 N.Y. Laws 382)).
169. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 158, at 27-29. By the second half of the nineteenth
century, many American cities had ordinances prohibiting cross-dressing. See id. at 27.
170. See id. at 31-32. Prior to this time, the main purpose of the law in this area was to
protect girls from men who wanted to have intercourse. The focus, however, greatly
expanded during the post-Civil War period. "Th[e] regulatory regime [now) not only
protected boys as well as girls, but defined the arena of sexual violation more broadly than
seduction and sodomy laws had done, to include sexual touching, fondling, and even just
observing sexual activities." Id. at 32. In Appendix A-3, Eskridge lists the statutes from
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violations of which were easier to prove than violations of sodomy
statutes, became a powerful weapon in the regulation and oppression
of homosexuals and other gender nonconformists.7 2
Starting in the 1880s, then, the state significantly increased its
legal regulation of same-gender sexual behavior. It would be a
mistake, however, to view the law as the primary source of meaning
in the construction of a homosexual identity; to believe so would be
to ignore Foucault's insights about the multiplicity of sexuality
discourses, most of which do not emanate directly from state
regulation.7 3 But as Bill Eskridge notes, the law played a "supporting
role" in the creation and marginalization of a homosexual identity
given that the law "reinforced social pressure by normalizing sex
around marital procreation."' 74  Sex outside of such procreation
became subject to increasing legal regulation. At the same time that
medical and psychiatric discourses led to "a unique construction of
identity crystallized around same-sex desire,"' 75 the law became much
more active and aggressive in its regulation of that desire.
World War I brought further changes in the legal regulation of
same-gender sexuality. The war itself was a period of relative
toleration of sexual and gender nonconformity as the nation focused
its attention elsewhere and as male friendships and camaraderie were
encouraged.176 After the war, however, there was a regulatory shift
from pre-war practices. The culture began to view homosexuals not
only as medical and psychiatric aberrations, but also as immoral and
predatory. There was a growing sense, for example, that children
needed to be protected from homosexuals. As Eskridge puts it,
"[t]he state's goals [became] to control and punish the psychopathic
homosexual, to harass and drive underground homosexual
communities and their expression, and to exclude homosexuals from
citizenship-all in the name of protecting children from a dangerous
force threatening their development into heterosexuals.'
7
Eskridge documents how sodomy and other criminal
prosecutions specifically targeted at homosexuals (for disorderly
all fifty states (including their years of enactment) intended to protect minors in sexual
matters. Id. app. A-3 at 342-51.
171. See id. at 32-34.
172. See id. at 24-34.
173. See supra Part I.A, notes 29-62 and accompanying text.
174. ESKRIDGE, supra note 158, at 52.
175. STEVEN SEIDMAN, EMBATTLED EROS: SEXUAL POLITICS AND ETHICS IN
CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 146 (1992).
176. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 158, at 39.
177. Id. at 40.
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conduct, lewd conduct, and solicitation) increased substantially
during the postwar period.78  Furthermore, the state harassed
homosexuals in public places (such as bars, parks, streets, and cafes)
where they sought to meet and associate.7 9 The state also, in the
period between the wars, intensified its censorship of gay books,
magazines, and theatre."' "The homosexual was not only a sexual
outlaw but one who by World War II had clearly caught the eye of
the government.'
' 81
World War II, like World War I, saw a period of relative
toleration toward gender and sexual nonconformity.' 2 But as the
nation refocused on domestic issues after the war, the repression of
homosexuals increased, even beyond the levels that were seen in the
period after World War I. In the late 1940s and 1950s, government
agencies hunted down lesbians and gay men through the use of the
criminal law at a level of ferocity not seen before or since. As
Eskridge explains, "[t]he state between 1946 and 1961 imposed
criminal punishments on as many as a million lesbians and gay men
engaged in consensual adult intercourse, dancing, kissing, or holding
hands."'83 Police departments created special vice or morals squads
that specialized in the targeting of homosexuals.Y4 Police stakeouts,
178. See id. at 41-42.
179. See id. at 44-45. George Chauncey describes how the regulation of homosexuality
in New York City in the 1920s and 1930s became progressively more intense and
pernicious as governmental agencies (such as the police and the alcohol regulation
authorities) aggressively enforced laws against homosexuals. See GEORGE CHAUNCEY,
GAY NEW YORK: GENDER, URBAN CULTURE AND THE MAKING OF THE GAY MALE
WORLD 1890-1940, at 331-54 (1994).
180. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 158, at 46-49.
181. Id. at 43.
182. See JOHN D'EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES: THE MAKING
OF A HOMOSEXUAL MINORITY IN THE UNITED STATES 1940-1970, at 24-31 (1983);
ESKRIDGE, supra note 158, at 59. Eskridge argues that "[b]y offering unprecedented
opportunities to women and by throwing men and women into homosocial settings, World
War II ... relaxed gender and sex roles and fueled the postwar expansion of homosexual
urban subcultures." Id.
183. ESKRIDGE, supra note 158, at 60. In addition to prosecutions for sodomy, which
according to Eskridge ranged from two thousand to five thousand nationally between 1946
and 1961, see id. at 66, "[p]olice also arrested people who cross-dressed, danced or flirted
with someone of the same sex, loitered in public restrooms, and solicited sodomy; these
mutually consenting activities could be the basis of arrests for solicitation, vagrancy, public
indecency, loitering, and disorderly conduct, depending on the jurisdiction," id.
184. See id. at 63.
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raids, and undercover operations became "much more aggressive and
invasive than they had been before the war."'185
In addition to the aggressive enforcement of the criminal law, the
1940s and 1950s saw the implementation of policies that identified
and expelled homosexuals from government jobs while excluding gay
applicants from those jobs altogether.'86 Lesbians and gay men were
subject to governmental harassment, surveillance, and witch hunts
with an intensity that matched the treatment of communists and other
leftists during the McCarthy era."8 In the end, however, while the
persecution of lesbians and gay men led to the destruction of
thousands of lives, it did not accomplish the government's "stated
goal of discouraging and erasing homosexual subcultures."'8 8 In fact,
the persecution of lesbians and gay men created a shared sense of
identity as they began to organize and fight back in the 1960s and
1970s.18 9 "Ironically, the American antihomosexual terror helped
create a homosexual rights movement."1 90
The law played a complicated role in this new development;
while it remained (as it remains today) a source of oppression and
discrimination, the law in the 1960s began to retreat somewhat from
the oppressive regulation of same-gender sexual conduct. The first
sign of this partial retreat was the American Law Institute's vote in
1955 to decriminalize consensual sodomy in its Model Penal Code. 91
In 1961, Illinois became the first state to decriminalize consensual
sodomy.192 Since 1961, thirty-one additional states and the District of
Columbia have decriminalized sodomy, either legislatively or through
185. Id. at 64; see also Robert L. Jacobson, Note, "Megan's Law": Reinforcing Old
Patterns of Anti-Gay Police Harassment, 87 GEO. L.J. 2431, 2433-40 (1999) (describing
police tactics used to harass gay men from the 1930s until the 1960s).
186. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 158, at 67-74.
187. See id; John D'Emilio, The Homosexual Menace: The Politics of Sexuality in Cold
War America, in PASSION AND POWER: SEXUALITY IN HISTORY 226-40 (Kathy Peiss &
Christina Simmons eds., 1989).
188. ESKRIDGE, supra note 158, at 82.
189. For an historical overview of this process see D'Emilio, supra note 187, at 129-96;
ERIC MARCUS, MAKING HISTORY: THE STRUGGLE FOR GAY AND LESBIAN RIGHTS
1945-1990, at 93-338 (1992).
190. ESKRIDGE, supra note 158, at 83. It is interesting to consider the connection
between a regime of legal regulation of homosexuality and the existence of a gay rights
movement. "In Italy," for example, "a country that never had anti-homosexual legislation,
even under Mussolini, gay rights has not had the political or social resonance found in the
United States or Germany." Alessandra Stanley, Dueling Festivals: Gay Pride and
Vatican Collide, N.Y. TIMES, June 3,2000, at A4.
191. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 158, at 84.
192. See id.
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judicial rulings based on state constitutional grounds. 193 Six of those
states (and the District of Columbia)'94 have done so after the
Supreme Court upheld the federal constitutionality of Georgia's
sodomy statute in Bowers v. Hardwick.9 s
Beginning in the 1960s, prosecutions for sodomy began to
decrease, as did prosecutions for "cross-dressing, consensual oral sex
and solicitation, and same-sex ... dancing. 19 6  Vague and broad
solicitation, lewdness, disorderly conduct, and vagrancy laws that
states used for decades to harass and oppress lesbians and gay men
began to receive greater attention by legislatures and scrutiny by
courts.9 7 Beginning in the 1960s, legislatures began "repealing
broadly phrased vagrancy and disorderly conduct laws and replacing
them with statutes criminalizing specified acts of public disorder."9
Furthermore.- as the Supreme Court strengthened individual rights of
speech and association during the civil rights era, there were
unintended positive consequences for lesbians and gay men.1 99
Judicial rulings gave lesbians and gay men greater legal protection
allowing them to speak, associate, socialize, and organize.200 Gay
publications, organizations, bars, and cafes began to proliferate as
lesbians and gay men for the first time were afforded partial
protection by the law20
193. See id. app. A-1 at 328-37 (containing a state-by-state history of sodomy statutes).
194. See id. The six states are Georgia, Kentucky, Montana, Nevada, Pennsylvania,
and Tennessee. See id. Since the publication of Eskridge's book, an intermediate
appellate court in Louisiana struck down that state's sodomy statute, only to be reversed
by the state supreme court. See State v. Smith, 729 So. 2d 648, 651-54 (La. Ct. App. 1999),
rev'd 766 So.2d 501, 517 (La. 2000). In Texas, a panel of the Court of Criminal Appeals
struck down that state's sodomy statute, only to be later reversed by the full court sitting
en banc. See Lawrence v. State, 2000 WL 729417 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000), withdrawn,
superseded on reh'g by, 41 S.W.3d 349 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
195. 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986).
196. ESKRIDGE, supra note 158, at 101.
197. See id. at 108-10.
198. Id. at 110.
199. Freedom of association cases such as NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958),
helped lesbians and gay men challenge local ordinances that prohibited them from
congregating. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 158, at 112-13.
200. The most important early case that specifically recognized the rights of association
of gay individuals was One Eleven Wines & Liquors, Inc. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverage
Control, 235 A.2d 12,19 (N.J. 1967). In that case, the New Jersey Supreme Court set aside
penalties imposed by the state against bar owners because they allowed lesbians and gay
men to congregate. Id. The New Jersey court relied inter alia on Supreme Court cases
such as NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965). See One Eleven Wines & Liquors, 235 A.2d at 18.
201. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 158, at 111-25.
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Ironically, then, after decades of legal persecution and
oppression, lesbians and gay men began to turn to the law for
protection. Vermont's enactment of comprehensive domestic
partnership legislation that provides gay and lesbian couples who
enter into civil unions the same rights and benefits enjoyed by
married heterosexual couples is only the most recent and dramatic
example of this phenomenon20° But there have been many others
along the way, including the enactment of state and local laws that
protect lesbians and gay men from discrimination,203 the issuing of
executive orders banning discrimination in federal civilian agencies,2' 4
as well as the recognition by many (though by no means all) judges
that the sexual orientation of gay and lesbian parents is not
inconsistent with the best interests of children.20 5 The result of all of
this is that the law today is as often the protector of lesbians and gay
men as it is their oppressor.
Of course, many law-based oppressions remain and we should
not minimize their impact. Examples are many and include the
following: (1) nineteen states still criminalize sodomy;2 6  (2)
harassment of gay men through solicitation and public lewdness laws,
while less prevalent than in the period after World War II, has by no
means disappeared;2°7 (3) the military continues to discriminate
openly against lesbians and gay men, and such discrimination has
been found by courts to pass constitutional muster;208 (4) three states
202. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 1202 (Supp. 2000). In 1997, Hawaii enacted a statute
conferring limited rights and benefits to couples (including same-gender couples) who
cannot legally marry. See HAW. REv. STAT. § 572 (Supp. 2000).
203. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 158, app. B-2 at 356-61 (listing states and
municipalities that have laws against sexual orientation discrimination).
204. See Exec. Order No. 13,087, 3 C.F.R. § 191 (1999) (amending Exec. Order No.
11,478, 3 C.F.R. § 803 (1966-70) to include sexual orientation in the list of categories for
which discrimination is prohibited).
205. See, e.g., In re M.M.D. v. B.H.M., 662 A.2d 837,854 (D.C. 1995); In re Adoption of
Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 319 (Mass. 1993); In re Adoption of B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271,
1273 (Vt. 1993). But see Constant A. v. Paul C.A., 496 A.2d 1, 3 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985)
(noting the trial court's finding that the "natural mother's lesbian relationship shows her
moral deficiency"); Hertzler v. Hertzler, 908 P.2d 946, 953 (Wyo. 1995) (Golden, C.J.,
dissenting) (noting that the trial judge stated that the "mother's open homosexuality... 'is
likely to negatively affect the development of the children's moral values' ").
206. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 158, app. A-1 at 328-37. Two recent state
constitutional challenges to sodomy statutes have failed. See State v. Smith, 766 So. 2d
501,517 (La. 2000); Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349,350 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
207. See Jacobson, supra note 185, at 2454-55.
208. See, e.g., Able v. United States, 155 F.3d 628, 636 (2d Cir. 1998); Holmes v. Cal.
Army Nat'l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126, 1136-37 (9th Cir. 1997); Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d
915, 934 (4th Cir. 1996).
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(Florida, Mississippi, and Utah)29 currently prohibit lesbians and gay
men from adopting children, and the view that gay and lesbian
parents do not deserve the same legal protections as heterosexual
parents still persists.210
Despite these remaining law-based oppressions, the law as a
codifier of sexual morality today plays a much less important role in
the subordination of lesbians and gay men than it did forty short years
ago. The law by and large no longer provides a hierarchy of
consensual sexual conduct that seeks to distinguish between
permissible and impermissible sexual acts. Even states that still have
sodomy statutes on the books rarely enforce them.2 In the same way
that adultery and fornication statutes have become largely irrelevant
(both legally and morally),212 laws that still oppress lesbians and gay
men have lost their ability to impact significantly the debate regarding
the morality or appropriateness of same-gender sexual acts. While
there remains a considerable societal hostility and animosity towards
lesbians and gay men, those who share those feelings can no longer
rely, as they once did, on having their views consistently reflected in
the law. In fact, the Supreme Court has held that to the extent that a
law is nothing more than the codification of animosity towards
lesbians and gay men, it violates the Equal Protection Clause.213 Our
contemporary legal institutions and rules, which simultaneously
protect and oppress lesbians and gay men, send mixed signals about
the status of homosexuality in our society-signals that largely cancel
themselves out.
This retrenchment in the ability of the law to serve as a code of
conduct that distinguishes between permissible and impermissible
209. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3) (West 1995); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3(2)
(1999); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-1(3)(b) (Supp. 2000). The Utah statute bars all
unmarried cohabiting couples from adopting, but it was clearly aimed at lesbians and gay
men. See Nora Stephens, Don't Adopt These Bills, SALT LAKE TRIB., Feb. 20,2000 at Al.
210. See generally Lynn D. Wardle, The Potential Impact of Homosexual Parenting on
Children, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 833 (arguing for the application of a rebuttable
presumption that parenting by lesbians and gay men is not in the best interests of children
because of the alleged potential harm that such parenting might inflict on children).
211. Even when not enforced, however, sodomy statutes still have negative
implications for gay and lesbian litigants in areas of the law such family, employment, and
immigration. See Diana Hassel, The Use of Criminal Sodomy Laws in Civil Litigation, 79
TEx. L. REv. 813, 831-43 (2001).
212. "The American Law Institute does not define either adultery or fornication as a
crime in its Model Penal Code, observing that such laws are widely disobeyed and rarely
enforced." Sylvia A. Law, Commercial Sex: Beyond Decriminalization, 73 S. CAL. L.
REV. 523, 526 n.8 (2000) (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 213 note on adultery and
fornication (1980)).
213. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634--35 (1996).
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consensual sexual acts allows for the development of an alternative
sexual ethic as individuals have a greater opportunity to affect the
meaning of their sexual acts and sexuality. Foucault in his later work
recognized that the absence of codes of conduct allows for the
development of a sexual ethic that is not based on universal rules.
The absence of codes of conduct permitted the flourishing of an ethic
as a care of the self in Greek and Roman antiquity. 14 Similarly, in the
United States over the last forty years, the law's contribution to the
elaboration of universal standards that affect the perceived morality
of consensual sexual activity has waned. This partial decodification
has allowed for the emergence of a gay and lesbian sexual ethic that,
while different in substance from a Greek sexual ethic, is procedurally
similar in that it encourages the individual to engage in an ethical
process of reflection and self-transformation 1 5
I want to make it clear that what I mean by a partial legal
decodification of sexuality entails the lessening of the ability of or
interest by the law to make distinctions between permissible and
impermissible consensual sexual acts. In this sense, decodification
means not the absence of law, but the absence of law as a form of
normative hierarchy that seeks to distinguish among different kinds
of sexual acts. Thus, by using the term "decodification," I do not
want to suggest that our society has as a descriptive matter embraced,
or that it should as a normative matter aspire to construct, a
libertarian framework that considers the absence of codes or
regulations sufficient to guarantee freedom and personal autonomy.
As I will argue in Part llI.B, the libertarian view that requires only
that the state not interfere with consensual relationships proves to be
insufficient for lesbian and gay men who depend on the state (and the
law) to protect them from discrimination and oppression as well as to
provide them with membership into certain institutions such as
parenting and (potentially) marriage.
2 16
It is also important to note that what I refer to as a partial
decodification of consensual sexual acts has not been limited to the
law. The same applies to other disciplines such as psychiatry. In
1973, the American Psychiatric Association removed homosexuality
from the list of mental illnesses contained in its Diagnostic and
214. See supra Part I.C, notes 104-44 and accompanying text.
215. See infra Part II.C, notes 249-322 and accompanying text.
216. See infra Part III.B, notes 388-416 and accompanying text; see also Eskridge,
supra note 61, at 384 (arguing that in the struggle for gay rights, the "arguments are not
libertarian, because the laws we seek will enlist the state as an ally in our struggle against
social oppression and because such laws will intrude upon private decision-making").
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Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). 17 The DSM, like the
laws that regulate consensual sexuality, is a code of conduct that
distinguishes between acceptable (or normal) and unacceptable (or
abnormal) sex.21 8 As long as homosexuality was officially listed as a
mental illness, the medical and psychiatric professions could continue
to subject lesbians and gay men to their commands and standards.
Over the last thirty years, however, the importance of codes in the
medical regulation of homosexuality has receded considerably as
substantial numbers of American medical doctors, psychiatrists, and
psychologists no longer view homosexuality as a disease.21 9 While I
do not attempt to explore in greater detail the medical decodification
of homosexuality, that phenomenon, like the legal decodification of
homosexuality, has allowed for the emergence of a gay and lesbian
sexual ethic. As these codes play less of a role in defining the
meaning of homosexuality in our society, lesbians and gay men have
been able, through a process of self-definition and self-
transformation, to give ethical meaning to their sexuality and their
sexual acts. Before I turn to a detailed discussion of the content of a
gay and lesbian sexual ethic, I want to explore another kind of
decodification of sexuality that has taken place in the United States in
the last few decades-namely, a moral one.
217. See RONALD BAYER, HOMOSEXUALITY AND AMERICAN PSYCHIATRY: THE
POLITICS OF DIAGNOSIS 101-54 (1981).
218. The DSM "is a fairly reliable map of the current moral hierarchy of sexual
activities." Gayle Rubin, Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of
Sexuality, in PLEASURE AND DANGER: EXPLORING FEMALE SEXUALITY 267, 280
(Carole S. Vance ed., 1984). The most recent edition of the DSM lists exhibitionism,
fetishism, pedophilia, sexual masochism, sexual sadism, transvestic fetishism, voyeurism,
and gender identity disorder as psychiatric illnesses. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC
ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (DSM
IV) 522-38 (1994).
219. See BAYER, supra note 217, at 155-78. In 1975, the American Psychological
Association approved the action taken by the American Psychiatric Association and
adopted the following resolution: "Homosexuality per se implies no impairment in
judgment, stability, reliability, or general social or vocational capabilities; Further, the
American Psychological Association urges all mental health professionals to take the lead
in removing the stigma of mental illness that has long been associated with homosexual
orientations." American Psychological Association, Policy Statements on Lesbian, Gay,
and Bisexual Concerns, at http://www.apa.org/pi/lgbpolicy/against.html (last visited Sept. 6,
2001). Recently, considerable attention has been paid to the appropriateness of medical
and psychiatric regimes that seek to "cure" lesbians and gay men. See generally David B.
Cruz, Controlling Desires: Sexual Orientation Conversion and the Limits of Knowledge
and Law, 72 S. CAL. L. Rev. 1297 (1999) (discussing different "treatments" and
"therapies" aimed at modifying same-gender sexual orientation).
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B. Moral Codification and Decodification of Sexuality
The idea of a sexual morality based on a code of conduct that is
tied to particular sexual acts has its roots in a Christian sexual ethic.
That ethic has two principal components, both of which are traceable
to the biblical writings of St. Paul and to the fourth and fifth centuries
writings of St. Augustine.220 The first component is that sex must take
place within marriage in order to be moral.22 The second component
is that even within marriage, sexual acts must be limited to those that
are reproductive in nature. 2 According to the Christian tradition,
only procreative, marital intercourse can turn sexual pleasure into a
moral good because only such sex is about more than physical
pleasure; it is also about the creation of new life and, what Aquinas
called, the fides of the marital union.3 By fides, Aquinas meant the
union of the mind and body of the two spouses into a unique form of
community characteristic of the marital relationship.P4
Rather than track the historical development of a Christian
sexual ethic, I want to discuss a contemporary (and ostensibly
secular) version of it as represented by the new natural law
philosophy of John Finnis. Finnis is the most prominent
contemporary Anglo-American legal philosopher who promotes a
conception of sexual morality that is based, in part, on a code of
conduct linked to the (im)morality of particular sexual acts 26
Finnis's moral code of sexual conduct is the philosophical equivalent
of a legal codification of prohibited sexual acts. In the same way,
however, that the relevance of legal codes on issues of sexual morality
has waned, so has the relevance of a moral code of conduct that relies
in a significant way on the nature of particular sexual acts to
distinguish between morally acceptable and unacceptable sex.
220. For a helpful synopsis of the development of Christian sexual morality that traces
it through the medieval canon law of the Catholic Church to contemporary America law,
see Mary Becker, Family Law in the Secular State and Restrictions on Same-Sex Marriage:
Two Are Better than One, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 1.
221. See id. at 19-27.
222. See id.
223. See Finnis, supra note 2, at 105.
224. See id. at 107-08.
225. For helpful sources on such a development, see, for example, JAMES BRUNDAGE,
LAW, SEX AND CHRISTIAN SOCIETY IN MEDIEVAL EUROPE (1987); PHILIP L.
REYNOLDS, MARRIAGE IN THE WESTERN CHURCH: THE CHRISTIANIZATION OF
MARRIAGE DURING THE PATRISTIC AND EARLY MEDIEVAL PERIODS (1994);
BOSWELL, supra note 119.
226. See Finnis, supra note 1, at 1063-76; Finnis, supra note 2, at 97-98. For other
representative writings explicating new natural law's assessment of human sexuality, see
George & Bradley, supra note 1; Lee & George, supra note 2.
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At its most basic level, the normative foundation of new natural
law philosophy on issues of sexuality is the connection between sex
and reproduction. Reproduction gives sexual intimacy a higher
purpose; it removes sex from the arena of pleasure and places it in the
seemingly loftier position of supporting the survival of the species.
New natural law theorists, however, do not ground their normative
view of reproductive sexual intimacy on instrumentalist grounds; to
do so would be to demean human sexuality by placing it at the service
of species survival. Thus, new natural law theorists such as Finnis
view sexual intimacy as an indispensable component of the intrinsic
good of marriage.227 According to Finnis, "[g]enital intercourse
between spouses enables them to actualize and experience (and in
that sense express) their marriage itself, as a single reality with two
blessings (children and mutual affection)."'  As Finnis sees it,
lesbians and gay men cannot attain the intrinsic good of marriage
because their intimate relationships have "nothing to do with their
having children by each other, and their reproductive organs cannot
make them a biological (and therefore personal) unit."' 9 Gay sex,
according to Finnis, can "do no more than provide each partner with
an individual gratification" 3° and thus is no different, from a moral
perspective, than sex between two strangers, or with a prostitute, or
with oneself. 1
Finnis explicitly states that what interests him is "the question
[of] whether certain types of acts are morally right or wrong.1232
Feelings of love, mutuality, and friendship in sexual intimacy matter
but only if they are expressed from within the institution of marriage
and if they accompany sexual acts that have "procreative
significance." 33 As Finnis notes, "wrongful sex acts are more
seriously immoral the 'more distant' they are from marital sexual
227. See Finnis, supra note 1, at 1063-64; see also George & Bradley, supra note 1, at
306 ("[W]e hold that marriage and marital intercourse are intrinsically good; and ... we
deny that sexual intercourse may legitimately be instrumentalized to any extrinsic end.").
228. Finnis, supra note 1, at 1064.
229. Id. at 1066.
230. Id.
231. See id. at 1067.
232. See John M. Finnis, Law, Morality, and "Sexual Orientation," 9 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 11, 30 n.8 (1995) (emphasis added). This is the same essay as
Finnis, supra note 1, with some additional comments by Finnis added to the footnotes.
233. See Finnis, supra note 1, at 1067. For Finnis, sexual acts have "procreative
significance" if they in general could lead to reproduction, regardless of whether they
actually do so. See id. In this way, Finnis can prioritize penile-vaginal intercourse even
when engaged in by a sterile or elderly couple.
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intercourse." 4 It is possible, therefore, to construct a hierarchy of
sexual acts based on Finnis's conception of sexual morality:
1. Uncontracepted penile-vaginal sex by a married couple
2. Contracepted penile-vaginal sex by a married couple
3. Oral or anal sex by a married couple
4. Any kind of sex by an unmarried heterosexual couple
5. Masturbation
6. Any kind of sex with someone of the same gender
For Finnis, only the first kind of sexual intimacy on this list is
moral. All others, including contracepted penile-vaginal sex by a
married couple, are not. 5 There is a hierarchy for Finnis because the
farther one moves away from marital reproductive sex, the more
immoral the sex becomes. While Finnis undoubtedly believes that
same-gender intimacy (item six on the hierarchy) is worse than
contracepted penile-vaginal sex by a married couple (item two), the
common denominator of acts two through six is that they are
motivated largely by a desire to experience physical pleasurey 
6
Masturbation and same-gender intimacy are at the bottom of the
hierarchy for Finnis because he cannot conceive of any reason for
engaging in those acts other than the seeking of pleasure. No
meaningful human connection, and no actual mutuality, can arise
from sexual conduct that has no resemblance to marital reproductive
sex. While lesbians and gay men may think that a meaningful
mutuality is a component of their sexual intimacy, such mutuality is
for them an emotion rather than a reality:
Reality is known in judgment, not in emotion, and in reality,
whatever the generous hopes and dreams and thoughts of
giving with which some same-sex partners may surround
their sexual acts, those acts cannot express or do more than
is expressed or done if two strangers engage in such activity
to give each other pleasure, or a prostitute pleasures a client
234. Finnis, supra note 2, at 98.
235. See id. at 1068 n.50; see also John M. Finnis, Natural Law and Unnatural Acts, 11
HEYTHROP J. 365, 384 (1970) (arguing that "the choice to exclude the possibility of
procreation while engaging in intercourse is always, and in an obvious and unambiguous
way... a choice directly and immediately against [the] basic value" of procreation).
236. See Finnis, supra note 1, at 1067. Lee and George argue that when individuals
engage in masturbation or sodomy (whether homosexual or heterosexual), they
experience pleasures as individuals rather than as a unit, and therefore use sex
instrumentally. See Lee & George, supra note 2, at 146-47. According to them, only
married couples who engage in coitus experience sex noninstrumentally, that is, as part of
the basic good of marital union. See id. at 144.
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to give him pleasure in return for money, or (say) a man
masturbates to give himself pleasure and a fantasy of more
human relationships after a grueling day on the assembly
line.
237
Even when mutuality exists "in reality," it is the nature of sexual
acts that for Finnis often plays a determinative role in the moral
assessment of sexuality. Thus, the same married heterosexual couple
can have the same level of love and respect for each other, and yet if
one day they engage in uncontracepted penile-vaginal sex, they use
their sexuality morally, but if on the next day they use a condom or
engage in oral sex, they use it immorally. Again, while Finnis is not
dismissive or unmindful of the importance of mutuality, the
determinative role in his conception of sexual morality is often played
not by mutuality but by the nature of the sexual act itself. No degree
of love, respect, or concern for the other will make sexual acts two
through six in the hierarchy free of moral suspicion.238
I have argued elsewhere that when Finnis questions the ability of
lesbians and gay men to participate in sexually intimate relationships
characterized by a true and meaningful mutuality, he questions their
basic humanity. 9 I do not here want to take issue with Finnis's
hierarchy; I simply want to note that his conception of sexual morality
requires a hierarchy of some sort. Finnis may argue that his
conception of sexual morality does not focus on particular sexual acts,
but that it instead distinguishes between marital sex and non-marital
sex.240 That argument is not persuasive because the distinction that
Finnis tries to make is itself based on the premise that only one kind
of sexual act can be "marital" in nature. Again, Finnis relies on a
hierarchy when he argues that "wrongful sex acts are more seriously
immoral the 'more distant' they are from marital sexual
intercourse. '241  In the end, not much has changed between the
Christian penitentials of the sixth century, which codified
proscriptions against all sexual acts other than penile-vaginal
intercourse within marriage,242 and Finnis's conception of sexual
morality.
237. Finnis, supra note 1, at 1067.
238. See Finnis, supra note 235, at 385 (arguing "that some sexual acts are ... always
wrong because [ofl an inadequate response" to the basic good of procreation).
239. See Carlos A. Ball, Moral Foundations for a Discourse on Same-Sex Marriage:
Looking Beyond Political Liberalism, 85 GEO. LJ. 1871, 1911-19 (1997).
240. See Finnis, supra note 1, at 1067 (arguing that "sexual acts are not unitive in their
significance unless they are marital").
241. See Finnis, supra note 2, at 98.
242. See supra notes 97-102 and accompanying text.
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There are many Americans today whose conception of sexual
morality remains wedded to a hierarchical list of particular kinds of
sexual acts (even if some would draw the line between moral and
immoral sexual acts at different places than Finnis does), or who, at
the very least, view all sexual acts outside of marriage as immoral 43
On the other hand, there are many Americans (gay and straight) who
have delinked their conception of sexual morality from a Finnisian
hierarchy of sexual acts. This delinking began at the start of the
twentieth century and reached its apogee in the decades after World
War II. As the twentieth century progressed, more Americans began
to view sex as having functions that went beyond reproduction and
included the deepening of emotional bonds and the enjoyment of
physical pleasure? 44
The tension between a traditional conception of sexual morality
founded on a code of conduct that seeks to distinguish between
permissible and impermissible consensual sexual acts and one that de-
emphasizes the importance of privileged sexual acts (such as penile-
vaginal sex within marriage) remains quite strong in our society.
Many of our most divisive political issues, from abortion to
homosexuality to teenage sexuality, reflect this tension.4 It is, in a
sense, easier for those who subscribe to a traditional conception of
sexual morality to articulate a concise sexual ethic because they can
point to a hierarchy of sexual acts that uses marriage and
reproduction to distinguish between moral and immoral sexual
conduct. Conversely, it is more challenging for those of us who reject
the linkage between sexual ethics and a hierarchical code of particular
sexual acts. But it is certainly not impossible. In fact, a group called
the Sexuality Information and Education Council of the United
States (SEICUS) recently took out a full page ad in the New York
Times to explain how its conception of sexual ethics differs from what
243. A comprehensive survey of 2483 Americans conducted in the early 1990s, known
as the National Health and Social Life Survey, found that approximately one-third of the
respondents believed that all extramarital sex is wrong. See ROBERT T. MICHAEL ET AL.,
SEX IN AMERICA: A DEFINITIVE SURVEY 232-34 (1994). Nearly half believed that "sex
should be part of a loving relationship, but that it need not always be reserved for
marriage." Id. at 233. A little more than one-quarter of the respondents believed that
"sex need not have anything to do with love." Id.
244. See, e.g., NANCY F. CoTr, PUBLIC Vows: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE
NATION 181-82 (2000); JOHN D'EMILIO & ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, INTIMATE
MATTERS: A HISTORY OF SEXUALITY IN AMERICA 239-74 (1988); SEIDMAN, supra note
175, at 17-48; STEPHEN SEIDMAN, ROMANTIC LONGINGS: LOVE IN AMERICA 1830-
1980, at 65-156 (1991).
245. See SEIDMAN, supra note 175, at 5-8.
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I have here described as the traditional Christian sexual ethic.246 The
ad was titled a "Religious Declaration on Sexual Morality, Justice,
and Healing" and listed several principles including "Sexuality is
God's life-giving and life-fulfilling gift" and "Our faith traditions
celebrate the goodness of creation, including our bodies and our
sexuality." 247 One of the principles set forth in the advertisement is
particularly relevant for our discussion and is worth quoting in its
entirety:
Our culture needs a sexual ethic focused on personal
relationships and social justice rather than particular sexual
acts.
All persons have the right and the responsibility to lead
sexual lives that express love, justice, mutuality,
commitment, consent, and pleasure. Grounded in respect
for the body and for the vulnerability that intimacy brings,
this ethic fosters physical, emotional, and spiritual health. It
accepts no double standards and applies to all persons,
without regard to sex, gender, color, age, bodily condition,
marital status, or sexual orientation.2 8
Alternatives to a conception of sexual ethics that is founded on a
hierarchical code of conduct look to normative values that are
delinked from particular sexual acts. In the next section, I discuss
what I take to be the values of one such alternative, namely, that
offered by a contemporary gay and lesbian sexual ethic.
C. A Gay and Lesbian Sexual Ethic
Many opponents of gay rights view a gay and lesbian sexuality as
lacking moral or ethical value.249 Critics of gay rights usually frame
the debate as a struggle between morality on one (their) side and
immorality on the other. The later Foucault, by writing so
provocatively about nontraditional sexuality within a framework of
sexual ethics, however, helps us understand how lesbians and gay men
approach their sexuality ethically.
The shift away from the legal, medical, and moral codification of
same-gender sexuality has had important implications for the
246. See Religious Declaration on Sexual Morality, Justice, and Healing, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 25, 2000, at A19.
247. Id.
248. Id. (emphasis added). More information on the declaration can be found at
http://wvw.religionproject.org (last visited Sept. 7,2001).
249. See Finnis, supra note 1, at 1063-76; George & Bradley, supra note 1, at 313-18;
Podhoretz, supra note 1, at 1063-76.
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emergence of a gay and lesbian sexual ethic. The de-emphasis of
codes as sources of sexual morality has allowed lesbians and gay men
to construct and abide by a new form of sexual ethic, an ethic that has
both procedural and substantive components. I discuss the former in
Part lI.C.1 and the latter in Part II.C.2. I finish this section of the
Article with a discussion, in Part II.C.3, of some of the implications of
a gay and lesbian sexual ethic.
Before I begin this discussion, I want to acknowledge a possible
criticism of my treating lesbians and gay men in a unitary fashion
without emphasizing the differences between them. I believe that
there is sufficient common ground between lesbians and gay men in
terms of how they construct ethical lives through their sexuality that
permits us to speak in broad terms of a gay and lesbian sexual ethic. I
do not believe, for example, that lesbians and gay men experience or
celebrate values of openness, mutuality, and pleasure, which I identify
below as constitutive values of a gay and lesbian sexual ethic, in
significantly different ways. When one emphasizes commonalties,
however, there is always the danger of minimizing important
differences. Lesbians, for example, have to deal with their own
distinct oppression as women in a society that retains strong
patriarchal norms and values. It also appears that some lesbians have
a more fluid sense of their sexual identity than do most gay men. °
Explorations of these differences and others are important and merit
their own separate projects. I believe, however, that there are enough
commonalties that make it fruitful to speak of a gay and lesbian
sexual ethic that is broad enough to encompass the intimate lives and
aspirations of both groups.
1. The Process of a Gay and Lesbian Sexual Ethic
The procedural component of a gay and lesbian sexual ethic
consists of a process of self-definition that is similar to what Foucault
describes as a care of the self. A gay and lesbian sexual ethic emerges
as lesbians and gay men give ethical meaning to their sexual practices
through reflection. The ethical meaning of gay and lesbian sexuality
will not be found in societal sexual norms, most of which aim to
stigmatize and marginalize lesbians and gay men based on their
sexual conduct. Instead, the gay or lesbian individual must turn
inward to reflect and elaborate on the ethical meaning of his or her
250. See Laura S. Brown, Lesbian Identities: Concepts and Issues, in LESBIAN, GAY,
BISEXUAL IDENTITIES OVER THE LIFESPAN 3, 4-18 (Antony R. D'Augelli & Charlotte J.
Patterson eds., 1995).
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sexual practices. The legal, medical, and moral decodification of
sexuality as represented by the waning of rigid normative hierarchies
of sexual acts has given lesbians and gay men greater freedom to craft
their own ethical sexual lives.
Opponents of gay rights often refer derisively to a gay and
lesbian "lifestyle." 1 Lesbians and gay men often respond that just
because one engages in sex with someone of the same gender does
not mean that one leads a different lifestyle.~ But opponents of gay
rights may be on to something when they speak of a gay lifestyle,
even if the implications of their observations (or, perhaps more
accurately, of their accusations) are the opposite of what they
contend. For Foucault, a gay style of life is a positive, not a negative,
because a gay life can be styled and crafted through the relationship
that the gay person has towards his or her sexuality. The style
emanates from the creative and transformative possibilities of same-
gender sex. Thus Foucault asked:
Is it possible to create a homosexual mode of life?... It
seems to me that a way of life can yield a culture and an
ethics. To be 'gay,' I think, is not to identify with the
psychological traits and the visible masks of the homosexual,
but to try to define and develop a way of life.2 3
As David Halperin puts it, "Foucault in effect seizes on that most
abjected and devalued feature of gay male self-fashioning, namely,
style.., and finds in it a rigorous, austere, and transformative
technology of the self which produces concrete possibilities for the
development of personal autonomy."'  The practices of the self
engaged in by lesbians and gay men lead to "new forms of
relationship, new modes of knowledge, new means of creativity, and
new possibilities of love." 5
In a gay and lesbian sexual ethic, then, what distinguishes ethical
sexual conduct from unethical sexual conduct is not the nature of the
sexual act itself but instead how the individual uses it to craft an
251. See, e.g., Bryan Fischer, Gay Lifestyle Should Not Be Endorsed Anywhere, IDAHO
STATESMAN (Boise, Idaho), Sept. 28, 1999, at 7B.
252. See, e.g., Liam Miller, Letter to the Editor, Lifestyle Not the Word for Gay Pride
Reporting, NEWS & RECORD (Greensboro, N.C.), June 19, 1999, at A10 (arguing that
"[t]here is no one 'gay lifestyle,' just as there is no one heterosexual lifestyle.").
253. MICHELFOUCAULT, Friendship as a Way of Life, in ETHICS: SUBJECTIVITY AND
TRUTH, supra note 5, at 135, 137-38; see also id. at 137 (noting that homosexuality
"make[s] us work on ourselves and invent-I do not say discover-a manner of being that
is still improbable").
254. HALPERIN, supra note 20, at 73-74.
255. Id. at 79.
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ethical life. Thus, Edmund White has it exactly wrong when he
argues that sex is about aesthetics and not about ethics. 6 It is
precisely the fact that sex can be an integral part of an aesthetics of
existence that imbues it with ethical meaning. A gay and lesbian
sexual ethic is about crafting a certain relationship with the self. I use
the word "crafting" purposefully because it suggests active
participation by the individual in the molding and creating of an
ethical life, akin to the work that a craftsman or an artist does in
creating an object of beauty. "Sex is not a fatality," Foucault noted,
"it's a possibility for creative life." 7
It is true, of course, that not every lesbian and gay man views her
or his sexual life through the rather rarefied prism of aesthetics. But
all sexually active lesbians and gay men must at some point and at
some level cope with the dissonance between their self-worth and
self-regard as sexual beings and the societal norms that deem their
sexuality to be abnormal, perverse, and immoral. Coping with this
dissonance requires the constructing and crafting of ethical sexual
lives that are built around an alternative sexual ethic. This process
does not require endless self-redefinition and self-transformation;
lesbian and gay men do not constantly re-evaluate their ethical
assessments of their sexual lives. It is reasonable to assume that they,
like everyone else, find routine and stability in ethical judgments
appealing. But before they can settle into a routine, there is ethical
work to be done as they reflect on what their sexuality means to them
quite apart from what society tells them it should mean. They must
construct ethical lives where love, relationships, families, and
communities are built around a form of sexuality that most of the rest
of society considers at best odd and at worst perverse and immoral.
Lesbians and gay men have to themselves give ethical meaning to
their sexual lives; society will not do it for them. Lesbians and gay
men must transform themselves from the perverse, abnormal, and
immoral persons that society deems them to be into individuals who
use their sexuality as a way of crafting ethical lives. They must, as
Sarah Hoagland puts it, "create meaning through [their] living." 8
256. "Sexual habit.., to my mind is... an aesthetic rather than an ethical issue, a
matter (so long as no one is hurt) of what gives pleasure rather than what is good or right."
EDMUND WHITE, STATES OF DESIRE: TRAVELS IN GAY AMERICA 38 (1980).
257. MICHEL FOUCAULT, Sex, Power, and the Politics of Identity, in ETHICS:
SUBJECTIVITY AND TRUTH, supra note 5, at 163, 163.
258. SARAH L. HOAGLAND, LESBIAN ETHICS: TOWARD NEW VALUE 13 (1988).
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2. The Substance of a Gay and Lesbian Sexual Ethic
I should acknowledge at the start of this section that Foucault
never explicitly gave his conception of ethics a substantive content; he
never intended, in other words, to tell people what to do or how to go
about doing it. Given the constant barrage of accusations made by
opponents of gay rights about the supposed immorality of gay and
lesbian sexuality, however, it is normatively acceptable and politically
necessary to explore the substantive elements of a gay and lesbian
sexual ethic.
The process of ethical self-transformation in which many lesbians
and gay men engage in today has led to the emergence of substantive
values that are constitutive of a gay and lesbian sexual ethic. In my
estimation, that ethic includes the values of openness, mutuality, and
pleasure. I discuss each of these values below. Before I do, however,
I want to make it clear that I am not suggesting that these are the only
values that are part of a gay and lesbian sexual ethic or that the way
in which I interpret them is the only way of doing so. Others may
want to offer additional values or describe the values that I identify in
different ways. My goal is less to offer a definitive and final
interpretation of a contemporary gay and lesbian sexual ethic than it
is to argue for the existence of such an ethic that, regardless of its
precise contours, constitutes a powerful and appealing alternative to
the traditional Christian sexual ethic.
a. Openness
An important value in a gay and lesbian sexual ethic is openness,
a straightforward value that need not detain us long. Foucault in The
History of Sexuality, Volume I, noted that society's power relations
and systems of knowledge simultaneously create, marginalize, and
silence sexual identities that are considered abnormal or perverse.29
The principle of openness addresses the silencing element in the triad
noted by Foucault. By remaining silent, we as lesbians and gay men
contribute to our own marginalization. For lesbians and gay men, to
be silent about issues of sexuality is to implicitly contribute to
society's disapproval of homosexuality.
It is common for lesbians and gay men to be told, "you do
whatever you want to do, just don't assume that others want to hear
about it." That is an ethically untenable principle for a gay or lesbian
person to abide by because the silencing only deepens the stigma and
259. See supra Part I.A, notes 29-62 and accompanying text.
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marginalization of the conduct that then, in turn, reinforces the
silence. Through openness, lesbians and gay men can attempt to
break this never-ending loop. The starting point of a gay and lesbian
sexual ethic, then, entails a refusal to contribute to our own silencing.
In many ways, the AIDS crisis has made it impossible for
homosexuals-and gay men in particular-to keep our sexuality
hidden. Remaining in the closet in the face of such death and
suffering threatens one's integrity and self-respect. While sex can be
kept private and hidden, death and dying cannot. A gay and lesbian
sexual ethic encourages lesbians and gay men to find strength and
dignity through the very same sexual acts that societal norms rely on
to marginalize and oppress them. With AIDS, gay men have the
additional need to seek strength and dignity in the face of a deadly
epidemic and under the onslaught of vituperative attacks by some
conservatives (mostly Christian evangelicals) who equate AIDS with
a just punishment for immoral behavior 60 Under such conditions,
the first step toward using one's sexuality ethically is an open
acknowledgment of it.
b. Mutuality
Mutuality is a second substantive value in a gay and lesbian
sexual ethic, one that serves as common ground for bringing together
different ways of thinking about the role of sex in the lives of lesbians
and gay men. The sociologist Steven Seidman has identified two
primary strains in gay sexual culture. The first is libertarian and holds
that the only restraint on sexual activity should be consent.26' The
second is romanticist and views sex instrumentally as creating and
260. See MICHAEL BRONSKI, THE PLEASURE PRINCIPLE: SEX, BACKLASH, AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR GAY FREEDOM 75 (199S); see also Dr. Koop Warns of Spread of AIDS,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1987, at Cl (noting that the Reverend Jerry Falwell in the past
stated that "AIDS could be God's judgment against a nation that chooses to live
immorally"); God Hates Fags, at http://www.godhatesfags.com/main/aboutwbc.html (last
visited Sept. 7, 2001) (explaining that the activities of the Westboro Baptist Church of
Topeka, Kansas, include engaging in sidewalk demonstrations displaying signs stating that
"AIDS CURES FAGS" and "THANK GOD FOR AIDS").
261. According to the libertarian gay ethic,
[t]he only moral rule governing sexual desire and behavior should be a norm of
mutual consent. This ethic fits, of course, with gays' struggle for rights and social
inclusion. A libertarian ethic maximizes tolerance for diverse intimate lifestyle
choices. For many homosexuals, it also resonate[s] with the elaboration of a gay
male urban community that [is], in fact, organized around sexually oriented
institutions, e.g., bathhouses, bars, pornography theaters, and sex shops.
SEIDMAN, supra note 175, at 172.
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strengthening emotional bonds between individuals. 62 The tension
between these two viewpoints manifests itself periodically in
criticisms by gay commentators about promiscuity and an excessive
focus on sex among some in the gay male community.26 3 Following
such complaints, there is often a response by other gay commentators
who view any criticism of a free and unrestrained sexuality as a threat
to gay liberation and as a dangerous incorporation of traditional and
conservative heterosexual values (such as monogamy and marriage)
into the gay sexual culture!' 6 An inclusive gay sexual ethic, therefore,
must somehow reconcile the different perspectives of the libertarian
and romanticist camps. In my estimation, the value of mutuality (by
which I mean respect and concern for the needs and vulnerabilities of
the sexual partner) provides the framework for an inclusive sexual
ethic that brings together both libertarians and romanticists within
the gay and lesbian community.
Mutuality entails more than mere consent because mutuality
presupposes a respect and concern for the other person, neither of
which is required by consent. In fact, some libertarians within the gay
community have argued that since the only relevant issue on matters
of sex is consent, consensual sex is outside "of the realm of
morality. 2 65 If we demand mutuality, however, we make it clear that
262. Under the romanticist view,
[s]ex is understood as involving a dense web of individual feelings and longings.
The proper sphere of sex is in intimate committed relationships where the
integrity of each individual's feelings is respected. As a medium of intimate
bonding, sex should exhibit caring, tender qualities, and individuals should
always be treated as complex whole beings. From the standpoint of sexual
romanticism, sex that is devoid of the thick emotional and social content of
intimate bonds is morally suspect if not outright dehumanizing.
Id. at 173.
263. See GABRIEL ROTELLO, SEXUAL ECOLOGY: AIDS AND THE DESTINY OF GAY
MEN 1-122 (1997) (arguing that the high number of sexual partners among some gay men
in the 1970s and 1980s significantly contributed to the spread of the AIDS epidemic in the
United States); MICHELANGELO SIGNORILE, LIFE OUTSIDE, at xxv (1997) (arguing that
"a highly commercialized gay sexual culture sells a particular physical aesthetic to us and
demands that we conform to it"); Larry Kramer, Gay Culture, Redefined, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 12, 1997, at A35 (arguing that "[a]llowing sex-centrism to remain the sole definition
of homosexuality is now coming to be seen as the greatest act of self-destruction").
264. See Michael Bronski, Behind the Sex Panic! Debate, HARV. GAY & LESBIAN
REV., Spring 1998, at 29; Caleb Crain, Pleasure Principles: Queer Theorists and Gay
Journalists Wrestle Over the Politics of Sex, LINGUA FRANCA, Oct. 1997, at 27, 27-31, 36-
37; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Gay Culture Weighs Sense and Sexuality, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23,
1997, § 4, at 1. The citations in this and the previous footnote relate to the intra-
community debate that took place in the 1990s. Seidman recounts in great detail the
debate that took place in the 1980s. See SEIDMAN, supra note 175, at 154-70.
265. SEIDMAN, supra note 175, at 171.
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the sexual actor must accept a minimum level of moral responsibility
for the well-being of the other person; if the actor does not meet the
needs and concerns of the other person, the sexual act will lack the
requisite degree of mutuality 66 A concern for mutuality also
requires a recognition of the sexual other as a vulnerable human
being. Sexual intimacy by its very nature requires a letting go, a
trusting of the other, a lowering of self-protective mechanisms, all of
which can make the parties feel vulnerable and insecure. By being
respectful and considerate of the other, however, sex that takes place
in a context of mutuality helps the other turn initial feelings of
vulnerability and insecurity into ones of self-assurance and self-
respect.
Mutuality is, of course, often present in sexual intimacy that is
part of loving and committed relationships (though as I argue below
mutuality can also be present in sexual encounters where there is no
affectional connection between the parties).267 It is a shame that
Foucault, in his extensive discussions of sexuality, did not speak more
of the affectional implications of sexual acts. As Mark Poster has
noted, "the great lacuna of Foucault's history of sexuality [is] a
relative and remarkable absence of discussion about the affective
nuances of sexual relations."2' In at least one interview given
towards the end of his life, however, Foucault did address the ethical
implications of the affection and love that can accompany same-
gender sexual acts. 69 What Foucault said was fascinating (which
makes one wish he had said more!). He started by noting that society
is less troubled by gay sex than it is by gay love. A same-gender
sexual act does not by itself raise "troubling [questions about]
266. Feminist theory has been critical of liberalism's almost exclusive emphasis on
consent in matters of sex. See Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and the Legal Control
of Sexual Conduct, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 777, 796-97 (1988). The problem with consent is
that it does not account for unequal bargaining power (along, for example, gender lines)
between the sexual partners. See RAYMOND A. BELLIOTTI, GOOD SEX: PERSPECTIVES
ON SEXUAL ETHICS 86-96 (1993). The norm of mutuality, which demands respect and
concern for the sexual partner, can better take into account inequalities between the
parties. See Chamallas, supra, at 835-43; see also ESKRIDGE, supra note 158, at 170
(noting that "[t]he norm for sexual intimacy that has been advanced by feminist and gay
legal theory is mutuality: sex is good and normal when the participants welcome it, when
the sex is truly a joint enterprise meeting the needs of the partners").
267. See infra notes 286-92 and accompanying text.
268. Poster, supra note 127, at 214. Poster suggests that "[p]erhaps the reason for the
omission lies in Foucault's aversion to Freudian discourse, laden as it is with the question
of conscious and unconscious feelings." Id.; see also TERRY EAGLETON, THE IDEOLOGY
OF THE AESTHETIC 395 (1990) (arguing that under Foucault's analysis, "[w]e are ... not
permitted to enter the tabooed realms of affection, emotional intimacy and compassion").
269. See FOUCAULT, supra note 253, at 135.
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affection, tenderness, friendship, fidelity, camaraderie, and
companionship, things that our rather sanitized society can't allow a
place for without fearing the formation of new alliances and the tying
together of unforeseen lines of force.""27 It is precisely because same-
gender intimacy can lead to new emotional possibilities and new loves
that society fears it. "To imagine a sexual act that doesn't conform to
law or nature is not what disturbs people. But that individuals are
beginning to love one another-there's the problem."271 Foucault's
astute observations are reflected in our current debates over same-sex
marriage. Our society today, as David Halperin points out, has an
"easier [time] ... legaliz[ing] gay sex than gay marriage. ' 272 While in
most states gay sex is no longer a criminal act, no jurisdiction
recognizes same-sex marriage. 3
With the exception of the recent enactment of the Vermont civil
union statute, lesbians and gay men have failed in their attempts to
gain meaningful state recognition and protection of their
relationships. Despite the absence of pre-determined relational
frameworks (legal and otherwise) upon which to rely, it is nonetheless
remarkable how lesbians and gay men, have, over the last few
decades, created new types of relationships and loves with their own
distinctive characteristics and forms.274 Gay families, for example, do
not have a pre-determined biological structure. They can include
close friends, current and former lovers, adopted children, and
children from previous heterosexual relationships, among others.275
Instead of organizing families around principles of biology, gay
families are "[o]rganized through ideologies of love, choice, and
creation."276 Thus, by their very nature, gay families are more fluid
and accommodating than traditional heterosexual families, which are
270. Id. at 136.
271. Id. at 136-37. Foucault noted the bind in which some institutions find themselves
when they simultaneously foment and discourage same-gender camaraderie and
companionship. An example is the military, "where love between men is ceaselessly
provoked [appelj] and shamed. Institutional codes can't validate these relations with
multiple intensities, variable colors, imperceptible movements and changing forms. These
relations short-circuit it and introduce love where there's supposed to be only law, rule, or
habit." Id. at 137.
272. HALPERIN, supra note 20, at 98.
273. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
274. As Mark Blasius has noted, lesbians and gay men "must invent ways of relating to
each other because there are not ready-made cultural or historical models or formulas for
erotic same-sex relationships, as there are for different-sex erotic relationships." MARK
BLASIUS, GAY AND LESBIAN POLITICS: SEXUALITY AND THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW
ETHIC 191 (1994).
275. See KATH WESTON, FAMILIES WE CHOOSE: LESBIANS, GAYS, KINSHIP 3 (1991).
276. Id. at 27.
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primarily defined through biological ties.277 Similarly, committed and
sexually intimate gay and lesbian relationships cannot rely on pre-
determined gender roles that have traditionally been incorporated
into heterosexual intimate relationships (such as the role of the male
money earner and that of the female homemaker). When gay or
lesbian partners decide that their sexual intimacy leads to emotional
bonds that are strong enough to make their lives into one, they must
work out the arrangements and dynamics of their relationship with
little societal or legal guidance. The structure and form of gay and
lesbian relationships and families do not depend on pre-determined
concepts of law and biology or on presumptions about gender roles.
Instead, the structure and form are provided by the mutuality (as
reflected in reciprocity and support) that exists between the partners.
It has been argued that "[t]he aesthetics of self-creation and self-
fashioning only puts emphasis on 'the constructive, creative nature of
our expressive languages, and ignores the 'dialogical setting, which
binds us to others.' "278 In fact, the later Foucault has been criticized
for emphasizing an ethics of individualism that ignores relationships,
communal ties, and collective action.279 In Foucault's defense, he
made it clear that the care of the self, as practiced in antiquity,
"constituted, not an exercise in solitude, but a true social practice."8 0
He also noted that while the "care for the self is ethical in itself... it
277. "In [gay] families we choose, the agency conveyed by 'we' emphasizes each
person's part in constructing gay families, just as the absence of agency in the term
'biological family' reinforces the sense of blood as an immutable fact over which
individuals exert little control." Id. at 38.
278. Lothar Bredella, Aesthetics and Ethics: Incommensurable, Identical or
Conflicting?, in ETHICS & AESTHETICS: THE MORAL TURN OF POSTMODERNISM 29, 40
(Gerhard Hoffmann & Alfred Hornung eds., 1996) (quoting CHARLES TAYLOR, THE
ETHICS OF AUTHENTICITY 67 (1992)).
279. See, e.g., EAGLETON, supra note 268, at 393 ("Foucault's vigorously self-mastering
individual remains wholly monadic. Society is just an assemblage of autonomous self-
disciplining agents, with no sense that their self-realization might flourish within bonds of
mutuality."); Herbert Grabes, Ethics, Aesthetics, and Alterity, in ETHICS & AESTHETICS,
supra note 278, at 13, 20-21 (noting that the "individualist ethics" of thinkers such as
Foucault "is gravely deficient concerning the problematic side of intersubjective alterity");
Jean Grimshaw, Practices of Freedom, in UP AGAINST FOUCAULT, supra note 104, at 51,
68 (arguing that in Foucault's writings "there is no sense ... of collective goals or
aspirations"); LOUIS MCNAY, FOUCAULT AND FEMINISM: POWER, GENDER AND THE
SELF 163-64 (1992) (arguing that Foucault's "ethics privileges a notion of the self
establishing a relation with the self, rather than understanding the self as embedded in and
formed through types of social interaction").
280. FOUCAULT, supra note 7, at 51 (emphasis added). In classical antiquity, there was
an insistence "on the need to fulfill one's obligations to mankind, to one's fellow-citizens,
and to one's family .... [L]axity and self-satisfaction in practices of social withdrawal"
were denounced. Id. at 42.
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[also] implies complex relationships with others insofar as this ethos
of freedom is also a way of caring for others." 1 These statements
notwithstanding, Foucault was not as explicit as he should have been
about the relational and associational components of his conception
of ethics.2
Despite the fact that Foucault did not explicitly emphasize the
connection between relationships and communal ties on the one hand
and ethics on the other, the very idea of a gay and lesbian sexual ethic
suggests shared values by collective entities (gay and lesbian
friendships, relationships, families, and communities),z 3 It is not an
individualistic ethic in the libertaian sense where the primary norm is
freedom constrained only by issues of consent-rather, it is a
collective ethic (or an ethos) developed by a group of individuals
whom society has marginalized and stigmatized because of their
sexuality and whose ethical values and practices of freedom are direct
responses to that oppression. As Mark Blasius notes, "contemporary
gay men and lesbians live in a situation where, because of their sexual
and affectional attractions, they must create relationships and
networks of relation with each other against the void in which they
have historically and culturally found themselves." 284
281. FOUCAULT, The Ethics of the Concern for Self, supra note 5, at 287. For Foucault,
"technologies of the self... permit individuals to effect by their own means, or with the
help of others, a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts,
conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state
of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection or immortality." FOUCAULT, Technologies of the
Self, supra note 67, at 225 (emphasis added).
282. Foucault, for example, could have elaborated further in The Use of Pleasure on
the role that same-gender sexual intimacy played in the formation of strong bonds
between men in ancient Greece. Martha Nussbaum, after a comprehensive discussion of
homosexuality in classical Greek thought, concludes that the "Greek texts show, and show
repeatedly, that the passionate love of two people of the same sex may serve many
valuable social goals apart from procreation. The couple may communicate love,
friendship, and joy; they may advance shared political, intellectual, and artistic ends."
Nussbaum, supra note 117, at 1600 (emphasis added).
283. That ethic "involves... the creation of a way of life-understood as a primary
means of creating one's own self in and through one's relations with others." BLASIUS,
supra note 274, at 192; see also THOMAS DUMM, MICHEL FOUCAULT AND THE POLITICS
OF FREEDOM 153 (1996) ("The cultivation of ourselves is no exercise in narcissism but
involves a deep engagement with others as we cultivate them and get them to recognize
our selves in response."); MCWHORTER, supra note 20, at 197 ("[Glaring for one's self
would lead, often, to caring for others and for one's community and world.... [N]o one
engages in any sort of ethical practice-no one establishes routines, values, systems of
meaning-alone.").
284. BLASIUS, supra note 274, at 192. I have elaborated elsewhere on the role that gay
communities play in protecting the freedom and dignity of lesbians and gay men. See
Carlos A. Ball, Communitarianism and Gay Rights, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 443, 468-79
(2000).
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The creation of gay and lesbian relationships, families, and
communities results from lesbians and gay men reflecting on, and
working through, the meaning and purpose of their sexuality. The
bonds that build and cement gay and lesbian relationships, families,
and communities most often originate from a sexual attraction that is
different from the societal norm. That different and stigmatized
attraction leads lesbians and gay men to a myriad of connections and
associations that provide the support and affirmation that is denied by
the broader society. Gay and lesbian relationships, families, and
communities are the collective manifestations of a process of self-
definition and self-transformation in which lesbians and gay men
engage as they seek to build ethical lives based, in part, on sexual
intimacy. For lesbians and gay men, caring for others, defining and
transforming the self, and sexuality are all bound together. As
Blasius notes, "lesbians and gay men use their sexuality throughout
the course of life to create diverse relationships and to integrate
sexual freedom within relationships as a source of revitalization,
innovation, and self-invention." 5
While gay sex has led to the formation of new kinds of
relationships based on love and commitment, the principle of
mutuality in sexual relations can also be satisfied outside of an
affectional context. It is possible, for example, for mutuality to be
present even in an anonymous S/M sexual encounter. One of the
aspects of S/M that fascinated Foucault was the fluidity of its internal
power relations. The uninformed outsider may view an S/M
encounter simply as the sexual domination of one party over another.
But the power dynamics within an S/M sexual encounter can shift at
any time. As Foucault noted, "the S&M game is very interesting
because it is a strategic relation, but it is always fluid. Of course,
there are roles, but everybody knows very well that those roles can be
reversed. Sometimes the scene begins with the master and slave, and
at the end the slave has become the master." 6 The fluidity of power
in an S/M encounter embues it with mutuality, which is the polar
opposite of a rigid domination of one party over the other. In fact,
Blasius discusses the fluidity of power in gay and lesbian S/M as well
285. BLASIUS, supra note 274, at 109.
286. FOUCAULT, supra note 257, at 169.
287. Sadomasochism "is a game in which power differentials are subordinated to the
overall strategic purpose of producing human pleasure; it is not a form of domination in
which human beings are subordinated to the functioning of rigidly structured power
differentials." HALPERIN, supra note 20, at 87.
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as in so-called butchfemme lesbian relationships.' He notes that in
both situations, as well as in a more general gay and lesbian sexuality,
[t]here may be a top and a bottom, but "who" is "what" is
ambiguous and reversible in terms of power. It is not only
that people may switch roles .... Rather, to the extent that
people invent an erotic power game, it is understood as an
invention, and neither position is reinforced by social power
relations as it is in heterosexuality. 9
Sex that lacks mutuality is inconsistent with a gay and lesbian
sexual ethic because such sex cannot play a role in either the creation
of gay and lesbian relationships, families, and communities, or in
maintaining equality and a balance of power between sexual partners.
Mutuality is a crucial component of a gay and lesbian sexual ethic; it
explains the role of sex in both committed relationships and in sexual
encounters where there is no affectional commitment but there is
nonetheless a minimum of respect and concern for the other
individual as a distinct human being with his or her own needs,
expectations, and vulnerabilities.29° In fact, Finnis's conception of
sexual morality is limited precisely because it does not sufficiently
account for mutuality in sexually intimate relationships.291 For Finnis,
no amount of mutuality can mitigate the intrinsic immorality of some
sexual acts. So, for example, the respect and concern that two gay
288. See BLASIUS, supra note 274, at 86-91. In a butch/femme relationship:
[t]he gender-rejecting butch is rewarded for her courage by the admiration of the
femme. Indeed, it is often the femme who takes care of the butch who has been
battered by the world's abuse of her "gender dysfunction." This taking care
occurs through a sexuality that, because the femme has created it herself to give
pleasure to another woman rather that to satisfy the demands of a man, is truly
her creation... through her femme sexuality. This reciprocity has been
emblematized by Joan Nestle in the single word "butch-femme."
Id. at 88-89 (citing THE PERSISTENT DESIRE: A FEMME-BUTCH READER 267 (Joan
Nestle ed., 1992)).
289. BLASIUS, supra note 274, at 91.
290. If such minimum respect and concern for the other person is missing, then the sex
will be inconsistent with a gay and lesbian sexual ethic. See J. Michael Clark,
Phenomenology & Prophesy, Victimization & Transformation: Further Notes on Gay
Ethics, 4 J. MEN STDS. 263, 264-67 (1996) (noting that if gay men engage in sex where
"neither partner.., is 'really interested in the historical density of the other as [a] full
individual,'" such sex does not "help foster mutuality in-relation or diversity in-
community.") (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
Mutuality in matters of sexuality is not, of course, an exclusive norm of the gay
and lesbian community. As I explain below, however, mutuality plays a unique role in the
development of a gay and lesbian sexual ethic because of the way in which homosexuality
is problematized in our society. See infra notes 311-13 and accompanying text.
291. See supra notes 226-42 and accompanying text (explaining how Finnis's
conception of sexual morality creates a normative hierarchy based on the nature of
different kinds of sexual acts).
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men may have for each other as they engage in sexual acts (whether
or not in a committed relationship) is morally irrelevant to Finnis
because they are engaging in the wrong kinds of sexual acts 92 This
view places Finnis in the morally indefensible position of having to
argue that which bodily orifice is penetrated, and by whom, has a
greater normative significance than the mutuality that may exist
between the parties. A gay and lesbian sexual ethic, on the other
hand, values mutuality because it assists lesbians and gay men in
constructing affectional relationships, loving families, and enriching
communities around a form of sexuality that a large segment of the
society deems to be immoral and perverse. Without mutuality in
sexual intimacy, lesbians and gay men could not create and maintain
those collective entities; it is mutuality, through the trust and
confidence in others that it provides, which makes up for the lack of
pre-determined structures (afforded by law, biology, and gender
roles) that are characteristic of heterosexual relationships and
families. In addition, mutuality plays a crucial role for those lesbians
and gay men who choose to engage in sex in the absence of
affectional commitment. The principle of mutuality allows for the
delinking of sex from commitment (for those who so choose) without
compromising a respect for the other person and without
incorporating into the sexual encounter society's pre-determined
power relations and hierarchies such as those that are part of
traditional gender roles.
c. Pleasure
The third important value that I take to be constitutive of a gay
and lesbian sexual ethic is pleasure. For Foucault, an emphasis on
sexual pleasure requires a corresponding deemphasis on sexual
desire. As he explains it, the Christian conception of sex is centered
around controlling lustful desires. 93 The psychiatric conception is
centered around understanding and categorizing sexual desire. 94 On
the other hand, Foucault was intrigued by the sexual ethic of the
ancient Greeks because they delinked sex from desire; neither the
subject nor the object of desire was of ethical interest to them.2 95
Instead, what mattered was sexual pleasure, and how the individual
came to it and incorporated it into his ethical life 96
292. See supra notes 226-42 and accompanying text.
293. See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
294. See supra Part I.A, notes 29-62 and accompanying text.
295. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 113-31 and accompanying text.
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The idea that sex should be governed by desire is so ingrained in
our consciousness that it is, at first glance, difficult to imagine sex
without desire. But that is precisely what Foucault asks us to
entertain: to take sex out of the sphere of desire and place it in the
sphere of pleasure. Foucault explains this idea as follows:
I am advancing this term [pleasure], because it seems to me
that it escapes the medical and naturalistic connotations
inherent in the notion of desire. That notion has been used
as a tool, as a grid of intelligibility, a calibration in terms of
normality: "Tell me what your desire is and I will tell you
who you are, whether you are normal or not, and then I can
validate or invalidate your desire ....
The term "pleasure" on the other hand is virgin territory,
unused, almost devoid of meaning. There is no "pathology"
of pleasure, no "abnormal" pleasure. It is an event "outside
the subject," or at the limit of the subject, taking place in
that something which is neither of the body nor of the soul,
which is neither inside nor outside-in short, a notion
neither assigned nor assignable.297
While desire, in other words, can be defined and manipulated by
scientific, medical, and religious discourses, pleasure is a "virgin
territory" that has largely escaped analysis and categorization.
2 8
While various disciplines and moral perspectives have sought to
distinguish between normal and abnormal sexual desires, little
attention has been paid to pleasure, which is usually dismissed as a
dangerous concept associated with self-satisfaction and self-
indulgence.2 99 As a result, pleasure is an appropriate focus for a gay
and lesbian sexual ethic that seeks to challenge traditional sexual
moralities and discourses grounded on the distinction between
normal and abnormal sexual desires. As Ladelle McWhorter notes,
297. HALPERIN, supra note 20, at 93-94, 215 n.165, 217 n.181 A slightly different
translation of the same interview can be found in DAVID MACEY, THE LIvEs OF MICHEL
FOUCAULT 365 (1993).
298. As Foucault notes, "[p]leasure is something which passes from one individual to
another; it is not secreted by identity. Pleasure has no passport, no identification papers."
HALPERIN, supra note 20, at 95 (quoting MACEY, supra note 297, at 364); see also
MCWHORTER, supra note 20, at 184 (noting that "attempts to quantify pleasure and
measure it, to capture it in terms of statistically manipulable developmental norms, have
not met with much success").
299. It is precisely because new natural law theorists view all same-gender sexual
intimacy as nothing more than the pursuit of pleasure that, in their estimation, makes such
intimacy morally suspect. See Finnis, supra note 1, at 1066-67; see also George & Bradley,
supra note 1, at 142 ("To be morally right a sexual act must involve more than a fair and
nonviolent pursuit of pleasure.").
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"Foucault advocates the use of pleasure and the expansion of our
capacities for pleasure as a means of resisting sexual normalization
and creating different lives for ourselves."3°
A gay and lesbian sexual ethic embraces and celebrates sexual
pleasure. In order to do so, it must constantly work to counteract the
idea that it is pleasure that makes sex morally suspect.301 For a gay
and lesbian sexual ethic, pleasure is a normative good; it is the
pleasure of sex that leads individuals to use sex and sexuality in the
construction of an ethical life. As Michael Warner notes, "[p]leasures
once imaginable only with disgust, if at all, become the material out of
which individuals and groups elaborate themselves.' '31 When we
evaluate sex from the perspective of pleasure, rather than desire, we
shift the focus away from codes of conduct that seek to distinguish
between moral and immoral sexual desires and towards the ways in
which individuals use sexual pleasures to transform themselves.
For Foucault, pleasure is both creative and transformative.
Sado-masochistic sex, for example, is intriguing for Foucault because
he sees it as expanding the possibilities of pleasure. While an outsider
might view S/M as painful and violent, such a view, according to
Foucault, "is stupid.""3 3  Instead, S/M is about "inventing new
possibilities of pleasure with strange [or different] parts of the[]
body-through the erotization [of nongenital parts] of the body.
'3 4
Sadomasochism, Foucault concludes, is "the real creation of new
possibilities of pleasure, which people had no idea about
previously.
30 5
Gay and lesbian sex, like S/M sex, explores the boundaries of
pleasure as a means of self-definition. In response to society's
stigmatization of same-gender intimacy, the lesbian or gay individual
300. MCWHORTER, supra note 20, at 177; see also Huijer, supra note 13, at 73-74
(noting that for Foucault, "ethics was not a solemn matter, something we use in an effort
to keep evil under control. Ethics was ... a matter of pleasure, of taking risks, of danger
and the intensity of existence.") (citations omitted).
301. As Gayle Rubin has noted, in our culture "[s]ex is presumed guilty until proven
innocent. .. . [T]he exercise of erotic capacity, intelligence, curiosity, or creativity all
require pretexts that are unnecessary for other pleasures, such as the enjoyment of food,
fiction, or astronomy." Rubin, supra note 218, at 278.
302. MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS, AND THE
ETHICS OF QUEER LIFE 12 (1999) (emphasis added). As Gayle Rubin has noted, "[m]ost
people find it difficult to grasp that whatever they like to do sexually will be thoroughly
repulsive to someone else, and that whatever repels them sexually will be the most
treasured delight of someone, somewhere." Rubin, supra note 218, at 283.
303. FOUCAULT, supra note 257, at 165.
304. Id.
305. Id.
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asks herself or himself the following: how do I use sexual pleasure to
simultaneously constitute and transform myself.? It is the seeking of
this sexual pleasure that makes me a "homosexual," and yet it is
through this pleasure that I can work on myself as an ethical person. It
is through a reflective posture vis-a-vis the pleasure of sex that I can
escape the normalizing and stigmatizing efforts by society to link my
sexual conduct to supposed abnormal sexual desires.
An emphasis on pleasure, of course, makes lesbians and gay men
vulnerable to accusations of hedonism and moral relativism. Such
accusations are best addressed by emphasizing that pleasure is only
one of the values of a gay and lesbian sexual ethic and that another
value-that of mutuality-places limits on the uses of pleasure.
Particular sexual pleasures in particular contexts violate what I take
to be an appropriate gay and lesbian sexual ethic if, in the seeking of
pleasure, the individual fails to respect the needs, expectations, and
vulnerabilities of the sexual partner .3 06 Furthermore, no one denies
that a life that is only concerned with pleasure is an empty and
unsatisfying one.307  But sexual pleasures that are part of the
cultivation of the self, that are aimed to better the self and create
links of mutuality and respect with others, ought to be seen as ethical
regardless of which bodily orifice is penetrated or the gender of the
penetrator. A gay and lesbian sexual ethic is not meant to justify any
and all sexual pleasures; rather, such an ethic "acknowledge[s] ...
that the imaginative and intelligent pursuit of pleasure requires a
certain amount of work (in the sense of exertion) and that it does a
certain amount of work (in the sense of transformation).
308
The key ethical precept, then, is not to be passive vis-a-vis sexual
pleasure. Like the ancient Greeks, the key is to work with pleasure in
order to transform oneself.309 The result of this transformation for
contemporary lesbians and gay men will, of course, be different from
the transformation of the privileged males in ancient Greece. These
differences, however, are consistent with Foucault's views since, as
already mentioned, he did not want us simply to embrace the sexual
ethics of antiquity.31° Instead, he wanted sexual ethics to focus on the
need to transform the self rather than on universal codes of conduct
306. See supra Part II.C.2.b, notes 261-92 and accompanying text.
307. This is a point that Robert Nozick makes when he hypothesizes about the lack of
appeal in plugging into a machine that would "give you any experience you desired." See
ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 42 (1974).
308. HALPERIN, supra note 20, at 107.
309. See supra notes 104-31 and accompanying text.
310. See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
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that seek to distinguish moral sexual acts from immoral ones. For the
contemporary lesbian or gay man, the transformation that can be
achieved through the values of openness, mutuality, and pleasure is a
transformation from an individual who is marginalized and
stigmatized to one who, through reflection and self-definition, leads
an ethical life characterized by dignity and self-respect.
3. Some Implications of a Gay and Lesbian Sexual Ethic
Many heterosexuals, of course, also emphasize openness,
mutuality, and pleasure in their sexual relations; lesbians and gay men
obviously do not have a monopoly on these values. It is therefore
possible to articulate and defend a progressive sexual morality that
applies to everyone regardless of sexual orientation. Gayle Rubin, in
her influential essay on human sexuality, explains such a morality in
this way: "A [sexual] morality should judge sexual acts by the way
partners treat one another, the level of mutual consideration, the
presence or absence of coercion, and the quantity and quality of the
pleasures they provide.""31 What is different for lesbians and gay men
is that, unlike heterosexuals, society defines them morally as human
beings, not just as sexual human beings, through their sexuality. As
the philosopher Ladelle McWhorter notes of her unsuccessful efforts
to overcome society's definition of her based on her sexual identity:
Very quickly... I was made to understand that society
would not allow me not to be a sexual subject and that if I
persisted in engaging in homosexual acts I would have to be
a homosexual subject and be outcast and ridiculed as such.
What kind of moral subject I might be was exhaustively
defined by my homosexuality; nothing I might do would
mitigate society's moral condemnation of me. My sexuality,
not my morality, determined who I truly was.
311
The gay or lesbian individual uses his or her sexuality to
construct and fashion an ethical life through a process that does not
replicate itself for heterosexuals because their sexuality is already
ethically privileged. While heterosexuals can, of course, lead sexually
ethical lives, they do not construct for themselves an ethical sexual
life in the face of societal norms that equate their very sexuality with
abnormality, perversity, and immorality.
The relationship that heterosexuals have with their sexuality is
not unlike the relationship that white Americans have with the color
311. Rubin, supra note 218, at 283.
312. MCWHORTER, supra note 20, at 101.
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of their skin. Many, if not most, white Americans cannot
comprehend the reactions and sensitivities that African Americans
have towards issues of race because black skin is problematized in
America in a very different way than is white skin. W.E.B. Du Bois
wrote famously about the double-consciousness that African
Americans experience as a "sense of always looking at one's self
through the eyes of others, of measuring one's soul by the tape of a
world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. ' 313 Black skin is
marginalized and oppressed, whereas white skin stands in a
relationship of supremacy vis-h-vis black skin. The same applies to
heterosexuality, which is defined and receives its many privileges
when juxtaposed to the supposed immorality and perversity of
homosexuality. Lesbians and gay men, on the other hand, are defined
and despised "through the eyes of others" as society sits in moral
judgment of them primarily through their sexuality.
There are in this regard interesting parallels between a gay and
lesbian sexual ethic and a feminist sexual ethic. While female
heterosexual sexuality has not been as despised as gay or lesbian
sexuality, it has had to cope with its own distinctive set of taboos
requiring circumspection and subservience to the desires of men.
There is a long-standing myth that men enjoy sex more than women,
and this belief has led to all kinds of misperceptions and stereotypes
about women's sexuality.314 Believing that women have less interest
in or use for sex helps reinforce cultural norms that sex is really about
satisfying the needs of men, and that the role of women, here as in so
many different areas of American life, is to serve men. One of the
goals of the early women's liberation movement was to address the
double standard that applied to women's sexuality.315 It is not
surprising, then, that there are commonalties between what I take to
be a contemporary gay and lesbian sexual ethic and the sexual ethic
of the early women's liberation movement. That movement pursued
313. W.E.B. DU BOIS, THE SOuLS OF BLACK FOLK 3 (Bantam Books 1989) (1903).
For a thoughtful analogy between racism and homophobia that discusses, among other
matters, Du Bois's concept of double consciousness, see DAVID A.J. RICHARDS,
IDENTITY AND THE CASE FOR GAY RIGHTS: RACE, GENDER, RELIGION AS
ANALOGIES 6-38 (1999).
314. See, e.g., PAUL R. ABRAMSON & STEVEN D. PINKERTON, WITH PLEASURE:
THOUGHTS ON THE NATURE OF HUMAN SEXUALITY 121-25 (1995).
315. See LYNNE SEGAL, STRAIGHT SEX: RETHINKING THE POLITICS OF PLEASURE,
at xi-xii (1994) ("The fight against sexual hypocrisy and for sexual openness and pleasure
provided much of [women's liberation] early inspiration, as women decided that pleasure
was as much a social and political as a personal matter."). Segal's book encourages
contemporary feminists to refocus on issues of sexual openness and pleasure.
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goals that included, inter alia, the need: (1) to discuss openly female
sexuality (including lesbianism); (2) to demand a minimum degree of
mutuality and respect between men and women in intimate
relationships; and (3) to promote awareness that women can also get
pleasure from sex.316  Given the problematization by society of
women's sexuality, the attempts by women to cope with their
marginalization and oppression, to lead lives of dignity and self-
respect, are imbued with an ethical content, a content that is simply
nonexistent (and largely incomprehensible) for heterosexual men.
The same is true for lesbians and gay men who must create ethical
lives, from within a society that views their sexuality as intrinsically
immoral, through reflection and self-transformation, and through the
promotion of values such as openness, mutuality, and pleasure.
As society moves towards greater tolerance and acceptance of
gay and lesbian relationships, however, an interesting question
emerges: what happens to the process of ethical self-definition and
self-transformation once gay sex is no longer viewed as morally
problematic? If society some day ceases to morally problematize
same-gender sexual intimacy, then the opportunity to engage in self-
transformative practices through that intimacy will be reduced. That
does not mean, however, that gay sex will become ethically or morally
valueless, in the same way that contemporary society's failure to
problematize consensual heterosexual sexuality does not render it
valueless. If and when gay sex is no longer morally problematic in the
minds of a clear majority of Americans, that will mean that norms
such as openness, mutuality, and the value of sexual pleasure will be
more morally relevant to the sexual ethic of most Americans than the
nature of particular sexual acts or the gender of the parties involved.
A gay and lesbian sexual ethic, in other words, will be part of, or at
least be consistent with, largely accepted sexual norms.
There are some in the gay community who are afraid of the day
when gay sex might lose its transgressive meaning and outsider
status.317 For these individuals, lesbians and gay men must never
become part of the sexual mainstream of society because to do so will
be to give in to conservative, heterosexist values. I do not see it that
way. As I argue in Part III.B, I do not see much value in
transgression for the sake of transgression; the ultimate goal should
not be transgression-a morally empty concept that does not by itself
316. See, e.g., KATE MILLETT, SEXUAL POLITICS passim (1970); THE BOSTON
WOMEN'S HEALTH BOOK COLLECTIVE, OUR BODIES, OURSELVES passim (19713).
317. Michael Warner is an eloquent proponent of this view. I discuss Warner's ideas in
infra notes 407-16 and accompanying text.
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tell us what we should transgress against-but the reduction, and
eventual elimination, of oppression. If society some day ceases to
problematize gay and lesbian sexuality, then I think lesbians and gay
men should happily trade in their marginalization and stigmatization
for the opportunity to live open and dignified lives in a society that
values them as full and equal human beings. If society someday no
longer morally problematizes gay and lesbian sexuality, that will not
mean that society will have simply co-opted lesbians and gay men into
accepting its values. If problematization of same-gender intimacy
ends some day, those values will have been modified in order to
incorporate the relationships and sexuality of lesbians and gay men.
If, for example, same-sex marriage is one day recognized in the
United States, that will mean that the gender of spouses will become
irrelevant for purposes of marriage. This development will mean that
centuries-old ideas about gender roles and privileges within marriage
will be undermined and weakened. The radical, transformative
impact of such a change should not be underestimated. True
acceptance of gay and lesbian relationships and sexuality will require
a meaningful transformation of society's norms that should help allay
the concerns of some about co-optation of lesbians and gay men into
existing values.
While some on the left will be skeptical of the notion that a gay
and lesbian sexual ethic should (ever) be part of a mainstream sexual
ethic, some on the right will argue that the values of a gay and lesbian
sexual ethic as I have explained them here do not speak of the need
for restraint on matters of sex. A traditionalist will argue that a gay
and lesbian sexual ethic will allow individuals to do whatever they
want as long as they reflect on the meanings of their sexual acts and
use those acts to define and transform themselves. The traditionalist
will point out that a code of conduct, such as the one that is part of
traditional Christian sexual morality, places certain sexual acts out of
bounds. Not so a gay and lesbian sexual ethic.
There are at least two responses to this argument. First, as
explained above, the value of mutuality in sexual relationships-a
constitutive element of a gay and lesbian sexual ethic-acts as a
restraint on sexual conduct. 18 A gay and lesbian sexual ethic
demands that the needs, concerns, expectations, and vulnerabilities of
sexual partners be respected because it is through that mutuality that
gay relationships, families, and communities are formed and
maintained. In addition, it is that mutuality which protects and
318. See supra Part II.B, notes 220-48 and accompanying text.
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promotes equality and a balance of power in gay and lesbian sexual
encounters that take place outside of an affectional context.
Second, there are other moral and ethical norms (that are not
explicitly about sex) that are always applicable to sexual relationships
and encounters. The duty not to cause pain or suffering, the duty not
to deceive or mislead, the duty to treat others as ends rather than
merely as means for the attainment of our own ends, to name just
three, are moral obligations that apply whenever humans interact,
including interactions that have a sexual component. The
traditionalists, however, want to go beyond those kinds of generalized
moral restraints by automatically placing certain sexual acts outside
of acceptable moral bounds. 319  It is precisely the efforts by
traditionalists to mandate sexual restraint through a code of conduct
that is based on the gender of the parties involved and on the
particular bodily orifices that are penetrated that have caused
unacceptable suffering and oppression. What a gay and lesbian
sexual ethic questions most fundamentally is the traditionalist idea
that there is intrinsic moral (un)worthiness associated with particular
sexual acts.
A traditionalist might also take issue with the fact that I have not
included monogamy as a value in my conception of a gay and lesbian
sexual ethic. I have not done so because I have tried to focus on
those values that a broad spectrum of lesbians and gay men-defined
at both ends of the spectrum by what I, following Seidman, refer to
above as the libertarian and romantic camps in the gay community-
can embrace.320 As with heterosexuals, there are many lesbians and
gay men who practice monogamy, while there are others who do not
prioritize exclusivity in their sexual lives. In fact, there are many
homosexuals, especially gay men, who do not believe that monogamy
is an essential characteristic of conmmitment in a sexually intimate
relationship.21 It seems to me that whatever harms might arise from
319. See supra notes 226-42 and accompanying text.
320. See supra notes 261-64 and accompanying text.
321. The results of studies published almost twenty years ago (and conducted several
years earlier) showed that only a minority of gay men (though not of lesbians) were
sexually exclusive in their relationships. See PHILIP BLUMSTEIN & PEPPER SCHWARTZ,
AMERICAN COUPLES 271-72 (1983); DAVID P. MCWHIRTER & ANDREW M. MATrISON,
THE MALE COUPLE: How RELATIONSHIPS DEVELOP 252-59 (1984). It is likely that as a
result of the AIDS epidemic and the greater acceptance of homosexuality by society, the
number of gay men for whom sexual exclusivity in committed relationships is important
has since then increased. See SIGNORILE, supra note 263, at 208-65 (noting the trend in
gay male relationships towards greater sexual exclusivity, especially outside of large urban
centers). In fact, in a recent study of ninety gay and lesbian couples, Gretchen Steirs
found that "92 percent of the lesbians and 81 percent of the gay men stated they had either
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some instances of nonmonogamy, they can be avoided through two
ways already noted: first, by requiring mutuality in all sexual
encounters, both inside and outside of affectional contexts; and
second, by applying the more universal norms that go beyond matters
of sexuality and apply whenever human beings interact and which
proscribe deception and the causing of pain and suffering to others.
Thus, sexual non-exclusivity when there is consent and agreement by
all of the potentially affected parties does not violate a gay and
lesbian sexual ethic.
322
In any event, despite the inevitable skepticism that will be
expressed by traditionalists about a gay and lesbian sexual ethic, it is
clear that Foucault's conception of ethics requires an active
participation by the individual in the formation of an ethical sexual
life. This raises the intriguing question of whether a capacity for
autonomy is a constitutive element of such a life. I next turn to the
role of autonomy in the formation of a gay and lesbian sexual ethic.
III. THE ROLE OF AUTONOMY IN A GAY AND LESBIAN
SEXUAL ETHIC
As discussed above, many scholars who write about
homosexuality abide by an antiessentialist view of sexual
orientation.323 Foucault's highly influential The History of Sexuality,
Volume I, provides powerful support for the idea that sexual
orientation categories are the effects of societal discourses and power
relations.3 4 Prior to writing Volumes II and III, it was also quite clear
that Foucault was not only an antiessentialist on issues of sexuality,
but was also a committed philosophical antifoundationalist who
agreed to be monogamous or assumed the relationship was monogamous." GRETCHEN
A. STEIRS, FROM THIS DAY FORWARD: COMMITMENT, MARRIAGE, AND FAMILY IN
LESBIAN AND GAY RELATIONSHIPS 53 (1999). Interestingly enough, the study found that
while the clear majority of the couples interviewed thought that their relationships were
meant to be monogamous, only thirty-two percent of the lesbians and ten percent of the
gay men discussed "the importance of monogamy as part of their commitment to their
partners." Id. at 52. This raises the intriguing possibility that monogamy may be honored
more in practice than in theory in at least some gay and lesbian relationships (arguably the
exact opposite than in some heterosexual married relationships).
322. Andrew Yip has documented the way in which some gay male couples set "ground
rules" for sexual activity outside of the relationship so that such activity is done with the
consent and agreement of both partners. See Andrew K.T. Yip, Gay Male Christian
Couples and Sexual Exclusivity, 31 SOC. 289, 296-98 (1997). Yip concludes that what is
important to many of the couples he studied was emotional fidelity and commitment
rather than sexual exclusivity. See id. at 303.
323. See supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
324. See supra notes 29-47 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 80
SEXUAL ETHICS AND POSTMODERNISM
rejected objective or universal conceptions of truth.32  Although
Volumes II and III by no means turned Foucault into a Kantian
liberal, it is nonetheless intriguing that Foucault in those two books
for the first time wrote extensively about practices of freedom. In my
estimation, Volumes II and III allow us to consider whether it is
possible to delink antiessentialism on issues of sexuality from
antifoundationalism on issues of moral and political philosophy.
I argue in Part III.A below that Foucault, in his later work, had a
conception of the self that allows for a discussion of a capacity for
autonomy as a universal good that is necessary for the development
of an alternative sexual ethic. Foucault's later work, in fact, leads us
to the conclusion that the difference between liberal autonomy and
postmodernist agency is not as marked as some queer theorists have
argued. I argue in Part III.B that there is also common ground
between queer theorists and liberals on the importance of individual
rights for lesbians and gay men. I will explain how the important
differences among academic supporters of gay rights positions are not
those between queer theorists and liberals, but are instead between
those who defend a negative conception of freedom and those who
defend a positive one.
A. Agency Versus Autonomy in Foucault's Late Writings
As with many of Foucault's philosophical ideas, his conception of
the self was complicated and not always consistent throughout his
career. As we saw in Part I, the earlier Foucault viewed the self as a
largely passive creature who is constituted by the effects of social
discourses, systems of knowledge, and power relations that are
beyond its control.326 In the earlier part of Foucault's career, then, it
was common for him to write sentences such as the following: "It is
one... of the prime effects of power that certain bodies, certain
gestures, certain discourses, certain desires, come to be identified and
constituted as individuals."327 As we also saw in Part I, however, the
later Foucault came to have a different conception of the self. The
325. See, e.g., MICHEL FOUCAULT, Truth & Power, in POWER/KNOWLEDGE, supra
note 150, at 109, 131 ("Each society has its regime of truth, its 'general politics' of truth:
that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true.").
326. See supra notes 38-47 and accompanying text.
327. FOUCAULT, Two Lectures, supra note 150, at 98; see also FOUCAULT, supra note
325, at 117 (arguing that "[o]ne has to dispense with the constituent subject, to get rid of
the subject itself, that's to say, to arrive at an analysis which can account for the
constitution of the subject within a historical framework"); Foucault, supra note 75, at 208
(noting that the objective of his work has "been to create a history of the different modes
by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects") (emphasis added).
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later Foucault by no means denied the importance of social
discourses, systems of knowledge, and power relations in the
formation of individual identities, and he never argued that it was
possible for individuals to step outside of them. But the self for the
later Foucault was no longer hopelessly passive; instead, the self in
the later works played an active role in its own constitution through
self-defining and self-transformative practices, including sexual
ones.32 The issue that I want to explore in this section of the Article
is whether the later Foucault, in allowing that the subject can play an
active role in constituting and defining itself, was speaking of a
capacity for autonomy that is in any way similar to the way in which
autonomy is viewed by some liberals. If the answer to that question is
yes, then I believe that Foucault's later writings can help us find some
common ground between liberal and postmodernist supporters of gay
rights.
Postmodernists are, as a rule, extremely skeptical of the concept
of autonomy. Ladelle McWhorter, for example, criticizes "liberal
theorists [for] their delusions of autonomy."'329 Judith Butler sees
autonomy as an illusion held by dominant groups such as men.331
Individual autonomy for these thinkers is a liberal ruse that views the
individual as being separate from and existing prior to society. For
postmodernists there is no such Archimedean point from which we
can apply (or celebrate) so-called neutral and universal values such as
autonomy.
331
Postmodernists, however, cannot completely give up on the idea
that the self has some control over its life because to do so would be
to give up all hope of a progressive political agenda. If the self is
indeed nothing more than a reflection of societal systems of power
and knowledge, there is little room for optimism that it can, in any
meaningful way, resist or undermine existing social relationships and
practices. A conception of the self that requires us to view it as being
nothing more than the effect of power and knowledge would lead to
despondency and hopelessness about the human condition. Thus,
postmodernists like to speak not of autonomy but of agency. The self
328. See supra notes 63-91 and accompanying text.
329. MCWHORTER, supra note 20, at xvi.
330. See BUTLER, supra note 20, at vii (noting that "[t]he radical dependency of the
masculine subject on the female 'Other' ... exposes his autonomy as illusory").
331. See Allan C. Hutchinson, Identity Crisis: The Politics of Interpretation, 26 NEW
ENG. L. REv. 1173, 1184-85 (1992) ("Rather than think of the individual subject as a
unitary and sovereign subject whose self-directed vocation is to bring the world to heel
through the exacting discipline of rational inquiry, postmodernism interrogates the whole
idea of autonomous subjectivity and abstract reason.").
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as an agent is not prior to society. Instead, it is defined and
constructed by society; within those parameters, however, there is
enough room to oppose and subvert existing power relations. As
Butler puts it, "[e]ven within the theories that maintain a highly
qualified or situated subject, the subject still encounters its
discursively constituted environment in an oppositional
epistemological frame. The culturally enmired subject negotiates its
constructions, even when those constructions are the very predicates
of its own identity." '332 Mark Bevir also makes it clear that in his view
there is an important distinction between autonomy and agency.
"Autonomous subjects," he argues, "would be able, at least in
principle, to have experiences, to reason, to adopt beliefs, and to act,
outside of all social contexts. ' 333 He contrasts such ultimately illusory
liberal subjects to
[a]gents [who] exist only in specific social contexts, but these
contexts never determine how they try to construct
themselves. Although agents necessarily exist within
regimes of power/knowledge, these regimes do not
determine the experiences they can have, the ways they can
exercise their reason, the beliefs they can adopt, or the
actions they can attempt to perform. Agents are creative
beings; it is just that their creativity occurs in a given social
context that influences it.
334
Clearly, the concept of an aesthetics of existence as a form of
ethical practice as envisioned by Foucault in The History of Sexuality,
Volumes II and III, requires at the very least the kind of agency that
332. BUTLER, supra note 20, at 143; see also id. at 145 (arguing that agency is located
within repetitive processes of gender regulation when those processes allow for new
possibilities "that contest the rigid codes of hierarchical binarisms"). For Butler, there is
no pre-discursive subject; both the subject and its agency are fully constituted by culture
and discourse. See id. Carl Stychin provides the following explanation of a postmodernist
conception of agency: agency emanates from "the necessarily incomplete delineation of
the boundaries of any discourse." CARL F. STYCHIN, LAw'S DESIRE: SEXUALITY AND
THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 21 (1995). This incompleteness "allows for intervention,
resistance, and subversion of the terms of the system. The active role of the agent,
through her creative intervention and resistance, ultimately contributes to the social
construction of identity." Id. at 22.
333. Bevir, supra note 94, at 67.
334. Id. Sarah Hoagland, writing more as a lesbian feminist than as a postmodernist,
calls autonomy a "thoroughly noxious concept" because it suggests separation,
independence, and self-sufficiency. See HOAGLAND, supra note 258, at 144. Rather than
autonomy, Hoagland prefers to speak of "autokoenony," which envisions individuals
making choices in a community of others who also make choices. See id. at 145. Hoagland
adds that it "is not a matter of us controlling our environment but rather of our acting
within it and being a part of it." Id.
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Bevir describes. Foucault's aesthetic of existence envisions the self as
participating in its own constitution and transformation as it
negotiates the construction of its identity.335 The issue is whether such
a view of agency is significantly different from the conception of
autonomy held by some liberals.
The definition of liberal autonomy that Bevir explicitly
provides,336  and that postmodernists such as Butler use as
counterpoints to their political philosophy, 337 is consistent with a
Kantian/Rawlsian conception of the self that views it as standing
apart from its social context. A Rawlsian subject enjoys two moral
powers: first, the capacity for a sense of justice, and second, the
ability to apply reason in order to develop and pursue a life plan .33
Rawls, however, is not interested in the way liberal subjects define or
transform themselves depending on how they are situated in
particular social contexts. For Rawls, "[i]t is not our aims that
primarily reveal our nature but rather the principles that we would
acknowledge to govern the background conditions under which these
aims are to be formed and the manner in which they are to be
pursued."339 For Rawls, then, principles of justice "reveal our nature"
and from those principles, "background conditions" (or social
contexts) are determined, which, in turn, define our political aims.3
335. See supra Parts II.B and II.C, notes 220-322 and accompanying text.
336. See supra note 333 and accompanying text.
337. Butler summarizes the liberal position as:
The prevailing assumption of the ontological integrity of the subject before the
law might be understood as the contemporary trace of the state of nature
hypothesis, that foundationalist fable constitutive of the juridical structures of
classical liberalism. The performative invocation of a nonhistorical "before"
becomes the foundational premise that guarantees a presocial ontology of
persons who freely consent to be governed and, thereby, constitute the
legitimacy of the social contract.
BUTLER, supra note 20, at 3.
338. See John Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 77 J. PHIL. 515, 525
(1980), reprinted in JOHN RAWLS, COLLECTED PAPERS 303,312 (Samuel R. Freeman ed.,
1999).
339. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 12 (1971).
340. As is well known, individuals in Rawls's original position, who choose the
foundational principles of justice behind a "veil of ignorance," are in a position that is
prior to what Rawls considers to be external contingencies to the self (such as race,
gender, age, and class). See id. "Rawls believes that one's life should be governed by
considered judgments which are 'independent of natural contingencies and accidental
circumstances,' and maintains that autonomous individuals should thus govern their lives
according to justice, which requires that people test their action against principles adopted
behind the 'veil of ignorance.'" THOMAS MAY, AUTONOMY, AUTHORITY AND MORAL
RESPONSIBILITY 45-46 (1998) (quoting Rawls, supra note 338, at 515).
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Similarly, for Kant, "self-governance [is] a necessary feature of
human beings, one not dependent on or created by society."3"
It is not necessary, however, to abide by a Kantian/Rawlsian view
that the self can be separated from its social context in order to
believe that the self has a capacity for autonomy. A believer in
autonomy "need not deny that the self is a cultural product, rather
than a divine or natural one."'' 4  There are liberal political
philosophers, in fact, who do incorporate the social situatedness of
subjects into their conceptions of liberalism and autonomy. One of
those philosophers is Stephen Macedo, who addresses the issue at
some length in his book The Liberal Virtues. 3
Macedo notes that a liberal conception of autonomy starts with
the proposition that "[a] crucial feature in the move from autarchy to
autonomy is the development of the capacity critically to assess and
even actively shape not simply one's actions, but one's character
itself, the source of our actions."3' The exercise of that autonomy,
however, takes place within particular social contexts and public
meanings. As Macedo notes (in a passage with which I believe the
later Foucault would have been in complete agreement):
We can control our own actions but not the public meanings
of our actions, for we act in a context largely given. We are
not -autonomous in the sense of "radically free" or able to
create the values that define the moral problems we face, or
to make words mean whatever we choose. Our freedom and
the autonomy we strive for are not the consequences of an
ability to extricate ourselves from this network of public
meanings. We are objects and not only agents of critical
interpretation?4
Macedo also recognizes that the identity of the self is not fixed,
but is instead contingent on dynamic forces that are both internal
(reflection and self-evaluation) and external (commitments,
attachments, social context, and language). "The desires, convictions,
341. J. B. Schneewind, The Use of Autonomy in Ethical Theory, in RECONSTRUCrING
INDIVIDUALISM: AUTONOMY, INDIVIDUALITY, AND THE SELF IN WESTERN THOUGHT
64, 69 (Thomas C. Heller et al. eds., 1986). "Kant thought that we might be able to
separate the metaphysical, transcendent self from the contingent self, such that the core
self can be brought to exist separately from its immersion in a particular culture, language,
or history." Lrrovrrz, supra note 22, at 11-12.
342. Schneewind, supra note 341, at 72.
343. See STEPHEN MACEDO, THE LIBERAL VIRTUES: CITIZENSHIP, VIRTUE AND
COMMUNITY IN LIBERAL CONSTITrrTIONALISM 203-53 (1990).
344. Id. at 216 (emphasis added).
345. Id. at 225.
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and even the identity of the autonomous liberal subject are never
fixed or closed: they are to some degree malleable and open to
revisions in response to the broad vista of human experience."' 6
"Liberal autonomy engages our understanding and responsibility at a
deep level by engaging the capacity critically to reflect upon morality
and personal identity, itself already constituted by projects, plans,
commitments and strong evaluations."347
Macedo in The Liberal Virtues is responding to the
communitarian critique of liberalism and not explicitly to
postmodernism 4s But the communitarian critique of the atomistic
individual, separated from communities and social attachments, is
similar to the postmodernist critique of the liberal conception of the
self. Macedo is one of several liberal political philosophers who have
taken the communitarian critique of liberalism seriously and who
have, in response, presented restructured understandings of
liberalism.349
Feminists have also criticized a conception of the self that gives a
descriptive emphasis and a normative priority to the separateness of
individuals. Feminists, therefore, have generally been skeptical of a
conception of autonomy that equates it with individualism and the
right to be left alone ° Many feminists instead emphasize the role
that ties, relationships, and an ethic of care play in the construction of
identities and the attainment of well-being of all individuals, and in
particular of women .3 5  A conception of the self that views it as
346. Id. at 223; see also id. at 226 ("Our very identity may be open to revision, but we
are not simply adrift... because autonomous persons are not passive but active centers of
self-direction, always constituted by a range of commitments, attachments, and
allegiances.").
347. Id. at 220; see also id. at 216 ("Strong evaluation allows us ... to situate autonomy
in a social context by emphasizing the roles played by language and articulation in the
process of deliberation.").
348. See id. at 2-3. On the communitarian critique of liberalism, see, for example, THE
COMMUNITARIAN CHALLENGE TO LIBERALISM (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 1996);
THE LIBERALISM-COMMUNITARIANISM DEBATE (C.F. Delaney ed., 1994); STEPHEN
MULHALL & ADAM SwIFr, LIBERALS & COMMUNITARIANS (2d ed. 1996).
349. Other liberals who have sought to present modified forms of liberalism that are
aimed, in part, to respond to communitarians include WILLIAM GALSTON, LIBERAL
PURPOSES (1991); WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY AND CULTURE (1989);
JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986).
350. For a helpful summary of different kinds of feminist critiques of autonomy, see
Catriona MacKenzie and Natalie Stoljar, Introduction: Autonomy Refigured, in
RELATIONAL AUTONOMY: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON AUTONOMY, AGENCY, AND
THE SOCIAL SELF 3, 5-12 (Catriona MacKenzie and Natalie Stoljar eds., 2000)
[hereinafter RELATIONAL AUTONOMY].
351. The two books that are usually credited with inspiring the articulation of a
feminist ethic concerned with relationships and caring for others are CAROL GILLIGAN,
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largely defined through social attachments, relationships, and
commitments, however, has not prevented liberal feminists from
recognizing and valuing a capacity for autonomy.352 As Catriona
MacKenzie and Natalie Stoljar put it, "[w]e can accept that social
relations influence and perhaps constitute agents' senses of
themselves and their capacities, without concluding that capacities
such as autonomy are nonexistent. '35 3  That capacity plays an
important role in the ability of women to give shape to their lives and
to define who they are rather than accepting definitions provided by a
male-dominated society.
35 4
The conception of autonomy held by restructured forms of
liberalism closes the gap between liberalism and the later Foucault.
While Foucault obviously never spoke of an autonomous subject that
can define itself independently of social power relations-and while
liberal philosophers such as Macedo are more optimistic than
Foucault ever was about the moral guidance that reason and
principles of justice can provide to individuals355-- the later Foucault's
belief in a capacity for agency is not significantly different from
Macedo's and liberal feminists' belief in a capacity for autonomy. In
fact, Bevir, in discussing Foucault's distinction between morality and
ethics,356 notes that,
[m]orality, in any sphere, represents a set of imposed rules
to follow, which is not truly to exercise one's agency, not to
be free, but only to regulate oneself. Agency and freedom
really appear only when we question moral rules by
interpreting them creatively in an ethics, although equally
we can develop an ethics only because we possess a capacity
IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982) and NEL NODDINGS, CARING: A FEMININE APPROACH
TO ETHICS AND MORAL EDUCATION (1984).
352. See Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts, and
Possibilities, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 7, 7-13 (1989); see also SEYLA BENHABIB,
SITUATING THE SELF: GENDER, COMMUNITY AND POSTMODERNISM IN
CONTEMPORARY ETHICS 214 (1992) (arguing that "It]he situated and gendered subject is
heteronomously determined but still strives toward autonomy"); Marilyn Friedman,
Autonomy, Social Disruption, and Women, in RELATIONAL AUTONOMY, supra note 350,
at 35, 40 ("The fact that mistaken conceptions of autonomy are male-biased.., does not
show that autonomy properly understood is male-biased or antifemale.").
353. MacKenzie and Stoljar, supra note 350, at 8. As the liberal feminist Linda
McClain notes, "a liberal conception of autonomy does not require a model of the self as
immune from the process of social construction." Linda C. McClain, Toleration,
Autonomy, and Governmental Promotion of Good Lives: Beyond "Empty Toleration" to
Toleration as Respect, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 19,128 (1998).
354. See Nedelsky, supra note 352, at 8-9.
355. See MACEDO, supra note 343, at 226.
356. See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
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for agency and freedom. We are agents, but we exercise our
agency properly only when we resist the pressures of
normalization by challenging a morality through our
personal, ethical conduct.
3 7
If we substitute the word "agency" with "autonomy" in this
passage, there is nothing with which a liberal such as Macedo would
disagree. While trying to distinguish Foucauldian agency from liberal
autonomy, Bevir acknowledges that for the former to exist, social
structures must allow for a "space... where individuals [can] decide
what beliefs to hold and what actions to perform. 358 It is difficult to
imagine a more traditional bedrock principle of liberalism than the
need to create the necessary space for individuals to be able to choose
their own beliefs and actions.
David Halperin typifies the postmodernist queer theorist who, in
putting forth an eloquent defense of an antiessentialist conception of
sexual orientation,359 bundles that defense with a rejection of a liberal
conception of freedom. 60 As such, Halperin sides with the earlier
Foucault's conception of the subject when he notes that it "is not an
identity or a substance" (i.e., there is nothing to the subject that
stands apart from the effects of social constructions). 361 And yet,
practically in the same breath, Halperin adds a crucial qualifier:
"Nonetheless, insofar as the subject is an ethical subject, a subject of
ethical practices, it is to that extent a free subject, for that is what it
means, definitionally, to be an ethical subject. ' 36 Halperin adds that
"[t]he kind of power that Foucault is interested in,... far from
enslaving its objects, constructs them as subjective agents and
preserves them in their autonomy, so as to invest them all the more
completely. '363 It seems to me, however, that one cannot have it both
ways: either there is nothing to the self that is independent of the
effects of power and discourse or the self, even from within a regime
of power and discourse, has the capacity to exercise personal
autonomy, at least as conceived by a restructured liberalism as
articulated by Macedo. If the latter proposition is correct, then the
sharp contrast that postmodernist queer theorists seek to draw
357. Bevir, supra note 94, at 76.
358. Id. at 68.
359. See HALPERIN, supra note 20, at 38-48.
360. See id. at 123.
361. Id. at 212 n.137.
362. Id.
363. Id. at 18; see also id. at 74 (noting that Foucault has hope for a gay life style that is
"rigorous, austere, and transformative ... of the self which produces concrete possibilities
for the development of personal autonomy") (emphasis added).
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between themselves and (a restructured) liberalism is not as great as
they would like us to believe.3 6
The postmodernist philosopher Ladelle McWhorter, in writing
about issues of sexuality, also rejects a conception of the self that is
independent of power relations and discourses. For McWhorter,
there is no constitutive part of the self that is not an effect of power.
315
When we scratch at the surface and try to strip away our sexual
identity, for example, there is nothing below that particular layer that
is not itself constituted by societal forces. For McWhorter, the sexual
self as well as the knowing self are socially constructed. Social
construction, in other words, goes all the way down; there is for her
"no epistemic stopping point. '366 And yet, McWhorter grounds her
philosophy and politics on the ability of individuals to engage in
transformative practices, by which she means practices, chosen by
individuals, that lead to self-expansion and self-definition as a way of
attaining if not freedom, then at least some measure of meaningful
agency.3 67  She argues that there is no inconsistency between her
conception of the self and her faith in transformative practices
because, as she puts it, "I can exercise agency despite (and even
because of) the fact that my very existence as a subject is a form of
subjection." s  It seems to me, however, that McWhorter, like
Halperin, is trying to have it both ways. On the one hand, she follows
postmodern theory in arguing that nothing, including human beings,
364. Seyla Benhabib nicely captures the contradiction in postmodernist theory between
its conception of the self as completely determined by societal forces and its simultaneous
promotion of a set of values that she calls "hyper-universalist and superliberal":
What is baffling.., is the lightheartedness with which postmodernists simply
assume or even posit... hyper-universalist and suberliberal values of diversity,
heterogeneity, eccentricity and otherness. In doiig so they rely on the very
norms of autonomy of subjects and the rationality of democratic procedures
which they otherwise seem to so blithely dismiss. What concept of reason, which
vision of autonomy allows us to retain these values and the institutions within
which these values flourish and become ways of life? To this question
postmodernists have no answer.
BENHABIB, supra note 352, at 16; see also RAHMAN, supra note 20, at 134 (noting a
contradiction in queer theory "between an exclusive focus on discursive production of
subjectivity and the reflexivity of the subject which would allow for agency").
365. See MCWHORTER, supra note 20, at 34-61.
366. Id. at 50.
367. McWhorter gives a personal account of how the practices of gardening and
dancing, for example, have allowed her to expand her interests and experiences and have
therefore allowed her to expand her sense of self. See MCWHORTER, supra note 20, at
162-75.
368. Id. at 79. I discuss McWhorter's ideas in more detail in Carlos A. Ball,
Essentialism and Universalism in Gay Rights Philosophy: Liberalism Meets Queer Theory,
26 LAW & Soc. INOUIRY 271,274-85 (2001) (book review).
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is constituted independently of societal forces. And yet, at the same
time, she recognizes that we are capable of choosing among different
kinds of practices in order to transform ourselves. Whether we call
that capability agency or autonomy is less important than the fact that
it is a constitutive part of ourselves that is in some measure able to
stand apart from power and discourse in order to work on a self that
is ultimately a different one than would exist if it did not work to resist
societal forces through transformative practices. Again, I believe
such a view of the self is consistent with a liberal conception of a
capacity for autonomy.
In thinking about the role of self-transformative practices, or
what Foucault called practices of freedom,36 9 it is important to keep in
mind the distinction between self-definition and self-discovery.
Foucault very much rejects the latter because it suggests that there is
a true self that exists somehow prior to power relations and systems
of knowledge that is amenable to discovery.3 70 If we believe that self-
discovery is possible, then, power relations and systems of knowledge
can obstruct the discovery of the true self. For Foucault, however,
the practices of freedom have to be based not on self-discovery but on
self-definition, that is, on the working of the self by the self.37 1 But
not self-definition in a Kantian/Rawlsian sense whereby the
individual defines itself largely independently of its social ties and
encumbrances. Rather, the process of self-definition is a highly
contextualized one that takes place within, not outside of, societal
structures. The process of self-definition for Foucault was one of self-
transformation. That "[t]ransformation is ... not a distant flight away
from the conditions of our being but, instead, a metamorphosis, or
morphing, of the virtuality of our lives, building concretely upon the
experience of the present so as to realize our freedom as a
practice.""37
When we apply this theoretical framework to a gay and lesbian
sexuality, we see how lesbians and gay men develop a sexual ethic not
independently of societal norms, but very much from within them.
The ethic has to be developed from within those norms because it is
those norms that define the homosexual identity to begin with. But
369. See supra notes 65-91 and accompanying text.
370. See Peter Dews, The Return of the Subject in Late Foucault, 51 RADICAL PHIL. 37,
38 (1989) (noting that "Foucault's task, in his late work, will be to articulate the concepts
of subjectivity and freedom in such a way as to avoid any suggestion that such freedom
must take the form of the recovery of an authentic 'natural' self").
371. See FOUCAULT, On the Genealogy of Ethics, supra note 5, at 262-69.
372. DUMM, supra note 283, at 15.
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even as that identity is being determined by power relations and
systems of knowledge, the opportunity for resistance presents itself.
373
The socially-defined gay and lesbian subject seeks to transform itself
through practices of freedom. This transformative process requires a
self that has the capacity to participate in its own definition, that is, a
capacity for at least partial self-authorship or autonomy. It is true
that the self "is not a bare, vanishing, purely rational entity that
stands outside the world and judges it."374  In this sense, the
postmodernists are correct. Nonetheless, even if "the self is a
creature in and of the world, [it is also] one capable of at least
partially transforming herself through thought, criticism and self-
interpretation."3 75  This possibility of partial transformation for
Foucault entails the possibility of freedom, which, in turn, exists
wherever there is power because power (as opposed to domination)
requires freedom as a constitutive element.376 If power is everywhere,
then, so is the possibility of freedom. While postmodernists
emphasize the former when they discuss Foucault, they rarely
mention the latter. If you take away the capability of the subject to
exercise its autonomy, then you take away the possibility of freedom
and the possibility of engaging in ethical practices.377 Such scenarios
do, of course, exist when there is domination (i.e., the impossibility of
resistance). 378 But Foucault's discussion of sexuality was rarely about
domination; it was instead about power. And it is the omnipresence
of power that accounts for the omnipresence of the possibility of
freedom.
The capacity for autonomy, in my view, plays a foundationalist or
universal role in the development of an alternative sexual ethic. The
marginalized sexual subject, who works on the crafting of an
alternative sexual ethic through reflection and self-transformation,
must be given the opportunity to exercise its capacity for autonomy.
Without that opportunity, the development of a sexual ethic that
arises from a process of self-definition and that is different from and
373. See FOUCAULT, supra note 9, at 101-02.
374. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Two Senses of Autonomy, 46 STAN. L. REV. 875, 888
(1994).
375. Id. Seyla Benhabib similarly argues that even if we concede that subjectivity can
only be structured within narratives and culture, "we must still argue that we are not
merely extensions of our histories, that vis-a-vis our own stories we are in a position of
author and character at once." BENHABIB, supra note 352, at 214.
376. See supra notes 68-78 and accompanying text.
377. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text (discussing the connection that
Foucault makes between freedom and ethics).
378. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
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resistant to the societal norms relating to sexuality would be
impossible. The role that autonomy plays in that development is not
culture-specific. Instead, it is appropriate to speak of the capacity of
the sexual subject to exercise its autonomy as a form of universal
good.
It is important to understand what is and what is not universal
about this process. The need of individuals to exercise their capacity
for autonomy is universal. The ways in which sexuality is
problematized, which then leads some individuals (if they have the
opportunity) to approach their sexuality ethically in response to that
problematization, however, will vary across history and cultures. As
we have seen, the way in which the Greeks problematized same-
gender sexual conduct was very different from the contemporary
problematization of homosexuality.379  Similarly, the substantive
content of the sexual ethic that develops in response to the differing
forms of problematization will be different across history and
cultures. There is no such thing, then, as a universal sexual ethic.
It is clear that when Foucault alluded to a capacity for autonomy
in his later writings, he did not have in mind autonomous subjects that
are somehow separated from or independent of the society in which
they live. "Foucault saw the freedom that subjects have to work on
themselves not as an abstract freedom, but as dependent on the
resources they had at their disposal, both in terms of their own
capacities and the structures of society. ' 3 0  Autonomy does not
inhere in atomistic individuals; instead, the capacity for autonomy
must be cultivated internally (through a care of the self) and
promoted externally (through modes of power that encourage the
capacity and discourage submission and domination)
8 1
The later Foucault, then, allows us to build a bridge across the
seemingly irreconcilable differences between liberals and
postmodernists. Foucault's writings emphasize the postmodernist
379. See supra notes 117-32 and accompanying text.
380. Jeremy Moss, Introduction: The Later Foucault, in THE LATER FOUCAULT:
POLITICS AND PHILOSOPHY 1, 5 (Jeremy Moss ed., 1998) [hereinafter THE LATER
FOUCAULT].
381. Paul Patton explains this point as follows:
So long as human capacities do in fact include the power of individuals to act [on]
their own... we can see that Foucault's conception of human being[s] in terms of
power enables us to distinguish between those modes of exercise of power which
inhibit and those which allow the self-directed use and development of human
capacities.
Paul Patton, Foucault's Subject of Power, in THE LATER FOUCAULT, supra note 380, at
64,72.
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(and communitarian) idea that societal forces and relationships
largely determine the identity of the self. At the same time, however,
Foucault's conception of ethics recognizes a capacity for autonomy as
the self seeks to care for itself through self-constitutive and self-
transformative practices of freedom. The conception of ethics held
by the later Foucault, in other words, requires a self that is to some
degree capable of self-authorship. If even someone like Foucault,
who was of course no liberal, can acknowledge the importance of the
capacity for autonomy as individuals participate in the constitution of
their identity through practices of freedom, perhaps there is more to
the capacity for autonomy than postmodernists have been willing to
admit. On the other hand, Foucault's acknowledgment in his later
works that the omnipresence of power is not inconsistent with
freedom can allay the fears of liberals who believe that to pursue the
implications of Foucault's writings is to somehow give up on the idea
of human freedom.? 2 Again, as Foucault noted several months
before he died, "[t]he idea that power is a system of domination that
controls everything and leaves no room for freedom cannot be
attributed to me.
' 383
If liberals can lower their philosophical guards when approaching
Foucault's ideas, they may be more willing to explore the implications
of his trenchant observations about the role of power in society.
Liberals tend to view power only in its negative form, focusing largely
on the need to contain power in order to protect the individual;
Foucault emphasized power in its positive form, as a constitutive
element of all interactions and relationships among individuals, not as
a force that can be isolated 4.3  There is no need to fear the
omnipresence of power, then, as long as we understand that the
ability of power to constrain freedom is always accompanied by its
ability to provide for freedom 8 5 A conception of power that views it
382. See DUMM, supra note 283, at 5 ("From the perspective of most liberals, the bulk
of Foucault's work has participated in damaging the faith in liberal freedom necessary for
its continued sustenance as a value and its effective operation within institutions.").
383. See FOUCAULT, The Ethics of the Concern for Self, supra note 5, at 293.
384. As Foucault notes,
We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms:
it "excludes," it "represses," it "censors," it "abstracts," it "masks," it "conceals."
In fact, power produces; it produces reality, it produces domains of objects and
rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him
belong to this production.
FOUCAULT, supra note 40, at 194.
385. See supra note 68-78 and accompanying text; see also HALPERIN, supra note 20, at
17 (noting that power is not only about suppression and constraint, but "[p]ower is also
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only as a force from which we need protection is too limited because
power helps to constitute individuals. Power, in other words, plays a
crucial role in constructing the very individuals whose autonomy
liberals want to protect.
386
I do not want to suggest that Foucault completely reconciles the
hegemonic influences of power relations and systems of knowledge,
as emphasized in his earlier work, with the recognition that
individuals have a capacity for autonomy implied in his later work.
3 1
My point instead is that, at least in the context of sexuality, it is
possible to do some of the reconciling for Foucault if we separate the
social construction of sexual orientation categories from the
capability of individuals (once society places them in those
categories) to work on and transform themselves. That
transformation will never be so complete as to lead to a radically new
and free self that emerges from the socially constructed one. Instead,
a process can take place whereby the individual tries (sometimes
successfully and sometimes not) to create a modest separation
between a working on the self and societal moral codes. It is in the
space created by this modest separation that freedom for
marginalized sexual minorities resides. If what I am suggesting is in
fact possible, then the connection between antiessentialism on
matters of sexual orientation and antifoundationalism on matters of
positive and productive... [a]nd freedom.., is not freedom from power ... but a
potentiality internal to power, even an effect of power").
386. Dumm notes that under a traditional conception of freedom (which he calls
"utopian"), freedom is understood as:
[T]he removal of constraints on the activities of people, who would be able to
behave otherwise in the absence of repression.... But this vision of freedom has
never comprehended the constitutive powers that situate it. In understanding
freedom to be the opposite of repression, utopian thinkers misapprehend the
positive, constitutive character of power as it operates in shaping how we are
free.
DUMM, supra note 283, at 124.
387. Christopher Norris, for one, has argued that Foucault "left himself no room for
maneuver when it came to explaining how subjects could exercise a degree of ethical
autonomy or choice, a margin of freedom that would not be foreclosed by the pervasive
workings of power/knowledge." CHRISTOPHER NORRIS, THE TRUTH ABOUT
POSTMODERNISM 47 (1993); see also Dews, supra note 370, at 40 ("The obvious paradox
of a reflexive account of self-construction [i.e., an account about the relation of self to the
self] is that the self must already exist in order to construct itself."). But see
MCWHORTER, supra note 20, at 213 (arguing that "Foucault's claim that the subject is not
prior to and in control of all exercises of power is not the same as the claim that no subject
is ever prior to and in control of any exercise of power"); Neve Gordon, Foucault's
Subject: An Ontological Reading, 31 POLITY 395, 396 (1999) (arguing that the later
Foucault successfully "resituate[d] the subject, seeking a balance between agency and
structure, activity and passivity").
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moral and political philosophy is not as immutable as postmodernist
queer theory holds.
B. Queer Theory and Individual Rights
In the previous section, I argued that the conception of agency
held by queer theorists is not significantly different from that of
autonomy held by some liberals. As I explain below, there is also a
surprising common ground between queer theorists and liberals on
more practical matters such as the role of individual rights in
protecting lesbians and gay men from oppression and discrimination.
In fact, as I also explain below, the important divide in gay rights
academic circles on issues of individual rights is not between queer
theorists and liberals. Rather, the more relevant debate is between
those who defend a negative conception of freedom arguing that the
only obligation of the state is not to interfere with consensual acts and
relationships and those who defend a positive conception of freedom
believing that the state has proactive obligations to create the
necessary conditions for individuals to be able to exercise their
capacity for autonomy. The debate, then, is not so much whether the
promotion and protection of individual rights should be the principal
political and legal strategy of lesbians and gay men (and their
supporters), but is instead what kind of liberal political and legal
model should be promoted. I below provide a brief argument in
favor of a positive conception of freedom in the context of gay rights.
While postmodernist queer theorists are skeptical of liberal
theory, many of them remain, at the level of practice, focused on a
traditional liberal model of individual rights that seeks to protect the
freedom, autonomy, and equality of lesbians and gay men. s The
queer theorist Ladelle McWhorter, for example, relies heavily on
Foucault's writings to critique an essentialist conception of sexual
identity as well as foundationalist conceptions of truth and reason. 9
In the end, however, her political strategy is a liberal one, namely, to
work within the legislative and judicial systems to promote the civil
rights of lesbians and gay men.390  Similarly, Mark Blasius, while
388. An important exception is Judith Butler, who calls for performative transgressions
as alternatives to the traditional liberal focus on individual rights. See infra notes 402-06
and accompanying text.
389. See MCWHORTER, supra note 20, at 34-61.
390. See id. at 215-23; see also Francisco Valdes, Queer Margins, Queer Ethics: A Call
to Account for Race and Ethnicity in the Law, Theory, and Practice of "Sexual
Orientation," 48 HASTINGS. L.J. 1293, 1311 (1997) (noting that "nothing to date suggests
that present-day Queer activism and theorizing... is inclined to abandon [a] broad anti-
discrimination quest").
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defending a Foucauldian interpretation of politics, power, and ethics,
nonetheless calls for a recognition of relational rights through a
"recourse to the legal system."39' By relational rights, Blasius means
rights that would allow lesbians and gay men to aim for self-
determination in their relationships with others. 2 Furthermore, the
prominent queer theorist Michael Warner endorses a political
morality that is not very different from the liberalism of John Stuart
Mill. 393 Even those who are skeptical of relying on an individual
rights model because they view it as insufficiently radical and
transformative of cultural and social norms, recognize that individual
rights can play an important role in the struggle for freedom,
autonomy, and equality by lesbians and gay men.394 As Shane Phelan
notes, "[e]ven the most critical of queer theorists returns to rights
when needed. 395 Queer theory, then, has not been as skeptical of
individual rights as have other leftist academic movements such as
critical legal studies and (to a lesser extent) critical race theory.316
The continued reliance by many queer theorists on an individual
rights model may be more a matter of pragmatic necessity than
philosophical commitment, but such reliance supports the view that
liberal values such as freedom, autonomy, and equality remain a vital
part in protecting the interests and dignity of lesbians and gay men.
Of course, Foucault would not have agreed that individual rights
enforced through legal institutions and rules can play a particularly
helpful role in promoting the freedom and equality of lesbians and
gay men. Foucault did not see rights as providing protection for
individuals; instead, rights for Foucault were part of a liberal
discursive regime that uses the language of rights to mask power
relations and disciplines that are ultimately about submission and
391. BLASIUS, supra note 274, at 134.
392. See id. at 137.
393. See infra notes 407-12 and accompanying text.
394. See URVASHI VAID, VIRTUAL EQUALITY: THE MAINSTREAMING OF GAY AND
LESBIAN LIBERATION 178-80 (1995). But see VALERIE LEHR, QUEER FAMILY VALUES:
DEBUNKING THE MYTH OF THE NUCLEAR FAMILY 12 (1999) ("A rights-based approach
cannot challenge power as much as it can simply let a few privileged lesbians and gays gain
further entry to power.").
395. Shane Phelan, Queer Liberalism?, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 431,441 (2000).
396. These critics have viewed rights with suspicion, seeing them as reflecting current
power structures and norms and thus as insufficiently radical and subversive. See, e.g.,
DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION 299-338 (1997); Girardeau A.
Spann, Pure Politics, 88 MICH. L. REv. 1971, 2018-30 (1990); Mark Tushnet, An Essay on
Rights, 62 TEX. L. REv. 1363, 1364-71 (1984). Patricia Williams has criticized critical legal
scholars for underestimating the political utility of rights, a utility that can benefit
members of racial minorities. See PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND
RIGHTS 146-65 (1991).
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subjugation.3" For Foucault, a change in the law simply represents a
shift in a society's power relations and has no substantive effect on
possible freedom. But in the same way that Foucault underestimated
the role that the law plays in the formation of a gay and lesbian
identity,398 he also underestimated the role that the enforcement of
basic civil rights can play in helping to resist or at least partially
modify current power relations in order to make them less
oppressive. 99 We do not know, in fact, how Foucault would have fit
the recent enactment of comprehensive domestic partnership
legislation for lesbians and gay men (as well as for other unmarried
couples) in his native France or the recognition of same-sex marriage
by the Netherlands into his pessimistic assessment of the value of
individual rights.' One wonders whether a Foucault writing in the
first decade of the twenty-first century would have been more
optimistic about the ability of the law to ameliorate some of the worst
forms of societal discrimination and oppression against lesbians and
gay men. As noted above, even otherwise committed Foucauldians
such as McWhorter and Blasius support a political and legal strategy
based on liberal individual rights.401
Not all queer theorists abide by a political model of individual
rights. Judith Butler, for example, eschews the traditional civil rights
model in favor of transgressive practices aimed at undermining
397. "The system of right, the domain of law, are permanent agents of... relations of
domination, [of] polymorphous techniques of subjugation. Rights, should be viewed, I
believe, not in terms of a legitimacy to be established, but in terms of the methods of
subjugation that it instigates." Foucault, supra note 150, at 96. Although, as David
Halperin points out, Foucault did at times express support for gay rights positions, see
HALPERIN, supra note 20, at 80, it is fair to say that Foucault was skeptical of the growing
attention paid to the pursuit of individual rights. As Foucault put it, "if what we want to
do is create a new way of life, then the question of individual rights is not pertinent." Id.
398. See supra Part II.A, notes 148-219 and accompanying text.
399. As Douglas Litowitz notes, "a major problem with Foucault's understanding of
law... [is that] he focuses too closely on the genealogy of modem law and therefore fails
to appreciate the way in which the modem legal system (especially constitutional law) has
protected individuals against coercion." See LITOWITZ, supra note 22, at 84-85; see also
HUNT & WICKHAM, supra note 154, at 45 (noting that Foucault "makes an important
point when he insists that rights and freedoms are practices and no constitution or bill of
rights can strictly 'guarantee' them, but it does not follow that such provisions are mere
rhetorical flourishes"); Baxter, supra note 8, at 477-78 (arguing that "[ljaw, no less than
the discursive practices Foucault analyzed in detail, provides resources both for the
exercise of power and for resistance to power").
400. See Suzanne Daley, France Gives Legal Status to Unmarried Couples, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 14, 1999, at A3; Dutch Legislators Approve Full Marriage Rights for Gays, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 13,2000, at A4.
401. See supra notes 389-92 and accompanying text.
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socially constructed identities.402 Although Butler's work has been
highly influential inside the academy, it is not clear that her emphasis
on resistance to power through performative transgressions (such as
drag) translates into a coherent or viable political vision.403 The value
of transgression is that it allows for resistance of societal forces that
seek to oppress through normalizing pressures. In the context of
sexuality, to transgress against prescribed gender roles and
compulsory heterosexuality is to seek to undermine the claim that
everyone must abide by those norms. It is one of Foucault's great
many insights that he recognized that violence and domination are
not necessary for the exercise of power; modern systems of
knowledge and regulation (including those related to sexuality)
exercise immense amounts of power over their subjects through
modes of normalization.4" The problem with transgression, however,
as Foucault himself recognized, is that it has no positive content. 05 It
does not, in other words, provide us with arguments (either moral or
political) as to what we should transgress against. As Mark Bevir
notes, "we surely cannot accept that all behaviour contrary to existing
norms should be regarded as ethical. Yet once we evoke grounds for
distinguishing good and bad transgressions, then transgression itself is
unlikely to remain the cornerstone of our theory of freedom. ' '406
Michael Warner, another prominent queer theorist, has also
celebrated the value of transgression, though he, unlike Butler, does
so within a liberal model. Warner, in his recent book The Trouble
402. See BUTLER, supra note 20, at 124. In particular, Butler encourages performative
transgressions such as those contained in "the practices of drag, cross-dressing, and the
sexual stylization of butch/femme identities." Id. at 137.
403. On the political limitations of Butler's transgressive practices, see MAX H.
KIRSCH, QUEER THEORY AND SOCIAL CHANGE 8 (2000); MOMIN RAHMAN,
SEXUALITY AND DEMOCRACY: IDENTITIES AND STRATEGIES IN LESBIAN AND GAY
POLITICS 131-42 (2000).
404. See notes 29-47 and accompanying text.
405. See Michel Foucault, A Preface to Transgression, in MICHEL FOUCAULT,
AESTHETICS, METHOD, AND EPISTEMOLOGY 69, 74 (Robert Hurley et al. trans., James
D. Faubion ed., 1998).
406. Bevir, supra note 94, at 79. Martha Nussbaum notes that the emphasis that Butler
places on transgression or subversion, when coupled with her refusal to rely explicitly on
normative arguments, means that Butler assumes that her readers agree with her on what
needs to be subverted. See Martha Nussbaum, The Professor of Parody, NEv REPUBLIC,
Feb. 22,1999, at 37,42. "Subversion," Nussbaum adds, "takes many forms, not all of them
congenial to Butler and her allies." Id. In order to distinguish good subversion from bad
subversion, norms (such as "fairness, decency, and dignity") must be articulated-"and
this Butler refuses to do." Id at 43; see also Nancy Fraser, False Antitheses: A Response to
Seyla Benhabib & Judith Butler, in SEYLA BENHABIB ET AL. FEMINIST CONTENTIONS: A
PHILOSOPHICAL EXCHANGE 59, 68 (1995) (noting that "Butler seems to valorize change
for its own sake and thereby to disempower feminist judgment").
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with Normal. Sex, Politics, and the Ethics of Queer Life,40 7 seeks to
promote a radical and transgressive view of gay and lesbian sexuality
through what is in essence a codification of Mill's harm principle.40 8
As long as the conduct in question does not harm third parties, the
harm principle holds, the state has no business getting involved. 9
Under this view, the law can penalize those who engage in sexual acts
without the consent of the other, but would have to remain silent as
to all other sexual conduct, thus presumably leaving lesbians and gay
men the freedom to explore their sexuality to the fullest and to
transgress the boundaries of sexual and gender identities.410 Warner
is not troubled by the fact that the libertarian model does not by itself
require the recognition of same-sex marriage because such a
recognition is for him not a sufficiently transgressive or radical goal
for the gay and lesbian rights movement.4 u Warner would like
lesbians and gay men to give up on the goal of marriage so that they
can concentrate on the more transgressive and subversive
implications of a gay and lesbian sexual ethic.4 12 For Warner, then, a
407. WARNER, supra note 302. Warner is the editor of an important book on queer
theory. See FEAR OF A QUEER PLANET: QUEER POLITICS AND SOCIAL THEORY
(Michael Warner ed., 1993).
408. "[A]lthough th[e] book is the work of a leading queer activist and a defense of a
radical subculture, it is also a descendent of Mill's On Liberty, which similarly inveighed
against the tyranny of public opinion in the name of liberty and of 'experiments in
living.'" Martha Nussbaum, Experiments in Living, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 3, 2000, at 31,
32. Warner does not refer to Mill directly, though as Nussbaum observes, he "[i]n
effect ... advocates making Mill's 'harm principle' into a legal standard: if an activity does
no harm to non-consenting others, it should not be legitimate to regulate it by law." Id.
409. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 68-69 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., Penguin
Books 1982) (1859).
410. This approach appeals to someone like Warner who was one of the academic
founders of SexPanic!, a group formed in the early 1990s to counteract what its members
perceived to be anti-sex positions taken by New York City government officials (who
wanted to regulate sex establishments in the name of HIV prevention) and by some gay
commentators who were critical of what they perceived to be sexual promiscuity among
some in the gay community. See Crain, supra note 264, at 27.
411. For Warner, marriage, whether gay or straight, "sanctifies some couples at the
expense of others. It is selective legitimacy." WARNER, supra note 302, at 82.
412. Thus, Warner, for example, extols the virtues of sex for purposes other than
promoting committed relationships:
When gay men or lesbians cruise, when they develop a love of strangers, they
directly eroticize participation in the public world of their privacy. Contrary to
myth, what one relishes in loving strangers is not mere anonymity, nor
meaningless release. It is the pleasure of belonging to a sexual world, in which
one's sexuality finds an answering resonance not just in one another, but in a
world of others. Strangers have an ability to represent a world of others in a way
that one sustained intimacy cannot, although of course these are not exclusive
options in gay and lesbian culture.
Id. at 179.
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libertarian understanding of freedom that views freedom only as a
negative concept is sufficient.
The problem with Warner's view is that it ignores the needs and
priorities of a significant number of lesbians and gay men who are
interested in marriage (and parenting) and who consider that kind of
socially-recognized validation of their commitment important.413 For
those lesbians and gay men, the law has a positive role to play in
redefining institutions (such as marriage and parenting) from which
they have been excluded. A failure to recognize same-sex marriage,
or to provide protection to gay and lesbian parents, is not the kind of
traditional state coercion that a libertarian conception of freedom
proscribes. Rights under a positive conception of freedom, on the
other hand, not only protect individuals from state-sponsored
coercion, but also provide those individuals with a range of options
that are necessary for them to exercise their capacity for autonomy414
It is insufficient, under this view, to assert that the state must not
interfere in the lives of sexual minorities; principles of
noninterference do not impose positive obligations on the state to
create the social conditions necessary that make possible the full
exercise of our capacity for autonomy. Principles of noninterference
are undoubtedly useful in protecting the privacy of lesbians and gay
men and can be relied upon, for example, to question the
appropriateness of sodomy statutes and other criminal laws that
regulate consensual sexual conduct between adults. But for those
lesbians and gay men who want to exercise their capacity for
autonomy through marriage and parenting, principles of
noninterference, while certainly not irrelevant, are inadequate on
their own. At the same time, a positive conception of freedom
recognizes that the decision of whether to seek mutuality in matters
413. A 1994 poll of gay men found that almost two-thirds of them would marry another
man if they were legally able to do so. See Evan Wolfson, Crossing the Threshold: Equal
Marriage Rights for Lesbians and Gay Men and the Intra-Community Critique, 21 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 567, 583 (1994) (citing Janet Lever, Sexual Relations,
ADVOCATE, Aug. 1994, at 17, 24). A 1995 poll of lesbians found that seventy percent of
them would marry another woman if it were legal. See Craig W. Christensen, If Not
Marriage? On Securing Gay and Lesbian Family Values by a "Simulacrum of Marriage,"
66 FORDHAM L. REv. 1699, 1726 n.162 (1998) (citing Janet Lever, The 1998 Advocate
Survey of Sexuality and Relationships: The Women, ADVOCATE, Aug. 22, 1995, at 23,27.
414. I have elaborated on this point elsewhere, both in the context of gay rights, see
Ball, supra note 239, at 1920-30 (using the work of the legal philosopher Joseph Raz to
explain a positive conception of autonomy and its implications for gay rights), and in the
context of disability rights, see Carlos A. Ball, Autonomy, Justice, and Disability, 47 UCLA
L. REV. 549, 644-47 (2000) (explaining how autonomy for individuals with disabilities
requires both actions and omissions on the part of the state).
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of physical intimacy through marriage or through more transgressive
sexual practices is ultimately a decision for the individual to make.
The challenge, as discussed above, is to articulate a gay and lesbian
sexual ethic that accounts for both the libertarian and romanticist
views on sexuality that are held by the broad spectrum of lesbians and
gay men.
415
The tension between libertarians and romanticists in the gay
community spills over into debates over the advisability of seeking a
right to same-sex marriage because once the romanticists construct
relationships and families based on long-term mutuality and
commitment, it is understandable for them to seek the protection and
support of the law. Libertarians such as Warner then feel threatened
by efforts to privilege through law some relationships and not others.
I cannot here fully address the best way of resolving this intra-
community tension except to note that the pursuit of legal rights that
protect long-term relationships is not mutually exclusive of the idea
that individuals are the best judges of what kind of relationships are
most appropriate for their intimate lives.416
A libertarian such as Warner could argue that if what I posited in
Part I.C above is correct, namely, that lesbians and gay men must
seek to define and transform themselves through reflection on the
meaning of their sexual practices in order to lead ethical lives, then
why do they need social institutions such as marriage? The need to
turn inward, so to speak, is the result of societal judgments that deem
same-gender sexual intimacy as immoral and perverted, judgments
that oppress and marginalize lesbians and gay men and which leave
them no alternative but to seek ethical meaning outside of societal
codes of conduct. The finding of ethical meaning in this way is not an
intrinsic characteristic of homosexuality; rather, it is a reaction to
societal oppression. The ultimate goal has to be to reduce that
oppression, and providing lesbians and gay men with access to social
institutions such as marriage can contribute to that reduction. It is
true, as I noted in Part II.C.3, that if gay and lesbian sexuality and
relationships become largely accepted by society, there will be less of
a role for the kind of ethical practices associated with a care of the
self that I have argued characterize a contemporary gay and lesbian
sexual ethic. But, again, I believe that if society someday ceases to
problematize gay and lesbian sexuality, then lesbians and gay men
415. See supra notes 261-64 and accompanying text.
416. I elaborate on this point in chapter 3 of CARLOS A. BALL, THE MORALITY OF
GAY RIGHTS (forthcoming 2002).
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should happily trade in their marginalization and stigmatization for
the opportunity to lead open and dignified lives in a society that
values them as full and equal human beings.
CONCLUSION
I have argued in this Article that the later writings of Michel
Foucault allow us to think about the meaning and implications of a
contemporary gay and lesbian sexual ethic. That ethic, which
promotes values of openness, mutuality, and pleasure, provides an
important alternative to the traditional view of sexual morality that
seeks to create a normative hierarchy of consensual sexual acts. The
existence of a gay and lesbian sexual ethic has been made possible by
the partial decodification (legal, medical, and moral) of
homosexuality in contemporary America, in the same way that the
absence of codes of conduct in ancient Greece and Rome allowed for
the flourishing of a sexual ethic characterized by the care of the self as
practices of freedom.
I have also argued that the capacity for individual autonomy
plays a crucial role in the development of a gay and lesbian sexual
ethic as lesbians and gay men negotiate the construction of their
ethical lives. It is perhaps easy to despair about the possibility of
freedom if we view our entire world as nothing more than the effects
of power relations and systems of knowledge. Lesbians and gay men
have shown, however, that it is possible to lead lives that are both free
and ethical even in the face of powerful societal forces that
simultaneously define and marginalize their sexual identity.
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